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The projected threat environment in the year 2020 generates the need for a 
weapon system that has an enhanced capability in littoral scenarios as well as supporting 
major operations other than war (MOOTW) [Farrer, 2000].  The over arching objective 
of the CROSSBOW project is an attempt to assess the potential threat scenarios in the 
year 2020 (e.g., resultant proliferating weapon technologies, dynamic socio-economic 
conditions) and to propose the design for a weapon system that will ensure U.S. naval 
superiority is maintained.  
These scenarios dictate the need for a widely distributed, interconnected force for 
reduced attritional risk and increased tactical connectivity.  These scenarios also demand 
weapons that are fast, stealthy, force multipliers in power projection, complementary to 
the capabilities of Carrier Battle Groups, and jointly interoperable with various forces, 
domestic and international [Shelton, 2001].  Designed to operate primarily in littoral 
waters, these weapon systems will be required to operate independently in minor 
contingencies, in areas inaccessible to deep draft combatants.  
The CROSSBOW project examines these provisions within a conceptual weapon 
system.  The notional CROSSBOW force consists of eight surface combatant/aviation 
vessels (SEA ARCHER), twenty anti-ship/air escort vessels (SEA LANCE) and two 
logistics support vessels (SEA QUIVER).  Each SEA ARCHER will carry a 
complementing unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) squadron of eight SEA 
ARROWS.  These weapon systems will be specifically designed to work in concert with 
each other – creating synergy in their joint employment during a mission.   
The weapon systems are to leverage weapons technology projected to mature by 
2012 in order to realize an initial operational capability (IOC) of 2020.  The SEA 
LANCE design is the study of a previous Naval Postgraduate School Total Ship Systems 
Engineering effort and will not be discussed in this analysis [Naval Postgraduate School, 
2001].  The CROSSBOW study, as a whole, takes the SEA LANCE study further by 
 1
incorporating and integrating the SEA LANCE notional design characteristics and 
operational capabilities into the SEA ARCHER and SEA ARROW design characteristics.  
The specific design criteria of the SEA ARCHER and SEA ARROW are discussed in the 
Mission Need Statements (Appendices A and B).  The SEA QUIVER is a notional design 
and is discussed only in broad terms in Appendix A.   
Naval Expeditionary Logistics [Committee on Naval Expeditionary Logistics, 
1999a] further validates the need to study threat scenarios within the framework provided 
by the CROSSBOW project.  Navy tacticians have realized that future conflicts will 
involve small, semi self-sufficient combat units and ships that are expected to either 
resolve or contain a conflict until the arrival of reinforcements or a joint military 
operation is commenced.  These combat units must maintain battle readiness despite 
reduced manning, potential losses of forward supply points, and extended material  
pipelines.   
The often-neglected area of logistics and maintenance, cumulatively termed  
sustainment for this analysis, must evolve to accommodate these new and expanding 
circumstances.  Traditional approaches to sustainment will be ill fitted to the rapidly 
paced, highly focused requirements of future combat units.  During Operations Desert 
Storm and Desert Shield, theater commanders and logistics officers were routinely 
frustrated with the inability to quickly locate needed stock, track the status of requests, or 
track shipments within the theater [National Research Council, 1999].  Emphasis must be 
placed upon developing a robust maintenance system that is facilitated by an efficient 
logistics system - driven by a responsive information system, an intelligent transportation 
network, and a comprehensive data analysis capability.   
This thesis will explore these sustainment requirements within the context of the 
CROSSBOW weapon system.  The goal is to assess current misaligned sustainment 
processes – thus exposing areas for improvement translating into increased operational 
readiness.  The intended endgame of this analysis is the emphasis of making sustainment 
a fore thought, rather than an after thought, in the design of any weapon system.   
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 B. OBJECTIVE - STATEMENT OF TASKS   
This analysis will examine the potential of new technologies and concepts that 
reduce the size of the onboard sustainment structure while enhancing readiness of the 
CROSSBOW weapon system.  It will describe and recommend areas of research, 
methodologies, and technological development the Navy should invest in now to field 
systems that will enhance logistics and maintenance capabilities for a battle force in 
2020.  In the undertaking of this thesis, this analysis group will perform the following 
tasks: 
• Review the current Navy sustainment methodology and assess some of the 
prevalent problems experienced by Logisticians and Maintenance Officers 
(Chapter II).  
• Identify and evaluate areas of research, methodologies, and concepts that 
will reduce the need for current support infrastructures while increasing 
the operational readiness of a weapon system (Chapter II). 
• Develop a framework, integrating the selected research and 
methodologies, that will define the support and sustainment system for 
CROSSBOW (Chapter II).  
• Perform a Life Cycle Cost Analysis (LCCA) to assess the total ownership 
cost of the SEA ARROW and SEA QUIVER.  From this analysis, 
determine the cost drivers of the SEA ARROW and SEA QUIVER and 
discuss how efficiencies could be achieved through the CROSSBOW 
framework. (Chapter III). 
• Test the validity of the CROSSBOW framework using Arena, a 
computer modeling and simulation tool.  The analysis will compare 
models of current sustainment methodologies against models with 
incrementally increased logistics efficiencies (Chapter IV).   
• Discuss the potential benefits, of the framework, in relation to managing 
the current Aging Weapon Systems dilemma (Chapter V). 
• Discuss the need for transformation within Navy culture that currently 
hinders sustainment in the alignment of objectives with available 
resources (Chapter VI). 
• Develop a roadmap (Appendix C) that will list: 
• the specific technologies, research, and methodologies found 
suitable in meeting the objectives 
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• the industry and government leaders that are currently developing 
and advancing the technology 
• contact information to facilitate further study 
The reader should note the Roadmap (Appendix C) is not all inclusive of the 
technologies, research, and methodologies available, but serves as a starting point for 
further research.   
C. SCOPE  
Due to the conceptual nature of this study, an in-depth analysis of the elements 
involved in determining an exact sustainment support structure will not be accomplished. 
What is intended is a study to provide some insight into innovative maintenance and 
sustainment concepts that will enhance overall supportability of not just the CROSSBOW 
weapon system, but any weapon system.  
D. METHODOLOGY 
Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2 [Defense Acquisition Deskbook, 2001] 
establishes the methodology for ascertaining specific requirements from a mission need 
statement.  This methodology, referred to as the Requirements Generation System, is 
iterative in nature – producing information for decision-makers on specific requirements 
as defined within the mission needs statement. The user typically defines mission needs 
in broad operational terms and then evolves the needs into specific operational 
requirements.  A Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), or other appropriate 
requirements authority, validates and approves the mission needs - ascertaining that a 
non-material solution alone cannot satisfy the identified needs and recognizes that a 
potential new concept or system material solution should be considered.  These 
requirements are then assessed, normally through a systems architecture/engineering 
methodology, to produce a system or concept that fulfills the mission needs statement.   
In light of the iterative and comprehensively time-consuming nature inherent 
within the established Requirements Generation System, this standard DOD methodology 
is not feasible within the scope of this analysis.  Recognizing this constraint, the 
following alternate methodology will be used which consist of the following modified 
steps: 
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• Establish Precepts to regulate the guidelines and scope for the analysis to 
be performed within.  These Precepts establish that: 
• All research, methodologies, and concepts must fully support the 
requirements established within the Mission Need Statements 
• All research, methodologies, and concepts will enhance U.S. 
National Security Strategy and produce a tactical advantage 
through efficiency and speed for weapons systems repair and 
supportability 
• All research, methodologies, and concepts must create sustainment 
enablers which ensure: 
• Accurate assessment of weapon system’s operability and 
repair component requirements upon system degradation 
• Speed in determining degree of weapon system operability, 
in determining repair component requirements, in 
determining best delivery avenues for repair components, 
and in repair of the weapon system 
• Effectiveness in supporting and maintaining weapon 
system operability despite a dynamic battle space 
environment 
• An acceptable level of system risk when compared to 
capability, operability, and human factors designed into the 
system 
• All research, methodologies, and concepts should conform to Joint 
Multi-Tactical Digital Information Link (JM-TADIL) standards 
[Joint Multi-Tactical Digital Information Link, n.d.].  
Conformance to JM-TADIL standards will create a system that is 
universally compatible, flexible, dynamic, and an integrative 
system for all levels of:  
• Existing legacy logistics and maintenance systems 
• New logistics/maintenance systems 
• Existing tactical data links 
• All research, methodologies, and concepts must be as autonomous 
as possible, leveraging technology to support: 
• Reduced manning  
• Speed   
• Efficiency  
• Security 
• All research, methodologies, and concepts must support peace and 
wartime operations assuming limited to no forward basing 
[Committee on Naval Expeditionary Logistics, 1999b] 
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• Conduct a literature review of periodicals, theses, magazine articles, 
World Wide Web searches, and other library information for innovative 
techniques and ideas 
• Visit and conduct interviews with leading industry and government 
leaders to ascertain cutting edge techniques and methodologies in 
sustainment 
• Within the guidelines of the Precepts, identify sustainment technologies, 
methodologies, and concepts that fulfill the requirements established 
within the Mission Need Statements 
• Create a support and sustainment framework that integrates the 
technologies, methodologies, and concepts into a cohesive design 
• Develop a Life Cycle Cost Analysis (LCCA) for the SEA ARROW and 
SEA QUIVER platforms.  From this analysis, ascertain potential areas of 
cost efficiencies that could result from CROSSBOW technologies and 
methodologies. 
• Using the Arena simulation software, simulate the existing logistics and 
maintenance methodologies as well as the proposed CROSSBOW 
methodology. Compare and analyze the data produced from the 
simulations 
• Consolidating all literature review data, interview data, LCCA, and 
simulation data, propose recommendations on findings.  Compose a 
roadmap of the selected technologies, techniques, and methodologies for 
reference and further study 
• Discuss the potential benefits of the proposed CROSSBOW sustainment 
concepts with respect to the current aging weapon system issue 
• Discuss how Navy culture impairs attempts at improving the existing 
logistics and maintenance system, how the implementation of 
CROSSBOW sustainment concepts would be hampered by this culture – 
and the need for change 
• Summary of Analysis 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. THE CURRENT SUSTAINMENT ENVIRONMENT  
Each weapon system in the Navy is supported through the Naval Supply System 
by means of replaceable or repairable components.  Depots Level Repairables (DLR) are 
the components, or subassemblies, that can be replaced to make an unserviceable end 
item function properly.  DLRs are usually high cost items with relatively long 
procurement lead times.  These components are managed by Naval Supply Systems 
Command (NAVSUP) requiring intensive resources, manpower, and intellectual capital 
for determining proper levels of inventory, positioning of components, component repair 
requirements at repair depots, and efficient delivery systems to fleet activities.  
Coinciding with the supply system, the Navy employs three levels of maintenance 
for direct support to operational units: Organizational level repair (O-level; trouble 
shooting, removal and replacement of components on major equipment, preventive 
maintenance actions), Intermediate level repair (I-level; low volume, low-technical 
economic repair of components), and Depot level repair (D-level; high volume, high 
technical repair of components at established Naval repair facilities or the original 
equipment manufacturer [OEM]).  This methodology is established under the premise of 
lowest possible economical repair to regain serviceability of the weapon system.  
Naval surface and submarine combatant forces utilize a distinct, though similar, 
multi-tiered repair system that allows for optimized use of commercial and military 
support structures.  This thesis will discuss sustainment from an aviation viewpoint.  But 
the concepts presented are applicable to all communities. 
Figure 1 outlines a simplified flow of an Aviation Not Ready For Issue (NRFI) 
failed component from the organizational level unit (O-level) sent to repair facilities (I-
level/D-level) and an Aviation Ready For Issue (RFI) repaired component, in turn, sent to 
requesting commands or intermediate storage.  Functions within the flowchart requiring 
the expenditure of significant manpower to accomplish have been highlighted and clearly 
indicate the manpower intensive requirements of the current system.  These flow points, 
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with “a man in the loop,” illustrate time delays in the repair process until the performance 
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Figure 1.   Typical Carcass Flow NRFI to RFI. 
 
Prohibitively, customers lack visibility of NRFI components repair status once 
inducted for repair.  Nor do customers have visibility of RFI components located within 
an intermediate storage location – thus precipitating the need for expediters who track 
NRFI and RFI component status for repair time frames, shipping status, or RFI 
component availability at the intermediate storage location.  This example is 
representative of the difficulties faced by the fleet customer.    
Other prevalent issues have been identified that show current naval supply 
support inefficiencies to include:   
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• The Navy, and industrial stakeholders, maintain a legion of individualized 
databases utilized to manage and track components in all phases of supply 
and maintenance systems.  Figure 2 provides the current database 
environment distributed throughout the Navy.  These disparate computer 
systems are disconnected and largely un-linkable for data sharing, archaic 


































































































































Figure 2.   Today’s Fleet Support/CM Data Environment. 
(From: Courtesy of DD-X Program Office) 
 
• The Department of Defense transportation system provides little to no 
repairable component visibility during shipping and transit.  The 
established system is a loosely interconnected construct made up of 
multiple military services and commercial transport capabilities.  The 
systems operate mutually exclusive of each other, are not compatibly 
designed, and share information sparingly.  This lack of information 
results in losses, delays, inaccurate forecasting, and inventory 
control/accounting disparities.   
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• The Advanced Traceability and Control System (ATAC) is the Navy's 
logistics pipeline that integrates the management and transportation of 
weapon system components, or depot level repairables (DLRs), into a 
single physical distribution and control system.  The essential premise of 
this system is a one for one exchange of a broken component for a 
serviceable component.  If a serviceable component is issued without the 
return of a subsequent and matching broken component, the logistician 
incurs a penalty cost.  Lacking the ability to track the broken component 
during transit to the repair facility, the logistician is unable to determine 
when, or where, the component was lost.  Severe costs are often imposed 
upon the logistician and the command - without a means for determining 
an asset’s disposition and accountability during transit.         
The maintenance repair process is just as complex and fraught with its own 
inherent problems.  Components are becoming more complex and require more skill to 
troubleshoot and repair.  Test equipment is becoming commensurately complex and 
multi-functional in application.  Maintenance managers must face this growing 
complexity with additional issues to include: 
• The Navy’s method for assigning technicians to billets is not 
comprehensive enough to ascertain their current experience levels - as 
technicians lose or gain experience throughout their careers.  Combine this 
shortcoming with the Navy’s tendency to move technicians between a 
variety of platforms (e.g., F/A-18, F-14, H-60), and there is no manner of 
establishing a technician’s current technical ability from weapon system to 
weapon system.     
• Training takes time and time is money.  In an effort to reduce the cost of 
training, the Navy realized the benefits and began using built-in test and 
automated test and evaluation equipment instead of individualized hands- 
on training on “mock up” weapon systems. Technicians are taught to run 
the diagnostics on test equipment, but are no longer given comprehensive 
training of actual troubleshooting skills.  Combine this ill-trained force 
with a high operational tempo that emphasizes fast fixes, this has produced 
a culture where technicians are ill equipped to perform rudimentary 
troubleshooting techniques.  Taken further, this produces the possibility 
that technicians might inadvertently introduce degradation into weapon 
systems through ill-performed or unnecessary repairs.   
• Inadequate visibility of repair components during repair at maintenance 
facilities, as well as availability at storage locations, often leads 
maintenance managers to make incorrect decisions regarding maintenance 
production planning and repair actions.  To offset this lack of visibility, 
non-preferred maintenance actions such as cannibalization, jury-rigging, 
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and work-arounds are often employed by maintenance managers until an 
RFI component is received.   
• A weapon system is often produced in multiple and incompatible 
configurations from one lot of systems to the next.  This lack of a common 
configuration is inherently problematic and often unmanageable.  Repair 
of these systems requires sophisticated knowledge of the multiple systems 
and pin point accuracy when ordering a component for repair.  This lack 
of configuration control directly impacts operational availability.  
In response to these problems, logistics and maintenance managers are induced to 
circumvent the ill-trusted systems by acquiring the components and hoarding them in 
goody lockers.  To the credit of the Systems Command, enormous efforts are underway 
to address these various issues [Naval Supply Systems Command, 2001; Naval Air 
Systems Command, 2001].  
B. CROSSBOW SUSTAINMENT CONCEPTS DEFINED 
Future operational concepts of weapons platforms such as the CROSSBOW 
weapon system, defined in the Mission Need Statements (Appendix A and B) as well as 
the Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations [U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2000], 
Operational Maneuver From the Sea [U.S. Marine Corps, 1996], and Sea Based Logistics 
[Department of the Navy, 1994], dictates the need to actively evolve logistics and 
maintenance efforts to support these new strategic concepts.   
The selected CROSSBOW sustainment concepts and technologies were validated 
within the Precepts guidelines, with special emphasis that each aspect must enable 
sustainment through speed, accuracy, acceptable risks, and effectiveness of 
supportability. While some of the concepts presented are not new in their development, 
the integration of these currently disparate technologies and methodologies, into a 
cohesive and aligned strategy, shows considerable promise.  The Precepts are as follows. 
1. Autonomic Systems 
Autonomic Systems provides an application of information and systems 
integration technologies that can provide decision makers with accurate and timely 
information from the battle space.  This information technology will improve the ability 
to see, prioritize, assign, and assess information and resources [Bodnar, 2001].   
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Autonomic Systems provide the capability to automatically generate and transmit 
real-time, and near real-time, system performance data from the weapon system to remote 
stations for processing.  Integrated with an internal Prognostic Health Monitoring System 
(PHM), the Autonomic System will be capable of diagnosing weapon system failures, 
ordering the spares needed for repair, identify test and repair equipment, schedule 
technical personnel, and provide the technical data needed for repair [Georgia Technical 
Research, n.d.].   
Additionally, the real-time data is cached in a common database and shared with 
the transportation authority, tactical and strategic planners, Original Equipment 
Manufacturers (OEM), and training commands for all levels of weapon system support. 
2. Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) 
CBM aims to accurately detect the current state of mechanical systems and 
correctly predict systems’ remaining useful lives. This permits organizations to perform 
maintenance only as needed to prevent operational deficiencies or failures, essentially 
eliminating costly periodic maintenance while greatly reducing the likelihood of 
machinery or induced failures. 
CBM uses integrated, multi-sensor systems to detect and diagnose emerging 
equipment problems and to predict how long the equipment will effectively serve its 
operational purpose. Interfaced with an autonomous processor, the system gathers, fuses, 
and evaluates real-time data using algorithms that correlate the unique signals to their 
causes (e.g., vibrations created by a developing fault). The system alerts maintenance 
personnel to the problem, allowing maintenance activities to be scheduled and performed, 
as needed, before operational effectiveness is compromised or system failure is realized.  
CBM represents one of the most promising developments in the evolution of 
maintenance practices. As units are increasingly faced with demands to lower 
maintenance costs, decreased manning, and increased responsiveness/operational 
readiness, CBM has emerged as a viable alternative to traditional planned maintenance, 
run-to-failure operation, and the various maintenance approaches between the two 
extremes [Advanced Diagnostics, 2000]. 
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 3. Serial Number Tracking (SNT)  
SNT is a “closed-loop” cradle-to-grave tracking of maintenance critical serialized 
components.  [Hayes, 1999]  Facilitated by automatic identification technology (AIT) and 
web-enabled, SNT provides asset and material status not viewable within the current 
system.  SNT will provide: 
• full in-transit visibility of assets 
• assessments of depot performance 
• tracking of usage data 
• identification of least effective items for disposal 
• simplification of fleet material screens 
• accurate track reliability 
• accurate tracking of No Fault Found (A-799), erroneously replaced 
components 
• isolation of Integrated Logistic Support (ILS) deficiencies to specific 
weapon systems/squadrons/personnel 
• reduction of carcass loss through business process improvement 
• determination of component(s) life usage 
• identification of accurate component(s) configuration 
• tracking of warranties   
Configuration management has long plagued the military services.  AIT devices, 
such as embedded identification assets (Radio Frequency [RF] tags/smart chips/contact 
memory buttons), can accommodate up to 32K of memory allowing for storage of 
warranty or maintenance data.  AIT will enhance the solutions to configuration 
management. 
4. Distributed Mobile Networks with Intelligent Agents 
Distributed mobile networks are made possible by further evolutions in Internet 
technologies yielding wide-area network capabilities based on component-oriented and 
dynamic applications [Chen, n.d.].  Using ubiquitous access, or the ability of users to 
access computing resources from any wireless terminal, deployed units will be able to 
leverage current industry innovations in distributed mobile networks anywhere in the 
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world.  These new technologies operate using fault-tolerant networks that are robust 
against electronic attack (redundant transmissions) and secure against intrusion with 
encryption algorithms. 
Intelligent agent based communication applications have shown enormous 
potential for operating in unpredictable, dynamic environments such as mobile 
computing networks.  An example of a high-level distributed task that might be 
accomplished by intelligent agents, is the provision for Situational Reports (SITREPS).  
Major claimants or stockholders (e.g., CINCs, EPMAC, BUPERS, OEMs, Vendors, 
NAVICP, NAVAIR, NAVSEA) requiring periodic updates of weapon system status, 
operational status, administrative or personnel information, each would require different 
aspects of information at different times. The intelligent agent would perform search 
algorithms, based upon users requirements, and deliver timely information to each user in 
the desired formatted report. 
5. Single Definition Engineering (SDE) 
SDE defines a premise of weapon system design providing commonality among 
weapon platforms and weapon systems.  Historically, the acquisition of a new weapon 
platform often resulted in the complete redesign of major components thus precluding 
shared configuration between ships or aircraft of different classes or lots. The SDE 
concept forces standardized commonality of weapon systems [DiLisio, 2001a].   
Utilized to enhance innovation not constrain it, SDE would create common 
architectures of specific weapon systems requiring single supportability and sustainability 
plans - there by dramatically reducing sparing requirements, configuration management 
infrastructure, personnel, personnel training requirements, test equipment, and life cycle 
costs.  As with computer software upgrades, weapon system upgrades and improvements 
would be better accommodated with common system architectures.  
6. Life-time partnering of Weapon System Contractors  
Lifetime partnering with full, to near full, service contracts provides for technical 
support from the developer throughout the life of the weapon system.  [DiLisio, 2001b] 
Adversarial relationships, between government acquisition officials, program managers, 
and weapon system contractors, often disallowed the sharing of technical information 
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(proprietary) or the coordinated efforts for weapon system improvement.  Partnered 
Weapon System Contractors, hired under a performance based support criteria, would 
receive monetary incentives for exceeding the reliability, availability, or maintainability 
goals. Alternately, failure to reach goals would result in the loss of financial incentives.  
Technology insertions would also be contracted to ensure modernization of weapon 
systems at specified target time frames.  
7. Modular Weapon System Design 
Modular Weapon System Design infers the functional grouping of sub-system 
components within a unit.  This modular component is easily installed in the major 
system, portable, easily tracked, re-configurable, and easy to troubleshoot.  The reduction 
in repair cycle time, by shortening the Mean Time To Repair (MTTR), is the prime 
objective. Modularity is not limited to hardware but also applies to software (e.g., 
software configurable radios). 
8. Improved Forecasting and Trend Analysis Tools 
Embedded intelligent agents make improved forecasting and trend analysis tools 
possible.  The intelligent agent compares the baseline operating parameters with the data 
recorded during the last preventive maintenance cycle.  Significant deviations from the 
baseline are noted and forwarded to the maintenance activity for assessment or repair 
action.   
9. Tele-Maintenance 
Tele-Maintenance enables remote interface with engineering and maintenance 
expertise to solve maintenance problems for deployed platforms in real-time [Brown, 
2001c].  Web-enabled digital imagery provides distant link capability to remote 
geographic locations.  
10. Labor Saving Innovations 
Labor saving innovations to include paint-less aircraft, paint-less ships, and 
robotics are quickly becoming a reality. In the place of paint, single appliqués, made of 
polymers and other innovative materials, are applied to the weapon system and cured for 
semi-permanent bonding.  Once applied, periodic inspections are the extent of the labor 
requirements - dramatically reducing manpower requirements.  
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Robotics will be used for human tasks that are repetitive in nature, inherently 
laborious, and mundane in performance.  These tasks may include routine housekeeping 
and food preparation.  More challenging tasks may include ballast inspection [The Inside 
Track, 2000], underway refueling, and aircraft movement (yellow gear services).   
The availability of ever improving technology applied to increasingly powerful, 
and less expensive, computers drives the feasibility of these concepts.  Also, the 
anticipated advances in sensor systems, improvements in diagnostic and prognostic 
algorithms, and advances in signal processing methods will promote their employment 
within the CROSSBOW’s IOC.  
Leveraging use of this technology, CROSSBOW will meet three major 
objectives:  1)  increased operational availability, 2)  reduced total ownership cost (TOC) 
and 3)  improved operator and equipment safety. 
C. CROSSBOW SUSTAINMENT FRAMEWORK 
1. Concept and Premise 
The CROSSBOW framework is shown in Figure 3.  Developed to support the 
requirements of the Mission Need Statements and within the guidelines of the Precepts, 
this high level framework serves as a functional representation of key supportability 
concepts considered essential for supporting this future weapon system.   
The framework consists of five functional modules representing the foundations 
required for a successful weapons system deployment.  These five modules operate 
within a C4I (Command, Control, Communication, Computers, and Intelligence) 
Executive Information System architecture: 
 
• Logistics  
• Maintenance  
• Personnel  
• Training  
• Vendor/Contractor 
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 - Prog/diag systems 
- Service contracts with industry 
- Modular Design 
- Technology enabled maintenance 
- Lean Maintenance 
• Reduce WIP initiatives 





- Tailored Logistics packages 
- Serial # tracking/TAV 
- Independent component order 
- Forecasting tools 
- Lean Logistics 
• Fast transportation 
• Recognizable processes 
- Exec system analysis 
- Archived data 






- Automated Records Capability  
- Improved human resource  
  allocation; mix/number/rate 
- Personalized QOL initiatives 
Personnel 
- Online/Interactive training 
- Manuals available online 
- Direct link with schoolhouse 
- College courses? 
Training 
- Real-time SITREPS/CASREPS 
- OPS forecasting-analysis tools 
- Readiness data 
- Weapons system status 
- Personnel health/status 
- Decision Support Systems 
C4I - Executive Information 
Systems  
- Real-time links to OEM for   
  technical/engineering support 
- OEM real-time visibility or weapon system  
  status 
Vendor/Contractor 
 
Figure 3.   CROSSBOW Framework. 
 
The weapon system operates in an autonomic mode whereby internal/external 
self-regulating information technologies and communication architectures provide for the 
automatic transfer and receipt of data and information [Wagner, n.d.].  Autonomic 
systems will encompass mission areas to include aircraft/ship health, maintenance 
demand, weapon system status, system safety, and configuration management.  
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These framework modules interact in the sharing and transfer of data across 
functional boundaries.  A relational database (TAV - total asset visibility database) exists 
within the nexus of the five modules serving as the primary store of critical mission 
information.  A Decision Support System (DSS), maintained within the C4I environment, 
will be accessible to all system users yet robust against unsecured penetration.  The 
Decision Support System assesses the real-time mission data from all sources to provide 
potential solutions for mission needs.  Radio frequency (RF) tags, infrared markers, bar 
codes, scanners, and identity chips are placed on all critical weapon system components.  
The serial numbers of these components can be routinely queried by automated scanners 
and readers, driven by intelligent agents located throughout the pipeline environment, for 
identification, location, and condition status - creating total asset visibility (TAV) of the 
component.  
2. Autonomic Logistics Module 
The Autonomic Logistics Module encompasses the supportability functions to 
include the full range of logistics planning.  Based upon archived data and current usage 
data, the Logistics Module would create tailored logistics packages (COSAL/AVCAL) 
that are configured based upon the platform’s mission (e.g., humanitarian, peace keeping, 
war).  Tailored packages would dramatically minimize volume storage requirements 
resulting in more efficient utilization of space and capacity with units only carrying what 
is needed rather than what “might be” needed.  
Other capabilities of the Logistics Module would include: 
• Autonomic Logistics functions would automatically order components 
based upon anticipated demand (see PHM), reducing manpower 
requirements and reducing turn-around time.  Autonomic Logistics would 
provide for enhanced configuration management through real-time status 
of weapon system Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) and operational 
availability.   
• Visibility of component status (NRFI, RFI) provided within the TAV 
environment would focus management efforts and information flow 
allowing for efficiencies in delivery time frames, intelligent packaging of 
deliverables, consolidation of inventories, and recognizable processes for 
re-engineering. 
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• Determination of provisioning requirements based upon usage trends and 
storeroom volume availability 
• Improved forecasting tools for demand and shipping time frames that 
would improve management decision-making.  
3. Autonomic Maintenance Module  
The Autonomic Maintenance Module encompasses troubleshooting, failure 
analysis, and repair functions.  It is centered on reliability, or condition based, 
maintenance practices.  The system would be capable of: 
• Comprehensive prognostic and diagnostic management of embedded 
components/systems.  Monitoring of critical components and systems 
would provide real-time information allowing for trend analysis of 
degraded performance as well as impending failure notification.  
Enhanced prognostic/diagnostic capability would reduce maintenance 
downtime, automatically performing fault isolation even in the event of 
cascading failures. 
• Enhanced forecasting for scheduled and unscheduled maintenance 
activities 
• Recommendations for repair actions when RFI components are not readily 
available (e.g., screen for alternate repair components) 
• Embedded links to vendor/contracted engineering services to include 
failure notifications, engineering service requests, and technical data 
updates 
• Increased support to the technician to reduce mean time to repair (MTTR) 
using online tele-maintenance, support links, technical databases and 
virtual manuals 
4. Personnel and Training Module  
The Personnel and Training Modules fulfill administrative and personnel related 
functions.  These modules would be capable of: 
• Online/interactive training to include virtual rehearsal of maintenance 
tasks, lessons learned cataloging, and task-oriented frequently asked 
questions.  The individual’s training would be managed from specialized 
training (e.g., Corrosion Control) to class “C” technical courses linked to 
the cognizant naval training command. 
• Automated records maintenance and upkeep to include medical, dental, 
service record, pay and promotion documentation 
• Human Resource Allocation. BUPERS’ current Job Advertisement and 
Selection System (JASS) initiative for on-line information and decision 
system for job placement is but a precursor towards the potential for a 
more robust, efficient, and comprehensive system for human resource 
allocation 
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• Quality of life issues such as personal customization of embedded 
intelligent agents to provide communication links, entertainment, and 
distance learning links to select universities for professional/personal 
development 
5. Vendor/Contractor 
• Provides real-time link to the Prime contractor to enable engineering and 
technical support 
• Enables the Prime contractor to have visibility of real-time performance 
metrics 
6. C4I Executive Information System  
The C4I environment would encompass a Decision Support System utilizing 
intelligent agents.  This Executive System would interface with all functional modules, as 
well as all major stakeholders, providing real-time data, anticipatory metrics, and suggest 
course of action recommendations.  This module would also provide: 
• Situational and Casualty reporting 
• Operational forecasting for all battle group elements 
• Complete weapons system status 
• Personnel end strength and force status 
• Links to design reference missions combined with an ability to perform 
strategic planning 
7. Repair Action Walk-Through of Sustainment Framework  
The following example is presented to demonstrate the framework’s intended 
capability: 
• An airborne unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) experiences signal 
degradation in a power supply module within the armament computer.  
The UCAV onboard system prognostic/diagnostic sensors detect the 
degradation and determine, based upon troubleshooting algorithms, the 
armament computer will fail within 72 hours. 
• The impending failure is transmitted, via a data burst, from the airborne 
UCAV to receiving/transmitting nodes located on the nearest weapon 
platforms.  Because all weapon platforms are outfitted with nodes, the 
degraded weapon systems can readily transmit their data via the network 
created by the interconnected weapon platforms. 
• The failure data alerts the Autonomic Logistics Module of the need for an 
impending component replacement.  Queries are automatically sent to 
shipboard storerooms, replenishment ships, defense stocking points, and 
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the manufacturer, to determine the location of the nearest component, the 
fastest mode of transportation (if unavailable locally), and the projected 
delivery time frame along with projected delivery route.  
• The failure data, and the resultant logistics information regarding 
component availability and delivery time, is transmitted to the Autonomic 
Maintenance Module.  The Autonomic Maintenance Module schedules the 
UCAV for component replacement, other conditional inspections, and 
notifies the Decision Support System to update the situational status 
reports.  Other lower priority maintenance actions might also be scheduled 
to include inspecting the “paint-less” appliqué coating of the UCAV – one 
of the labor reducing applications to reduce required manning on board.    
• The appropriate technical shop is alerted of the scheduled repair. If 
additional troubleshooting is required, repair recommendations are 
provided “real-time” via satellite link (tele-maintenance) from the 
manufacturer or from the data library inherent within the Maintenance 
module.    
• The Personnel Module updates the assigned technician’s schedule to 
reflect his/her assignment to repair action. The Training Module notes the 
technician has not performed this type of repair for some time and 
recommends virtual training for a maintenance rehearsal of the impending 
repair action.  The module notes and records the completed training for 
future reference.  Comparing the statistical performance of the 
maintenance action against benchmarked data, the Training Module would 
make recommendations for future training if significant trends persist.   
• The Decision Support System, residing within the C4I environment, notes 
a trend in armament computer failures relating to its power supply.  This 
information is transmitted to the manufacturer and the repair depot for 
investigation. Trends are also transmitted to training commands for 
updates in training requirements. 
• The component is efficiently delivered within 48 hours making use of a 
combination of commercial and military carriers linked via the TAV 
database.  The specific component is tracked, using the serial number of 
the asset, to identify and maintain accountability as the component travels 
through the pipeline.  Also employed is radio frequency (RF) tagging to 
redundantly track the asset as well. 
• The component is installed by the technician and the status of the aircraft 
is instantly updated using his Personal Display Unit.  The Logistics 
Module notes the completion and awaits the NRFI carcass for turn in. The 
Maintenance Module notes the repair and updates the aircraft database of 
the specific UCAV.  The C4I Decision Support System notes the repair for 
the Situational Report of the squadron aircraft – providing the area 
commander real- time status of his available assets.  
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8. Can the DON Realize the Crossbow Sustainment Framework?  
Is the integration of the suggested individual concepts and technologies realizable 
within the CROSSBOW weapon system?  Current research and development initiatives 
in the DD-X, the Joint Strike Fighter, and AAAV [Mack, 2000] weapon system programs 
suggest the answer is yes to the capability.  However, Navy and DOD cultural issues 
negatively restrict the implementation of new technologies and methodologies (discussed 
later in this analysis).   
Corollaries exist in the business community that provide insight to the 
achievability of incorporating the suggested CROSSBOW sustainment concepts into a 
cohesive and synergistic system.  
The TRADENET system is an electronic data interchange (EDI) system that 
allows wireless computer-to-computer exchange of inter-company business documents 
and information [President and Fellows of Harvard College, 1990].  Based out of 
Singapore and designed by IBM and Computer Systems Advisers, Pte. Ltd., the 
TRADENET System streamlined the procedures and protocols of many different 
agencies and organizations into a set of coherent and simplified data architectures.  More 
of a systems integration effort than a systems building effort, TRADENET performs 
semi-autonomous functioning to facilitate document generation, data analysis, 
performance algorithms, financial transactions, and resource allocation. 
With the implementation of TRADENET in 1989, turnaround time for processing 
documents and queries dropped from four days to as little as 15 minutes.  Significant 
logistic improvements were noted as well in material deliveries, the scheduling of 
delivery trucks, equipment, and manpower usage.  International users of the system 
reported savings of 25% to 35% achieved in the more efficient handling of trades and 
documentation. 
TRADENET architectures are now being employed as a value added network 
throughout the Singapore economy.  Singapore’s Intelligent Island concept will extend 
the TRADENET architectures to inter-bank services, health care administration, legal, 
retailing, and manufacturing [President and Fellows of Harvard College, 1994].  A 
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healthcare module called MediNet will wirelessly link hospitals, laboratories, 
pharmacies, drug distributors, private clinics, and medical supply companies.  The vision 
is to extend the use of EDI to every sector of the Singapore’s customer base to create a 
common commerce environment for conducting business. 
Though the requirements of TRADENET and the Department of the Navy 
logistics are inherently different, the similarities between the systems are striking:   
• Each system requires support for a large and geographically dispersed 
customer base with differing needs and requirements. 
• Each system requires time sensitive data to support different customers in 
desired formats 
• Each system requires the tracking, coordination, and planning of resources 
• Each system requires coordination between individual organizations to 
perform necessary functions 
• Each system requires autonomous actions to achieve efficiencies 
This example provides an indication of the technology available now that is 
achieving exponential increases in system efficiency.  The Navy faces the greatest 
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III. SEA ARROW COST ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This section will determine the projected life cycle cost (LCC) of the 
CROSSBOW UCAV (SEA ARROW) as well as the logistics support vessel (SEA 
QUIVER).  Analysis will include determination of the systems cost drivers and the 
potential of the CROSSBOW sustainment concepts to mitigate cost inefficiencies.  The 
methodology for costing will only be discussed in terms of the SEA ARROW.   
However, cost calculations and a cost summary for the SEA QUIVER are discussed in 
Appendix E.  The analysis concludes with the total life cycle cost of 600 SEA ARROWS 
over 20 years at $13.3 billion dollars.  The total life cycle cost of 2 SEA QUIVERS over 
20 years at $1.9 billion dollars.  
Using Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC) 
Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) F/A-18 systems cost data as a representative 
baseline - changes were imposed upon a simple parametric life cycle cost analysis 
(LCCA) Excel spreadsheet to reflect the systems and systems costs inherent within a 
UCAV platform. The data used in this analysis was acquired from NALDA [Naval 
Aviation Logistic Data Analysis, 2000a] Program and VAMOSC CAIG  databases 
[Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs, 2000].  
The NALDA data encompassed over 524,060 flight hours flown in 4 years (April 
1996 - March 2000) and provided input to the parametric model with regard to the Mean 
Flight Hours Before Failure (MFHBF).  The NALDA F/A-18 data contained 4,557 line 
items made up of five-digit Work Unit Codes (WUC) for each system on the F/A-18C.  A 
WUC is defined in the OPNAVINST 4790.2H as; a numeric or alpha/numeric code that 
identifies a system, subsystem, set, major component, repairable subassembly, or part of 
an end item being worked on [Naval Aviation Maintenance Program Manual, 2001]. 
The VAMOSC-CAIG template data was accessed for Fiscal Years (FY) 1988 - 
2000.  This data primarily provided costs of the F/A-18C weapons system for comparison 
and validation against the parametric cost spreadsheet model cost figures.  The 
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VAMOSC - CAIG template was segregated in cost elements from FY1988 to FY2000.  
The VAMOSC data reference manual defines this cost element grouping as an Aviation 
Type Model Series Report (ATMSR), that contains cost and non-cost elements for 
Aircraft Type/Model/Series by fiscal year.  Data elements are identified and developed to 
display meaningful operational statistics for each Type/Model/Series (T/M/S) that are 
recorded by flight hours during the fiscal year [Price, Waterhouse, Coopers, 2001]. This 
data was assembled and displayed by Major Commands that managed aviation 
operations.  
The structure of the ATMSR reports costing at seven distinct levels: Organization 
Level (1.0 series), Intermediate Level (2.0 series), and Depot Level (3.0 series), Training 
Support (4.0 series), Recurring Investment Costs (5.0 Series), Other Functions (6.0 
series), and Contractor Logistics Support (7.0 series).  The ATMSR also provides several 
non-cost metrics against which cost elements could be evaluated.  These non-cost metrics 
included Aircraft Numbers and Annual Flying Hours.  Additionally, there is a new 
section of the ATMSR titled “TMS Metrics”.  This section provides Navy-wide Average 
Age Year - End and Average Flight Hours in Life Year - End for each T/M/S reported in 
the ATMSR.  
B. BACKGROUND 
LCCA has been performed in various DOD programs in an attempt to capture all 
life cycle costs associated with a particular weapon system.  These cost estimates prove 
invaluable in determining initial acquisition purchase quantities and procurement 
development plans, particularly within constrained budgetary environments. In Life 
Cycle Costing, there are many techniques that can be used to estimate the cost of a future 
yet-to-be-developed system: 
• Engineering estimation is a method by which every item in the system is 
detailed and a dollar cost is associated with it 
• Analogy estimation takes historical costs from one system and adjusts 
them to assimilate the intended parameters of the unknown system 
• Expert opinion relies upon the knowledge of an expert in the field, and 
from that opinion an estimation is derived  
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• Delphi method is more robust than expert opinion. Consensus of many 
experts can be brought together to form a single determination 
• Extrapolation uses data derived from an existing and comparable system 
that is adjusted to meet the parameters of the proposed system.  The 
generated data, derived from the original system data, is determined with 
the assumption that it will act in a manner similar to the original system’s 
performance parameters.   
• Parametric analysis employs equations that describe relationships 
between cost, schedule, and measurable attributes of systems, hardware, 
and software.  The equations contained within the model attempt to 
describe how a product’s physical, performance, and programmatic 
characteristics affect its cost and schedule. These equations are often 
integrated into pre-derived software tools or formulated into an Excel 
spreadsheet [Loftus, 1999]. 
Examples of current LCCA software tools include FleetSight from Decision 
Dynamics, used in analysis of the P-3 Orion and SH-60.  Web-LCCA software, from 
Litton TASC, was used for costing the LANTIRN and PHALANX Close In Weapon 
System (CIWS).   
These software applications are very useful for developmental systems with 
attributable component reliability and system information.  CROSSBOW, in its current 
conceptual infancy, does not provide the comprehensive data required for the full 
implementation of these proprietary models.  However, a simplified academic 
spreadsheet model was obtained that provided reasonable calculations of costs despite the 
limitations of available CROSSBOW data [Junge, 2000]. This model made use of 
parametric analysis, extrapolation, and analogy estimations to derive quantifiable and 
viable cost assessments.  
C. LIMITATIONS  
In the establishment of the F/A-18C baseline cost data from NALDA, the 
difference between priority maintenance actions (e.g., Partially Mission Capable (PMC), 
Not Mission Capable (NMC)) could not be delineated.  All data was therefore, 
considered in worst-case scenarios of Not Mission Capable status.   
VAMOSC F/A-18C baseline cost data did not account for the cost of producing 
the aircraft or the costs associated with the length of time for a production run.  The 
parametric model used in the analysis accounted for the production costs, which 
produced a higher and more robust cost estimate than VAMOSC cost figures.  
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NALDA data was an aggregation of O and I level maintenance actions (MA) and 
Mean Time To Repair (MTTR).  Without exhaustive effort to separate the documented 
maintenance actions, there was no way to determine what times to repair could be 
attributed to each level of maintenance. 
While RDT&E is realistically an ongoing program throughout the life of a 
weapon system, only four years of RDT&E cost was considered in the development of 
the SEA ARROW system. 
D. METHODOLOGY  
1. Developing the Baseline Model 
The VAMOSC CAIG template data for the F/A-18C was downloaded from the 
VAMOSC website and transferred into an Excel spreadsheet for analysis.  A partial 





Number Element Description 1988 ($K) 1989($K) 
  Year number 1 2 
F/A-18C 1Subtotal Organizational Costs 32590 88273
F/A-18C 1.1Subtotal Organizational Personnel Costs 21472 44684
F/A-18C 1.1.1Organizational Military Personnel Costs 21472 44684
F/A-18C 1.1.2Organizational Civilian Personnel Costs 0 0
F/A-18C 1.1.3Organizational Contractor Personnel Costs 0 0
F/A-18C 1.2Subtotal Organizational Operations Costs 11118 43589
F/A-18C 1.2.1Temporary Additional Duty Costs 132 0
F/A-18C 1.2.2Training Expendable Stores Costs 1830 6131
  
Figure 4.   Example of Partial Elements in the CAIG Cost Template. 
 
It was found that the CAIG templates varied in element format, whereby some 
elements had been modified according to the FY that was being analyzed.  The elements, 
that were the same, were grouped as such: FY1988-1991, FY1992-1993, FY1994-1997, 
FY1998-1999 and then FY2000.   
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After FYs were grouped according to common element descriptions, the element 
costs were then totaled by FY column in the Total row of the spreadsheet (as seen in 
Figure 5) and discounted using a 10 percent rate in the formula:  
Total FY $/(1+Discount rate%)Year number 
The Total row was then added to the Discounted cost row to derive the 
Cumulative discounted cost row.   
 
Year number 1 2 
Total ($) $46,563,000.00 $141,932,000.00
Discounted cost $42,330,000.00 $117,299,173.55
Cumulative discounted cost $88,893,000.00 $259,231,173.55
  
Figure 5.   Example of the Element Total, Discounted and Cumulative Discounted Costs. 
 
The Cumulative discounted cost row for each FY column was then totaled to 
equal an overall FY1988-FY2000 total LCC that established another baseline for 
comparison with the parametric F/A-18C baseline spreadsheet and against the UCAV 
parametric analysis spreadsheets.   
2. Developing the Parametric Model 
The F/A-18C baseline data, for eventual use in the simplified academic worksheet 
model, was obtained from NALDA and loaded into pre-constructed excel worksheets 
labeled Raw F/A-18 Data, F/A-18 Filtered data – formulas, and UCAV Comp.  The Raw 
F/A-18 Data columns were totaled and summarized.  The F/A-18 Filtered data –formulas 
worksheet contained edited data from the Raw F/A-18 Data sheet that eliminated 




WUC NOMENCLATURE MFHBF Fail (4yrs) Failures/YR MFHBVF V-FAILS MTTR MMH/MA MMH MMH/FH-O MMH/FH-I
03***** MAINTENANCE INSPECTIONS 87343.33 6 1.50 104812.00 5 7.87 2.84 1063467.5 5.61566 0.00095
04***** CORROSION PREVENTION 262030.00 2 0.50 262030.00 2 4.87 2.12 363749.2 1.58839 0.00637
05***** GENERAL FUNCTIONS 30827.06 17 4.25 30827.06 17 6.77 1.77 11090.8 0.08057 0.00031
09***** NON-AERONAUTICAL WORK 8734.33 60 15.00 9035.52 58 3.51 2.67 975.3 0.00164 0.00080
11***** AIRFRAME                              6.69 78322 19580.49 6.77 77416 5.17 2.38 481231.2 1.83068 0.07293
12***** FUSELAGE/COMPARTMENTS                 140.95 3718 929.50 152.21 3443 2.86 1.60 20115.1 0.05623 0.01946
13***** LANDING GEAR SYSTEMS                  10.35 50643 12660.67 11.36 46131 5.64 2.88 340697.3 0.91795 0.77381
14***** DIRECTIONAL FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS    13.11 39973 9993.26 14.64 35804 9.40 3.86 321600.5 1.02986 0.43773
17***** ESCAPE SYSTEMS                        55.21 9492 2373.01 59.74 8772 2.73 2.06 51873.1 0.10520 0.07485
Subtotal 171.10 182147.73 45536.93
24***** AUXILIARY POWER PLANT (AIRBORNE)      124.92 4195 1048.75 162.10 3233 7.59 3.84 28871 0.10216 0.03545
F-18C 5 DIGIT WUC SUMMARY
BOTH UN-SCHEDULED AND SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE
FROM APRIL 1996 - MARCH 2000        FLIGHT HOURS = 524,060
 
Figure 6.   NALDA Baseline Spreadsheet Example (F/A-18 Filtered Data). 
 
This reduced the number of line items to 2,700.  The data was then aggregated at 
the two-digit WUC system level.  The result was 39 two-digit WUC subdivisions.  The 
data in the Mean Flight Hours Between Failures (MFHBF) and FAILURES columns 
were then totaled for each two-digit WUC category.  This worksheet also contained 
formulas that calculated the two-digit MFHBF and weapon system MFHBF by dividing 
the total number of flight hours (524,060) by the number of failures for each two-digit 
WUC.  The totals of the calculated MFHBF and FAILURE columns were also computed.  
The third worksheet UCAV Comp was developed to show the systems that would be 
eliminated from the F/A-18 data to assimilate the UCAV characteristics (extrapolation).  
The MFHBF and FAILURE columns were then recalculated for each two-digit WUC.  
The total flight hours  (524,060) was then divided by the resulting numbers in the two-
digit WUC FAILURE column to calculate a UCAV MFHBF for each of the two-digit 
WUC systems and weapon system MFHBF.   
Developed by an Aerospace Engineering student at Naval Postgraduate School, 
the parametric model was designed with eight linked worksheets; User Inputs, Manning, 
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Training, RDT&E, O&M, Totals, Graphical Summary, and Poisson Table.  Figure 7 
provides a graphic representation of the data flows of the parametric model.  
a. User Input 
The User Inputs worksheet provided the link to the various system, 
personnel, and equipment parameters.  It was divided into eight categories; general fiscal 
and attrition rates, operational consumption and operating time, manning, maintenance 
and equipment, training, research and production, and components. 
b. Manpower 
This section of the parametric model focused on the total manpower costs 
for Officers, Chief Petty Officer’s (CPOs) and Enlisted at the O, I and Squadron 
Headquarters levels.  This cost worksheet was divided into four sections, the Required 
Manning Levels, Individual Salary calculations, FY Inputs section (formatted by FY 
number and by corresponding program year number), and Totals for Squadron, I-level, 
and Squadron Headquarters.   
c. Training 
This section of the parametric model focused on the total training costs for 
the Officer, CPO and Enlisted at the O, I and Squadron Headquarters levels.  This cost 
worksheet was divided into three sections; the training cost of the individual, number of 
personnel that require training, and the funds required for training.   
d. Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDTE) 
The RDTE and Production worksheet was divided into seven sections 
labeled: FY Inputs, UAV Attrition Information, Production Line Open Costs, Ground 
Equipment Information, Development Costs, Production Costs, Total Development and 
Production Costs.  This worksheet illustrated RDTE costs that were associated 
throughout the program’s life cycle from initial system development to Follow-On Test 
and Evaluation (FOTE).   
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User Input Data 
Manpower 






- Failure Rate (λ) 
- MTBF (1/λ) 
- Required Spares (µ = kλt) 
- Spares Purchased (µ * unit cost) 
- Annual Maintenance Costs 
- Training Costs 
- Present Value 
- Inflation Rate 
Logical Functions 
 
- IF – THEN Excel functions 
- Ceiling Excel functions 
- Required manning 
- Salaries by activity  
- Personnel requiring 
training 
- Funds required for training 
- Required Spares 
- Maintenance Cost 
- Initial Spare Purchase 
- I-Level Activation cost 
- I-level Operation cost 
- Transportation Cost 
- Fuel/POL cost 
- Production Line Open cost 
- Ground Control Equipment 
- Development Cost 
- Test Equipment Cost 
- Total Production Cost 
- Total RDTE Cost 
 
Manning  Training   RDTE   O&M 
Inflation  Present Value Cumulative PV  




Figure 7.   Parametric Model Graphic Data Flows. 
e. Operations and Maintenance (O&M) 
The O&M worksheet was developed to estimate the number of required 
spares, annual maintenance costs, initial spare purchase cost, Intermediate level 
activation and operations cost, transportation cost from the Organizational level to the 
Intermediate level, and Fuel (e.g., petroleum, oil, and lubricants) cost.  Each of these 
areas was used in determining the LCC of the air vehicle O&M.   
f. Totals 
The Totals worksheet took the formulated cost from each functional 
worksheet (Manpower, Training, RDT&E, etc.) and placed them, by fiscal year, so that 
computations of inflation, present value, and net present values of the investment could 
be determined.  The culmination of all costs was summed to produce a total life cycle 
cost for the systems. 
g. Poisson Table 
The Poisson Table worksheet was used in conjunction with the calculation 
for component sparing (O&M) while the Graphical Summary presented the data 
pictorially.   
The input requirements of each worksheet are now briefly discussed.  
Detailed descriptions of the worksheets, inputs, and analysis are provided in Appendix D. 
E. SUMMARY  
1. The total life cycle costs for 600 SEA ARROWS over 20 years equated to 
$13.3 billion dollars.  The total life cycle costs of 10 SEA QUIVERS over 20 years 
equated to $7.7 billion dollars.  
2. Parametric modeling, extrapolation, and analogy cost comparison 
provided a reasonable depiction of cost data despite the lack of actual system data.   
The benefit of analogy cost comparison and extrapolation, within a parametric 
model spreadsheet, was a reasonable depiction of the potential life cycle costs associated 
with a notional unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV).  Without actual system data 
within a fielded system, accurate costing can be difficult to determine.   
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Parametric modeling, extrapolation, and analogy estimation proved easy to use, 
verifiable in calculation, and robust in ability to manipulate and process relational data.  
3. O&M costs proved to be the significant drivers of cost within the model. 
Second in cost magnitude were associated manpower costs. 
Historically, the greatest cost drivers of weapon systems have been the Operations 
and Maintenance and Manpower costs [Smith, 2001]. This analysis supported the 
assumption in both the UCAV and F/A-18C models.  The UCAV O&M was 49 percent 
of the total cost, while the F/A-18C O&M was 61 percent of the total cost.  Manpower 
was second in cost magnitude in both models with 32 percent for the UCAV and 19 
percent for the F/A-18C.   
4. The reduced flight-hours requirements for UCAV proficiency training 
produced substantial reductions in O&M costs.   
Within the O&M category, the factor that primarily affected costs was the 
reduction in monthly operating hours.  When the hours in the model were reduced from 
29.9 hours per month in the F/A-18C to 10 hours per month in the UCAV (reduced to 
reflect less flights required for training), the overall LCC decreased by $4.29B over 20 
years.  It was found that this cost reduction took place because the numbers of spares 
required were significantly less with the reduction in flight hours.   
The proficiency training would be accomplished on the Ground Control 
Equipment (GCE) trainer precluding the need to actually fly the air vehicle.  As UCAV in 
flight operations does not involve a hands-on aircraft interface, the UCAV operator gains 
the same quality of proficiency training through simulation on the GCE.  In contrast, with 
a piloted system, the pilot must be airborne in order to achieve the most realistic training 
and, as a result, increases the LCC with the need for more parts, fuel, and maintenance.  
However, GCE usage would invariably increase, to accommodate this enhanced training 
requirement.  Therefore it becomes essential to design the GCE with higher reliability 
and a low cost of repair. 
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5. The UCAV’s reduced requirement for performing flight for training 
reduced repair requirements throughout the repair pipeline - lending to consideration of 
eliminating intermediate level repair.   
The reduction in flight hours by almost 1/3 of the current operational time lends 
itself to consideration that the I-level system could be eliminated or reduced onboard the 
logistics support ship. Reduced flight hours translated into less maintenance actions that 
inferred a reduced I-level or a direct O-level to Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) 
logistics pipeline might be undertaken.  With the implementation of a direct O-level to 
OEM methodology, the idea of a truly centralized Inventory Control Point (ICP) for the 
UCAV support infrastructure could be entertained.  This concept would require a robust 
interface between commercial carriers and military transport as well as improvements in 
the interface between the current Navy ATAC and DOD transportation system.   
6. Improvements in repair turn around time, at the repair facilities, displayed 
a larger cost impact than improvements in system reliability. 
Maintenance costs were not driven as much by reliability as initially assumed.  In 
the parametric analysis, maintenance costs were largely impacted by the repair turn-
around-time of degraded components at the Intermediate and Depot levels of repair.  
While improvements within a weapons system’s reliability are an important component 
of availability, Intermediate and Depot level maintenance affected costs more 
dramatically with improvements in the repair Turn Around Time (TAT).  Enhanced 
repair capabilities were considered possible with the proposed implementation of a 
Prognostic Health Monitoring system within an autonomic environment.  
7. Reassignment of RDT&E costs to the contractor, through enhanced DOD 
partnership initiatives, reallocates risk. 
While not directly assessed within the parametric model, current efforts to transfer 
RDT&E costs shows considerable promise for long term cost savings.  Some of the 
RDTE costs might be deferred from the DOD budget through enhanced Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) research partnerships with civilian 
aviation industry contractors [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, 2001].  
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These projects are already underway with real-world UCAV and UAV projects and have 
produced significant RDT&E cost savings.   
8. Prognostic Health Monitoring (PHM) systems within the Autonomic 
structure showed significant benefit in LCC improvements. 
The model showed the potential LCC benefits of a Prognostic Health Monitoring 
System through the demonstrated cost savings.  Other findings, and potential benefits of 
the PHM systems, were the anticipated reductions in NRFI backlogs at the O, I, and D-
level with the improvements in troubleshooting and a reduction in A-799 (non-
duplicative component discrepancies) [Brown, 2001e].  With the elimination of redundant 
troubleshooting of elusive problems, wasted man-hours at O, I, and D-level would be 
dramatically reduced.  These additional man-hours would translate into increased man-
hours for other requirements at the squadrons and repair facilities.   
The logistics TAT would also be improved through the fault anticipation modes 
of the PHM system.  The requisition for the failed component could be replaced Just-in-
Time rather than Just-in-Case, eliminating costly component spares inventories onboard 
the ship.   
Reductions in cannibalization would also be produced with real-time diagnostics 
of impending component failures. A replacement component could be identified, shipped, 
and received before the component actually failed. 
9. Cost per squadron of the UCAV was on average 40 percent less when 
compared to the cost per squadron of the F/A-18C.   
• UCAV manning was 29 percent of the F/A-18C manning cost 
• UCAV Training was 52 percent of the F/A-18C training cost 
• UCAV RDT&E was 55 percent of the F/A-18C RDT&E cost 
• UCAV O&M was 27 percent of the F/A-18C O&M cost 
F. CONCLUSIONS  
The CROSSBOW weapon system would benefit from extensive use of Life Cycle 
Cost modeling.  LCCA illuminates the real cost drivers that predominate the budget of 
any weapon system.  O&M and manpower costs were identified as significant cost 
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drivers of this system.  Our analysis highlighted the number of modeling programs 
available as well as areas of opportunity for long-term cost efficiencies within the 
CROSSBOW weapon system. Areas of opportunity include: 
• Reduced flight hour requirements of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(UAV/UCAV) drove the maintenance, manpower, and training cost down.  
The caveat to this development is the increased use of the GCE 
introducing increased LCC cost for this subsystem.  
• The potential reduction in maintenance actions, coupled with a robust 
logistic pipeline suggested the potential reduction, or removal, of I-level 
repair.   
• Reduced repair turn around time at the O, I, and D level facilities, 
facilitated by PHM, produced higher returns than increased reliability of 
the component. 
Perhaps the most telling aspect in the LCCA was the number of aircraft that could 
be purchased at 30 percent of the LCC of the F/A-18C.  The O&M costs of the SEA 
ARROW were only 27 percent of the total LCC of the F/A-18 despite the additional 240 
aircraft.  Given these results, it was found that the overall LCC reductions made the 
UCAV a more cost effective option for most missions and wartime scenarios.  This idea 
operates under the premise of using the less costly Hyundai (SEA ARROW) for the less 
intricate missions while the BMW (F/A-18C) would be used for complicated missions 
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IV. MODELING AND SIMULATION OF THE REPAIR CYCLE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Recent advances in modeling and simulation programs show substantial promise 
in influencing current sustainment methodologies and paradigms.  Simply stated, a model 
emulates the actions and outputs of an actual system.  Simulation is the art and science of 
constructing a model and performing tests upon the model to determine impact and 
effect.  This proves very useful, as conducting direct experimental analysis on an existing 
sustainment system is obviously infeasible.  Simulation also provides the advantage of 
time.  Many simulations can be run which replicate days, weeks, or years of activity - 
providing tremendous flexibility in analysis. 
Using Arena 3.0 Simulation tools, this analysis determined that an increase in 
efficiencies imposed upon a baseline model produced an optimal range in Operational 
Availability of 77 to 86 percent.  The optimal range serves as a target for the 
implementation of new technologies and methodologies.  
The effort of this research was two fold:  to provide a quantitative assessment of 
selected CROSSBOW logistics and maintenance concepts (discussed in Chapter II) to 
illustrate the potential influence of the concepts in a graphical manner.  It will also show 
the usefulness and potential of modeling and simulation tools when conducting research 
such as the CROSSBOW project. 
B. OBJECTIVE   
This analysis is predicted to identify specific areas, within the current sustainment 
structure, which could be improved upon to reduce the replenishment and repair cycle 
time for the optimization of any weapon system - not just the CROSSBOW weapon 
system.   
The modeling and simulation methodology used in this research will: 
• Create a baseline comparator by simulating the current component repair 
methodology - from the removal of a component from the weapon system 
to the shipment of the component to a Designated Overhaul Point (DOP) 
for eventual repair 
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• Simulate a repair flow to emulate incrementally imposed efficiencies 
achieved through the CROSSBOW sustainment concepts 
• Simulate a repair flow to emulate incrementally imposed efficiencies 
achieved through increased reliability of system components 
• Assess the impact of the purported efficiencies against the baseline model 
for significance 
The significance of reducing replenishment and repair cycle time and increasing 
system reliability is critical for two key reasons.  First, the timely requisition, 
replenishment, and repair of a failed weapon system are essential to operational readiness 
and sustainability.  Secondly, because the high unit cost of depot level repairables (parts 
that are found economical to repair instead of discarding and replacing with a new unit), 
drives significant inventory investment as a result of the extended length of the repair 
cycle time [Kiebler et al, 1996].  
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS  
It should be noted that the repair pipelines, and the processing of aviation 
components (AVDLR) and surface combatant components (DLR), are characteristically 
different in the routing of NRFI assets to DOPs as well as IMA methodology.  However, 
this modeling simulation was designed to represent the general repair process flow 
(evident in both repair pipelines) for a given component to illuminate potential 
efficiencies that result from the CROSSBOW sustainment and maintenance concepts - 
and was not designed to perfectly mimic the existing systems.   
While dependency in probability failures might be evident within the model, 
independence was assumed with an established distribution of failure probabilities for 
simplification of analysis.  
It is important to note the distributions and process times were compiled primarily 
from NALDA data [Naval Logistics Data Analysis, 2000b].  While model validation and 
a screening process were performed on all data used, time limitations in analysis did not 
allow a robust assessment of all variables.  Therefore, further use of the models should 
only be performed with additional validation.     
The constraints involved in the software limited the creation of simulation entities 
to 150.  This constrained the aggregate number of spares and NRFI items, either in the 
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maintenance cycle or enroute for off ship repair, and was the driving factor behind 
limiting the number of operable aircraft to ten. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
Operational Availability (Ao) is defined as the probability that a weapon system, 
when used under stated conditions in an actual operational environment, will operate 
satisfactorily when utilized [Blanchard, 1992a].  
Ao can be mathematically expressed as: 
 
Ao = MTBM/ (MTBM  +  MDT) 
      
Or 
     




• MTBM (mean time between maintenance) = 1/(MTBMp  + MTBMc)  (or 
1/(1/λ + 1/fpt) where λ is the failure rate and fpt is preventive maintenance 
rate) 
• MDT (maintenance down time) = M + LDT + ADT; or the total elapsed 
time required to repair and restore a system to full operating status 
• M (mean active maintenance) is the mean or average elapsed time 
required to perform scheduled (preventive) and unscheduled 
(corrective) maintenance.  Also expressed as Repair Turn Around 
Time (RTAT). 
• LDT (logistics delay time) is the maintenance down time expended 
waiting for a spare part to become available, awaiting 
transportation, waiting for a maintenance facility, etc.  LDT 
typically comprises the largest portion of MDT. 
• ADT (administrative delay time) is the maintenance delayed for 
reasons of an administrative nature (e.g., personnel assignment, log 
book entries). 
Examining the equation for Ao, increases in MTBM can influence the equation 
towards increased system readiness yielding a higher quantity of fully mission capable 
aircraft per given period.  This can considered as increasing the reliability of the system.  
Additionally, any decreases in MDT will also increase Ao to more gainful levels of 
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availability.  A decrease in MDT is synonymous with reducing logistics and repair cycle 
time.  Given this relationship, MDT can be viewed as directly impacting the quantity of 
fully mission capable aircraft per given period.   
As such, the model was computationally formatted to report Ao in terms of the 
ratio of fully mission capable assets to the total authorized allowance (FMC/Total 
Aircraft Allowance). 
With a baseline model constructed, representing the current component cycle 
from system failure to system repair, the CROSSBOW concepts were superimposed upon 
the model.  These modifications were performed in four separate and distinct 
methodologies.  The first method represented efficiencies through decreased process 
times (LDT and ADT) of component sustainment.  The second method represented 
efficiencies by decreasing repair turn around time in the maintenance process (mean 
active maintenance).  The third method represented efficiencies through decreasing both 
maintenance and process times in equal increments.  The fourth method investigated the 
effects of increased component reliability. Individual functional modules were identified 
as supply, maintenance, or weapon system performance simulators by nature.  These 
modules were then incrementally improved in efficiency to determine the impact.  Each 
incrementally improved simulation result was graphed to determine an optimal range of 
efficiency within each model.  The optimal range represented a target, for technologies, 
methodologies, and reliability drivers that should be sought for maximum gains.   
The focus, in each scenario analyzed, was upon system operability factors, 
manifest from improvements in MDT.  These factors included: 
• System Down Time 
• Total Flight Hours (flown) 
• Total Failures 
• Operational Availability (Ao)  
The specific design scenarios included: 
• Scenario One:  Baseline Model of current sustainment methodologies. 
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• Scenario Two:  Process Scenario emulating the concepts of autonomic 
logistics and serial number tracking.  This scenario will concentrate on the 
sub-variables LDT and ADT. 
• Scenario Three:  Maintenance Model emulating the concepts of autonomic 
maintenance systems, CBM, PHM, improved forecasting and trend 
analysis, tele-maintenance support, modular system design, and labor-
saving initiatives.  This scenario will concentrate on reducing the sub-
variable M. 
• Scenario Four:  Assessment of the cumulative impact of combining both 
process and maintenance improvements for impact. 
• Scenario Five:  Reliability model assessing the impact of increased 
weapon system reliability.  This model compares a change in the total 
system reliability against a change in the top two high failure components.  
Not all of the concepts presented in Chapter II lends to the modeling and 
simulation technique.  These concepts included Distributed Mobile Networks with 
Intelligent Agents and Life Time Partnering with Weapon System Contractors.  The 
pronounced merit of these methodologies is promising and should be considered for 
further analysis using alternate techniques.  
E. PRESENTATION OF SCENARIO MODELS   
The flowchart (Figure 1) served as a sounding board and a validation tool for the 
construction of each model.  With the construction of a flow chart, the baseline model 
(Scenario 1) was designed to generally replicate the conditions, performance, and outputs 
of this current repair process.  The number of RFI spares was held constant throughout 
the analysis for simplification of assessment.  The actual level of sparing used in the 
baseline was determined by calculations in the LCC model.  
Program logic, descriptions of the model modules, distributions, and process 
times are provided in Appendix F.  Each scenario was incremented and run through ten 
iterations encompassing 6000 hours for each change to assess variability and impact.  
Results from the ten iterations were then averaged and used for comparison against the 




 1. Scenario One:  Baseline Model 
The baseline model produced the following operability factors (averages) for 10 
aircraft during 6000 cycles (hours):  
 
Down time per weapon systems: 23.07 hours 
Total flight hours per squadron: 974.9 hours 
Total failures per squadron:  327.4 
Operational Availability:  74.58 percent 
 
The beginning of each simulation was initialized by placing all weapon systems 
into a fully operational state.  Integrating aspects of the NALDA logistics data, the 
simulation modeled 10 fully mission capable aircraft flying one hour per day for 250 days 
(6000 simulations ÷ 24 hours per day).  Since each aircraft was scheduled for one flight 
per day, the aircraft could achieve a maximum of 250 flight hours in a 6000 hour period 
or 2500 flight hours per squadron.  The level of total flight hours per squadron typically 
fell between 875 to 1625. 
A 35 percent probability of component failure was assigned to establish a failure 
pattern.  Component failure was calculated using the following steps: 
• Determination of the MTBF for each associated subsystem  (NALDA) 
• Calculation of the subsystem failure rate (λcomponent = 1/MTBF) 







= ∑  
• Calculation of system reliability (Rsys = e-λt) 
• Calculation of the probability of failure as (1-Rsys) 
Based on the NALDA data, the baseline system reliability was 65 percent while 
the probability of a failure was 35 percent.  The following summaries outline the module 
functions within the model. 
a. Initialize Squadron 
This module initializes all systems to a fully mission capable state. 
Initiates flight operations (cycles) at one hour per flight.  Introduces a 35 percent 
probability of component failure.  FMC aircraft are delayed 23 hours before next flight. 
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b. Assign Type Failure 
Assigns one of seven component failures based upon NALDA failure rates 
for one-digit WUC aggregates.  An eighth component failure, for ground terminal 
equipment, is assigned based upon MTBF data [Kasal, 1999].  
c. O-Level Repair 
Contains module subsets for the general repair actions (component 
removal, replacement, inspections and minor repair) to return the aircraft to service.  
Subset modules include: 
• Replace Part at Squadron 
• Return aircraft to service after 23hr delay 
d. Initialize AVCAL Allowance 
Establishes sparing levels for eight components.  The initialized spares are 
stored in a rotable pool for issue. 
e.  Screen for Repair 
Contains module subsets, which determine level of repair action and 
routing to appropriate repair activity.  Subset modules include: 
• Route to Squadron Shop 
• Route to IMA by part type 
• Route offship for major repair 
f. IMA Repair 
Repair shops performing corrective actions on components to achieve 
ready for issue status.  RFI material is routed to the pool for storage and re-issue. 
g. Ship NRFI DLR for Major Repair/Replacement 
Average logistics time frames for shipment of NRFI components through 
the ATAC system, to the DOP for repair, and eventual storage after repair.  
2. Scenario Two:  Process Delay Time 
It was assumed that all efficiencies introduced by reducing process delay times 
applied to the whole system.  As such, a scaling factor was introduced that would allow a 
single change to increment percentage increases or decreases into the process delay times 
at all levels.  Using decrements of 5 percent, the process delay times were subsequently 
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reduced.  Optimal weapon system operability was attained within a reduction range of 15 
to 25 percent of LDT and ADT (Figure 8).  Operability factors were as follows:   
 
Down time per weapon systems: 21-23.6 hours 
Total flight hours per squadron  966-986.3 hours 
Total failures per squadron:  338-339 









0.00 -0.05 -0.10 -0.15 -0.20 -0.25 -0.30 -0.35 -0.40 -0.45 -0.50
Percentage Increment
Down Time (hrs/10) Total Flt Hrs (/100) Total Fails (#/100) Op Avail (%/10)  
Figure 8.   Chart of Adjustments in Process Delay Times. 
 
3. Scenario Three:  Maintenance Time 
Using the same method for scaling as used in process delay times, the 
maintenance model was decremented in steps of 5 percent.  Optimal weapon system 
operability was improved as MTTR was reduced in 5 percent decrements as shown in 
Figure 9.  The steepest aspect of the curve (slope) occurs between 15 and 30 percent 
indicating the greatest rate of efficiency gained for an optimal range.  Operability factors 




Down time per weapon systems: 11-16 hours 
Total flight hours per squadron 1003-1090 hours 
Total failures per squadron   357-376  
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Figure 9.   Chart of Adjustments in Maintenance Times. 
 
4. Scenario Four:  Combined Process and Maintenance Improvements 
Having run incremental changes in maintenance times and process delay times, 
the simulation was modified to increment both simultaneously.  The steepest aspect of the 
curve occurred between 15 to 20 percent indicating the greatest rate of efficiency gained 
for an optimal range (Figure 10).  Operability factors were as follows:   
 
Down time per weapon systems: 9-18.7 hours 
Total flight hours per squadron  1054-1113 hours 
Total failures per squadron   358-386 
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Figure 10.   Chart of Combined Adjustments in Maintenance and Process Delay Times. 
 
5. Scenario Five:  Increased Reliability 
To simulate the impact of changing reliability, the baseline model was modified 
by increasing the MTBF of the system and top two degraders in 5 percent increments (as 
discussed in Scenario 1 component failure calculation).  Figure 11 shows a plot of down 
time, flight hours, failures and operational availability with incremental improvements in 
reliability. The steepest aspect of the curve occurs between 15 and 20 percent indicating 
the greatest rate of efficiency gained for an optimal range.  The related reliability 
calculation spreadsheets are located in Appendix H. 
Down time per weapon systems: 19-22 hours 
Total flight hours per squadron  1018-1035 hours 
Total failures per squadron   306-311 
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Figure 11.   Chart of Adjustments in System Reliability. 
 
Figure 12 provides a graphic comparison of the incremental changes in MTBF 
and system reliability by contrasting the impact of improving all components 
simultaneously against improving only the top two degraders (i.e., Airframes/Flight 
Controls (WUC 1*) and Radio-Navigation-Weapons Controls (WUC 7*)).  The 
improvements realized by concentrating on the top two degraders yielded nearly the same 
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Figure 12.   Comparison of Improvements in System Reliability versus Improvements in 
Reliability of Top Two Degraders. 
 
F. ANALYSIS 
The advantages of simulation and modeling were noted and observed throughout 
the analysis.  The models were flexible and easy to use as changes in the applications 
were applied.  The results from each model were assessed and the following points are 
noted: 
• Reductions in the process delay time did not have a large impact on 
operational availability.  The benefit of reducing the process delays or 
eliminating transaction times did not materialize.  The curves representing 
operational availability, total flight hours, and down time stayed relatively 
flat.   
• Reductions in the maintenance process time produced substantial impacts 
on operational availability, total flight hours, and down time.  
Maintenance repair time represents a significant part of a components 
cycle time or turnaround time. By reducing the time required for these 
activities to repair assets, improvements in operational availability and 
total flight hours were observed while decreases in down times were 
measurably noted.   
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• Simultaneous reductions in both maintenance and process delay times had 
a measurable impact on operational availability, total flight hours, and 
down time. The combination of process and maintenance improvements 
produced a steep decline in down time.  To further analyze the impact, the 
model was adjusted to reflect a 20 percent improvement and then a 
specific component was targeted for spare reduction.  Improvements of 20 
percent enabled a 40 percent reduction in the Airframe/Flight Control 
sparing while maintaining an average of 78 to 80 percent Ao. 
• Increasing the Mean Time Between Failure improved operational 
availability.  The simulation supported pre-determined manual 
calculations with regard to the increase in availability when the time 
between failures was increased.  Combined with reductions in Mean 
Active Maintenance time, small improvements in the MTBF had a 
significant impact on availability.  In the first run, the MTBF of each 
component was improved to determine the impact on system reliability. A 
second run was then performed in which only the MTBF of the top two 
degraders were increased.  The results of each run were compared to 
analyze the impact on overall system reliability and overall system MTBF.  
Though not as significant as the improvements in all components, 
improving the mean time between failure of the top two degraders 
produced nearly the same overall system reliability. 
• Reductions in maintenance processes impacted availability more than 
increases in component Mean Time Between Failure.  As discussed in the 
summary in Chapter III, improvements in maintenance practices, which 
shorten cycle time, had a larger impact on aircraft availability and sparing 
levels compared to the large the improvements observed in achieving 
higher component reliabilities.   
G. CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of the model simulation was to analyze the impact of the 
efficiencies that the CROSSBOW framework would provide.  Top level aggregated data 
readily available for download (e.g., VAMOSC, NALDA, DLA) provided guides for 
designing the decision points and probabilities.  Given time to measure the numerous 
processes involved, the simulation models could be further refined to more accurately 
refine system behavior.  
The simulation evaluated system behavior through a range of 0 to 50 percent 
improvements.  Marginal cost effectiveness was not integrated in this analysis, but must 
be assessed to determine marginal cost benefits as improvements of 50 percent or greater 
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are most likely infeasible.  While the optimal points differed in all models, generally the 
optimal target range for improvements was between 10 and 30 percent.   
One major note should be highlighted at this point. The readings, up to this point 
might construe the reader to believe the elimination of manned processes is the major 
scheme of the CROSSBOW sustainment concepts.  The elimination of the man-in-the-
loop is not, in itself, the primary goal of the CROSSBOW framework.  However, 
manning is often not a function of system need, but a matter of insurance to ensure 
system shortcomings are offset.  Optimizing the system to eliminate inefficiencies is the 
primary consideration of CROSSBOW sustainment concepts.  From this perspective, the 
technologies leveraged to implement the CROSSBOW framework can provide efficient 
performance, error checking, automated data retrieval, and automated 
identification/diagnostics to eliminate the need to have personnel auditing every 
transaction.  In this way, the CROSSBOW will enable significant cost savings and 
efficiency.   
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V. AGING WEAPON SYSTEMS - THE CROSSBOW RESPONSE 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Aging weapon systems is, arguably, the most problematic issue currently 
impacting the fleet, aside from modernization which directly affects fleet aging.  While 
there is no specific definition for aging weapon systems, it can be generally described as 
the degradation of a weapons system caused by age, environment, storage, or operational 
use that reduces the operability of the system.  The impact of aging systems is the 
reduced performance capabilities of the aged system, increased maintenance 
requirements, increased O&M, and ultimately, decreased morale of the troops who must 
maintain the aged systems [Congressional Budget Office, 2001].    
This assessment determines that Prognostic Health Monitoring systems (PHM), 
Condition Based Maintenance (CBM), and Total Asset Visibility are key components of 
the CROSSBOW concepts that are essential to mitigate the effects of aging systems. 
B. BACKGROUND 
In a February 2000 Government Accounting Office (GAO) report entitled 
Tactical Aircraft: Modernization Plans will not reduce Average Age of Aircraft, the 
report concluded that, Navy Aircraft (and ships) are older than at any point in time in 
[U.S] history…as equipment gets older, component reliability decreases and depot level 
maintenance increases [General Accounting Office, 2001a].  This statement sets the 
stage for worsening trends in maintenance requirements and reduced mission capable 
rates as weapon systems wear down with age.   
Historically, the Navy attempted to maintain aircraft an average of 7.5 years and 
retire aircraft at 15 years (ships at 20 years).  This target has not been attainable in recent 
years, with an increased reliance on a single weapon platform without a replacement 
strategy.  For example, the lack of a replacement for the F/A-18 Hornet, as a fighter-
attack platform, has forced the Navy to extend the life of this airframe to 2019 [GAO, 
2001b].  Coupled, with increased operational commitments, the operability of the F/A-18 
system has been severely curtailed [GAO, 2001c].  Aging system experts believe most 
Navy systems are operating in the wear-out, or mature system aspect of the curve [Edge, 
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2001]. Results from GAO audits and Navy Inspector General Reports support this 
assessment [GAO, 2001d].  
Without service life extensions, 223 of the Navy’s 335 F/A-18s will be out of 
service by 2014 [GAO, 2001e].  At present, it will take an estimated $878 million to 
modify and extend the service life of 355 Hornet aircraft to meet future mission needs.  
The April 2000 Navy Inspector General report concluded, aging aircraft 
obsolescence and declining reliability management is being stressed by a support system 
that suffers from reduced staffing and maintenance proficiency.  Furthermore, the Navy 
should invest in logistics and engineering efforts to address reliability issues, noting that 
commercial airlines spend 2 staff years per aircraft for maintenance efforts compared to 
the Navy’s investment of 0.5 staff years per aircraft  [GAO, 2000].  What is demonstrated 
is a clear inability, within the Navy, in building a viable and long-term sustainment 
framework that supports systems throughout their life cycles.  
C.  CURRENT NAVY INITIATIVES 
Current Navy efforts at lessening the effects of aging weapon systems include 
Service Life Adjustment Programs (SLAP) and Service Life Extension Programs (SLEP).  
SLAP is a two-phase assessment designed to evaluate and assess aircraft life through the 
teardown and inspection of fleet-representative landing gear structures and existing test 
articles, an analytical assessment of existing and new data, and a structural test of aft 
fuselage arresting gear structures.  The targeted goals for this test and evaluation process 
are to assess and determine candidates for SLEP.  
Following the SLAP evaluation and data collection, a Service Life Extension 
Program (SLEP) is initiated for selected candidates.  The purpose of SLEP is to provide 
rework and/or inspection based extensions to produce, in the case of the F/A-18, an 
arrested landing extension to 2700 flight hours, a total landing extension to 14,500 flight 
hours, extension of flight control surfaces beyond 6,000 flight hours, and to provide new 
insight into hidden corrosion prone areas.   
The rework will implement Engineering Change Proposal (ECP-904) that 
replaces the center barrel and surrounding structures of the F/A-18 and “zeros” out the 
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Fleet Life Expectancy (FLE) counter in this section which allows the aircraft to be flown 
an additional 6,000 hours (see Figure 13).  The total cost of ECP-904 is $878 million and 
is currently scheduled to begin fleet implementation in December 2001.   
 
Figure 13.   ECP–904 Center Barrel and Surrounding Structure Replacement. 
(From NASNI NADEP) 
 
Although these initiatives are intended to provide extended life for current assets, 
these methods are limited in their ability to assess aging problems as they occur.  These 
rework methodologies assume systems incur aging problems with the increased age of 
the system, when in fact systems experience aging characteristics soon after acquisition.  
Additionally, these methodologies do not factor in the increased operational 
commitments performed by the weapon systems.   
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The aging issues at hand include the areas of structural fatigue, hydraulics 
corrosion, operation/flight controls degradation, maintenance contamination (inadvertent 
damage due to maintenance), wire cracking and fatigue, and depot level maintenance 
deferral.  Easily inferred, aging weapon systems creates increased requirements for 
manpower, resources, and specialized training to counteract the deteriorating impacts to 
the aging systems.  
D. CROSSBOW FRAMEWORK APPLIED 
The CROSSBOW sustainment and maintenance concepts seeks to mitigate and 
deter age-related issues through real time data collection with up to the minute Fleet Life 
Expectancy (FLE) tracking, and improvements in forecasting and trend analysis.  With 
comprehensive system visibility and near real-time weapon system status, aging 
degradations can be tracked, assessed for impact, and repaired when required rather than 
reacted to when planned with current repair methodologies.   
Aging symptoms, as a whole (e.g., structural fatigue, hydraulics corrosion, 
operation/flight controls degradation), are accurately diagnosed by the prognostic and 
diagnostic systems derived by the PHM system (Autonomic Maintenance Module) as 
well as detected by the Condition Based Maintenance multi-sensor systems.  Tracked on 
an asset-by-asset basis by the Autonomic Logistics Module for component degradation 
data, this information is automatically cached within the Total Asset Visibility database 
and instantly relayed to all major stakeholders for analysis and planning assisted by the 
Decision Support System (C4I).   
Maintenance contamination caused by continuous handling of systems and access 
panels, coupled with poorly trained technicians, represent another aging determinant.  
Maintenance contamination is lessened with highlighted training requirements identified 
through shared data between the Training module, TAV database, and the Autonomic 
Maintenance module.  Focused schoolhouse training, online/interactive training for 
inexperienced technicians, and refresher training for seasoned technicians ensure proper 
instruction when and where it is needed.  Vendor/Contractor visibility of problem areas 
would lead to the design of easily removed and replaced modular systems and panels, 
designed with human factors in mind, significantly lessening the deteriorating aspects of 
 56
system and component handling.  Additionally, CBM and PHM systems would 
accurately measure system operability, precluding the need to remove panels or handle 
systems needlessly.   
Widespread Wire Damage (WWD) could be detected early on through PHM 
identification of wire insulation deterioration, either caused by chafing or polymer chain 
scission [Eaton, n.d.].  A difference in signal strength would be noted by trend analysis 
tools and compared against a known baseline for significance.  Comparative and 
qualitative differences would be relayed to the Autonomic Maintenance Module for 
scheduling, inspection, and repair actions if necessary. The Vendor/Contractor module 
would also receive needed data to identify potential causes of WWD, initiate necessary 
repair actions, and prompt engineering changes to preclude future damage.  CBM would 
inhibit potential maintenance deterioration caused by human factors. 
Depot level maintenance deferral is believed to produce considerable cost savings 
with the delaying of weapon systems overhauls until absolutely needed.  This premise is 
based upon repair of systems only as they reach maturity.  The flaw in this premise is the 
determination of maturity.  Current methodologies are unable to ascertain component 
aging degradation within its current life cycle.  Questionably, depot engineers believe 
they can predict up to 78 percent of Fleet Life Expectancy (FLE) remaining in an aircraft.  
Through implementation of a robust data collection method (TAV database) coupled with 
specialized forecasting tools, FLE could be predicted with greater accuracy [Brown, 
2000].  
The aging of systems cannot by prevented.  However, the accurate and timely 
detection of improper operating parameters allow for key repair action before significant 
deterioration or catastrophic component failure occurs.  Made possible by PHM and 
improved forecasting and trend analysis tools, the CROSSBOW Autonomic Maintenance 
Module reacts quickly and decisively in the repair of the system.  The Autonomic 
Logistics Module tracks the component data for failure trends.  The TAV database 
collects the data while the Intelligent Agents search the data for prevalent aging system 
symptoms.  The Vendor/Contractor Module provides the OEM accurate information to 
repair or re-engineer the aging problem area.  The Training Module provides an adequate 
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assessment of fleet maintenance needs to focus the training on critical areas.  The C4I 
Module, aided by the Decision Support System, is able to present an accurate status of 
weapon systems as they experience aging factors.  Brought together, the CROSSBOW 
sustainment framework produces a robust system analysis and decision centered 
approach to aging weapon systems currently not available to the fleet (see Figure 14). 
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Increased funding for aging system research, manpower, and spare procurements 
will aid to some extent.  However, according to the February 2001 GAO report, Navy 
studies differed on the rate of cost increases and the types of support costs impacted by 
age and at least one other study indicates consistent and reliable data were not available 
for long enough periods to demonstrate the impacts of age.  This report infers the data the 
Navy is collecting (in 3M systems) is not meeting the minimum requirements to justify 
Congressional budget movement towards additional funding for appropriations for this 
funding intensive problem.   
The solution lies in an integrated proactive, strategic maintenance management 
program enabled by technologies demonstrated within the CROSSBOW framework.  As 
weapon systems age and budgets continue to become more constrained, a realistic 
assessment of system operability is not only desirable, but also essential.  The 
CROSSBOW sustainment concepts systematically identify degradation and problems as 
they occur, and derive solutions as they are needed.  Able to access current data, 
extrapolate trends, and offer evaluation, the CROSSBOW sustainment concepts presents 
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VI. NAVY CULTURE 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Potentially, the greatest challenge faced in implementing logistics and 
maintenance innovations, such as the CROSSBOW logistics concept, is Navy culture.  
Despite the magnitude of life cycle support costs, one F/A-18 costs $4 million per year 
(Naval Aviation Logistics Data Analysis, 2000b), the emphasis of cost remains 
myopically with the initial acquisition purchase price.  Given little voice during the 
design of the weapon system, logisticians face unrealistic system reliability estimates 
which drives the increased need for spares, decreases readiness, and increases O&M costs 
for sustaining the system [Eaton, n.d.].   
Faced with supporting maintenance intensive weapon systems, technicians and 
logisticians are initiated into a culture of learning to do more with less and performing the 
mission at all cost.  Failure in the successful performance of a mission is deemed an 
unacceptable outcome.  Rather than fail, technicians (and commands) resort to shortcuts, 
work-arounds, and misrepresentations of readiness to feign the appearance of mission 
readiness.  This dangerous acceptance of fabricating mission readiness permeates from 
the lowest technical shop up to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  In response to Joint Chiefs of 
Staff failure to accurately report the military readiness to the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, Senator McCain said to the Chiefs, the fact [is] that you were not candid to 
this member in the problems and challenges that we faced [New York Times, 1998].  
This assessment addresses some of the more prevalent cultural issues within the 
Navy that must be addressed in order to effect positive change in logistics and 
maintenance. 
B.  BACKGROUND 
Culture is best defined as the set of assumptions, beliefs, values, and norms that 
are shared among members [Newstrom et. al, 1993].  The culture is integral to an 
organization’s success as it defines the mission, provides stability and continuity within 
the organization, and provides the context for events that would otherwise seem 
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confusing or misleading.  Culture permeates an organization and is strongly influenced 
by top management.   
Navy logistics and maintenance practices have remained largely unchanged for 
the past thirty years.  Arguably, so has the logistics and maintenance culture - despite the 
fall of the U.S.S.R. and a dramatic downsizing of Naval forces from 600 ships to 317 
[Chief of Naval Information, 2001].  This culture has struggled to define new missions, 
assess shifting priorities, and deal with increasing scrutiny from Congressional 
stakeholders wanting the most bang for their appropriated bucks.  However, with little 
change to the inefficiently massive infrastructure that provides support, an ever-
increasing operational tempo, and the establishment of new asymmetric threats that 
pressure forces to respond in new ways - the inefficient aspects of the Navy culture are 
greatly exposed which undermine readiness.   
Some of the more prevalent sub-optimizing aspects of Navy culture include:  
1. The lack of spares, exacerbated by progressive weapon system aging, 
impels technicians to cannibalize for replacement parts to repair weapon 
systems. As quoted from the September 2001 Navy Times, “At VF-101, 
the fleet replacement squadron for F-14 Tomcats based at Naval Air 
Station Oceana, VA, the aviators are feeling the crunch of old airplanes 
and a shortage in spare parts.  “We have the money to fly the jets, but we 
don’t have the parts to repair the jets,” stated one of the instructor pilots 
[Navy Times, 2001].”  The same report cited a July 2001 GAO report 
which found that up to 17 percent of Prowlers and Tomcats were not 
mission capable due to spare-parts shortages.  The shortages were due to 
greater demands than anticipated and delays in awarding contracts for 
parts delivery from 1993 to 2000.  This lack of spares, coupled with the 
weapon system aging problem, translates into undesired maintenance 
practices such as cannibalization - or the removal of parts from one 
aircraft to repair another.  This type of practice typically doubles the 
amount of work necessary to repair the aircraft and decreases overall 
reliability.   
2. Navy culture maintains the principle of performance of the mission at all 
costs.  This credo often pushes the boundaries of risk whereby jury-
rigging, cannibalizations, and fast fixes become commonly acceptable in 
light of reduced spares availability and unreliable weapon systems.  
Coupled with a shoot the messenger approach to negative mission 
performance and readiness reporting, few Sailors are willing to 
countermand this unsaid edict of performance. 
 62
3. Critical influxes of acquisition funding are routinely diverted to offset 
operational shortfalls.  The number of procurements of new aircraft has 
commonly been sacrificed to compensate for the sparing and support 
shortfalls.  The fiscal 2002 budget proposal was projected to buy 88 new 
airplanes.  The goal for buying new major equipment (i.e., airplanes), or 
recapitalization, was between 180 and 210 to offset attrition rates.  From 
1998 to 2001, the Navy transferred 7.5 billion dollars from recapitalization 
accounts to readiness accounts to offset degrading readiness indicators.  
Shifting funds from modernization to readiness accounts exacerbates the 
problem. 
4. Apprehension regarding advanced development through automation in 
ship operations.  Optimization of DD-21 manning, from 350 Sailors to 95, 
has met with great resistance. A commercial consultant working to 
develop the optimized manning plan noted that the Navy’s culture did not 
favor unmanned spaces and consoles.  The consultant’s view that the Navy 
tended to be very wary of automated controls was lent support by a 
Midshipman briefing at the Naval Academy where nearly fifty percent of 
the questions referred to fear of losing the redundancy of manual backups 
to that of automated systems proposed for DD-21. The Midshipman also 
expressed concern regarding manning for damage control and what 
controls were in place to ensure adequate protection in spite of minimal 
crew sizes.   
The initial design of the Oliver Hazard Perry - Class Frigate 
provided an engine control room with automated systems.  In spite of the 
controls, the Navy manned the control rooms with watch standers that 
monitored the gauges during their entire watch. 
5. Other cultural issues include: 
• No incentives are provided to develop and unilaterally integrate 
weapon systems to optimize life cycle support.  On the contrary, 
Program Managers (PMs), system engineers, and OEMs strive for 
system performance while largely ignoring the premise of 
establishing commonality between weapon systems.  Integrated 
open systems architectures that enable true integrated logistics and 
maintenance support are seldom considered early in the 
development phase of any weapon system.   
• During initial acquisition, reliability estimates provided by the 
OEM engineers are critical in establishing sparing levels and 
technical support criteria.  Experience has shown the system 
reliability estimates to be dramatically incorrect.  The null 
hypothesis of having the OEM prove reliability estimates, as 
accurate computations, is seldom enforced [Raia, 2001].  What 
results is the development of a sustainment package based upon 
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incorrect reliability data, often producing sparing shortages, test 
equipment shortages, and decreased readiness.     
• Navy support commands operate under conflicting incentives that 
reward individual organization performance vice weapon system 
support.  Navy item managers base their performance on 
misleading measurement criteria that provides deceiving 
operational support determinations. Measurement criteria such as 
Supply Material Availability (SMA), Number of Backorders, and 
Average Customer Wait Time (ACWT), or Supply Response Time 
(SRT), have little to do with operational readiness and are self 
serving for the managers within the support command [Kang, 
1997].   
• The reward system for operational Commanding Officers is not 
judiciously coupled to the proficient use of budgets or efficient use 
of weapon systems.  Reprimands are levied, by higher commands, 
if all operational funding is not expended by the end of the fiscal 
year.  Promotions are coupled to the number of aircraft hours 
flown, number of ship steaming hours performed, and 
maximization of fuel allocation/usage.  Little regard is given to the 
operational stress placed on the weapon systems and personnel as 
they are pushed ever harder to outperform the prior COs 
accomplishment.  
C.  THE NEED FOR CHANGE 
The increasing cost of weapon systems (acquisitions) dictates the need to 
intelligently maintain these systems by reducing the cost of the support infrastructure 
while increasing operational availability - as well as not trading off logistics 
supportability features for more quantity or performance. This will only be accomplished 
with a significant paradigm shift in current acquisition, logistics, and maintenance 
methodologies.  This cannot be accomplished without support from top leadership - 
without a committed and lasting champion.  
Firm program readiness targets must be established that re-acclimate the 
acquisition stakeholders to balancing the variables between acquisition costs, system 
reliability, and system sustainability.  This paradigm shift will require the use of new 
models, such as the Brandenburger-Nalebuff model, that facilitates these new and often 
contradicting requirements [Brandenburger-Nalebuff, 1996].    
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Rewards and incentives must be realigned to congruently direct all resources, 
manpower, and intellectual capital in the common pursuit of system optimization.  
Singular and self-serving incentives must be discouraged to signal, throughout the Navy 
logistics culture, that new and more prominent priorities are now emplaced.  
The suggestion of a new logistics professional should be addressed.  System 
designs are becoming increasingly complex requiring better-trained professionals.  Most 
readings rationally discussed comprehensive use of logistics engineers to offset the 
increasing complexity [Moore, n.d].  One prominent expert recommends the 
implementation of a two-tier system for logistics skill sets.  The first tier would 
encapsulate acquisition logisticians with engineering degrees (e.g., mechanical, electrical) 
while the second tier would be made up of sustainment logisticians with general business 
degrees (e.g., finance, acquisition).  The acquisition logisticians would be better suited in 
the complex and engineering-intensive acquisition environment while the sustainment 
logistician would be best trained in the business aspects of Navy supply support.  Tightly 
aligned system goals would ensure mutuality between the parallel logisticians’ efforts to 
preclude professional enmity [Eaton, n.d.]. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Any attempt to fundamentally change the current logistics and maintenance 
methodologies will not be successful without addressing the issues of culture.  Issues 
such as incentives/reward system, current support paradigms, and establishing trust will 
require intelligent shaping to ensure a sustainment system, such as the CROSSBOW 
sustainment concepts, is properly aligned with the culture.  CROSSBOW’s integrated and 
automated monitoring and reporting systems will help alleviate apprehension, but will 
still require unequivocal support from Navy culture.  
Proactive planning, courage, active involvement on all levels of support, and a 
clear vision are the essential impetus to begin the cultural change.  The establishment of 
empowered logisticians and maintenance officers at critical levels of acquisition, 
sustainment planning, and life cycle cost analysis, will initiate a change of perspective in 
weapon system support.  The alignment of incentives with increasing system operability 
will establish congruence between resource providers and mission needs.  Rewarding 
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Commanding Officers for mission performance instead of successful expenditure of 
resources will exert critical resources only as needed - reducing the operational stress 
placed on weapon systems.  
Most importantly, a climate of efficiency, increased innovation, and candor will 
eventually characterize the Navy support structure.  Readers of this chapter have reason 
to be skeptical.  Years of cultural inertia, Department of Defense bureaucracy, shifting 
political agendas, and stalwart military gate-keepers suggest significant change is not 
only impractical, but virtually impossible given the current Navy mindset.  However, 
nothing short of significant change will remedy the shortcomings of the current 
acquisition and sustainment methodologies.   
Technologies and innovative methodologies exist today that, if successfully 
integrated into a coherent and formulated manner, will provide substantial returns in 
efficiency translating into increased system operability and LCC avoidance.  These 
innovations are moot without top-level support and a Navy culture that embraces logistic 
supportability change rather than relegating it to its current level of unimportance. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter presents the general conclusions and recommendations that follow 
from the thesis. 
Conclusion 1.  The current logistics and maintenance environment is manpower 
intensive, inadequately supported with Jurassic data systems, sustained within an 
inefficient infrastructure, and inflexible to emerging operational requirements. 
Recommendation 1.  The Navy should invest in the research and technology 
development areas listed in the Roadmap (Appendix C).  The effort should be in 
designing and integrating weapon systems with logistics and maintenance as a design 
criteria rather than a post design provision.   
Conclusion 2.  Emerging technologies, as presented in Appendix C, are critical 
for reducing manpower requirements, enhancing training, increasing asset visibility, 
reducing maintenance requirements, decreasing repair cycle time, and increasing 
operational availability - thereby translating into the sustainment of an effective and 
dynamic weapon system.  The CROSSBOW sustainment concept provides a general 
example of an integrated framework with new technologies and methodologies that are 
obtainable now.    
Recommendation 2.  The Navy should assume the null hypothesis that currently 
used technologies and methodologies will not adequately support the accelerated 
battlefield tempo and autonomous operations expected in the year 2020.  Given this 
premise, all effort should be expended now to conduct analysis, within a Systems 
Architecture/Engineering methodology, to adapt and integrate new technologies and 
methodologies to meet the requirements of the future Naval force.     
Conclusion 3.  Life Cycle Cost Analysis indicated significant cost savings were 
possible with the acquisition and fielding of the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle. 
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Comparative analysis supported this assessment whereby the reduced sustainment 
cost for a UCAV could be directly translated into the purchase and utilization of more 
unmanned aircraft.  Additionally, the UCAV development and sustainment costs were a 
fraction of current F/A-18C aircraft costs.  Removal of the human from the cockpit 
realized a training cost reduction of 99.1 percent.     
Recommendation 3.  The increasing use of unmanned vehicles provides 
indication of the utility of these systems.  The Navy should not only establish a UCAV 
implementation plan, but a robust robotics implementation plan to eventually fully 
integrate these systems into Naval operations.    
Conclusion 4.  The UCAV’s reduced requirement for performing flight for 
training reduced repair requirements throughout the repair pipeline - lending to 
consideration of reducing or eliminating intermediate level repair.  
Recommendation 4.  The reduction in flight hours required to maintain 
proficiency is dramatically reduced with the simulation training provided with the UCAV 
system.  Reduced flight hours translated into less maintenance actions that inferred a 
reduced I-level or a direct O-level to Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) logistics 
pipeline might be undertaken.  With the implementation of a direct O-level to OEM 
methodology, the idea of a truly centralized Inventory Control Point (ICP) for the UCAV 
support infrastructure could be entertained.  This concept would require a robust interface 
between commercial carriers and military transport as well as improvements in the 
interface between the current Navy ATAC and DOD transportation system. 
Conclusion 5.  Using Arena 5.0 Simulation tools, the analysis determined that an 
increase in efficiencies between 10 and 30 percent, imposed upon a baseline model, 
produced an optimal range of Operational Availability of 77 to 86 percent. The optimal 
range serves as  a target for the implementation of new technologies and methodologies.  
Recommendation 5.  The increased capabilities of simulation software tools 
provide tremendous flexibility and strength in assessing system characteristics and 
behavior.  The Navy should invest in a comprehensive simulation and modeling program 
for all major systems.    
Conclusion 6.  Despite the destructive impacts of Aging Weapon Systems, the 
utilization of Prognostic Health Monitoring systems (PHM), Condition Based 
Maintenance (CBM), and Total Asset Visibility tools help to mitigate the effects.   
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Recommendation 6.  The Navy should invest in a proactive and strategic 
maintenance management program enabled by technologies demonstrated within the 
CROSSBOW framework.  As weapon systems age and budgets continue to become more 
constrained, a realistic assessment of system operability is not only desirable but also 
essential.  The CROSSBOW sustainment concept systematically identifies problems as 
they occur, and derives solutions, as they are needed.  Able to take current data, 
extrapolate trends, and offer evaluation, the CROSSBOW logistics concept presents a 
potential resolution to a significant maintenance and readiness problem.  
Conclusion 7.  Navy culture serves as a major roadblock in the implementation of 
new systems.  These cultural issues must be addressed in order to effect positive change 
in logistics and maintenance methodologies. 
Recommendation 7.  Recognizing the fundamental need for change, a number of 
cultural issues must be addressed that include: 
• The need for top-level support to create a vision and a politically powerful 
champion 
• Established readiness targets to re-acclimate acquisition stakeholders 
• Re-aligning rewards and incentives for congruence of mission needs with 
mission resources 
• The potential establishment of a new type of logistics officer to address 
the ever increasing complexities of new weapon systems 
These problems are not all inclusive of the cultural issues faced, but largely 
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APPENDIX A.  SEA ARCHER MNS – VERSION 1 
SEA ARCHER MISSION NEED STATEMENT FOR 
CROSSBOW Version 1 
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A. SEA ARCHER MISSION NEED STATEMENT FOR CROSSBOW 
(VERSION 1) 
1. General Description of Operational Capability 
a. Mission Area 
(1) The U.S. National Security Strategy has shifted from a focus on a 
global threat to a focus on regional challenges and interests in the littoral.  While the 
prospect of global war has receded, we are entering a period of enormous uncertainty in 
regions critical to our national interests.  Our forces can help to shape the future in ways 
favorable to our interests by underpinning our alliances, precluding threats, and helping 
to preserve the strategic position we won with the end of the Cold War.  Naval Forces 
will be full participants in the principal elements of this strategy--strategic deterrence and 
defense, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution. The Naval White Papers 
“Forward From the Sea” and Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFFTS) provide 
direction to the U.S. Navy (USN) and the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) concerning the 
challenges of the post-Cold War world and shift the operational focus of naval forces 
from the open ocean to the world's littorals. The concept of Littoral Warfare emphasizes 
the capability of naval forces as a forward deployed crisis response force to deter conflict 
in the littorals, and to prevent escalation and restore stability where deterrence has failed. 
These Naval forces will meet far greater threats in numbers, quality and intelligence of 
weapons. As simultaneous coordinated attacks come with larger number of all types of 
weapons (from subsurface, surface, air and space), any Naval force will have far less time 
to plan and carry out defensive and offensive operations.  This view of a combat 
operation in the time frame of 2020 will require a mix of all types of Airborne missions 
both manned and unmanned operating from the Sea Archer class ship.  For planning 
purposes, the CROSSBOW equipped task force will embark from San Diego for the 
South China Sea in September of 2021.  All new Missions, Technologies, Equipment, 
and Operations Strategies must have Follow on Operational Test and Evaluation 
completed by the Summer of 2021. 
(2) The state of the world in Asia in 2020 is defined by the final report of 
the SEI 1 class and the two books by Michael Pillsbury on China.  With a far greater 
emphasis on joint and combined operations, the Navy, Marine Corps, Army and Air 
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Force will provide unique capabilities of indispensable value in meeting our future 
security challenges especially in the littorals.  Ready, relevant, and capable American 
Naval Expeditionary Forces provide:  a powerful yet unobtrusive presence, strategic 
deterrence, control of the seas, extended and continuous on-scene crisis response, precise 
power projection from the sea, and sea lift if larger scale war-fighting scenarios emerge.  
These maritime capabilities are particularly well tailored for the forward presence and 
crisis response missions articulated in the emerging National Security Strategy.  The 
requirement for the capability to deploy, transport, and project landing forces in sufficient 
strength and capacity for the conduct of up through Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) 
level amphibious operations without nearby land bases for support has been identified in 
the Marine Corps Master Plan (MCMP) 1996-2006. 
(3) Our ability to command the seas in areas where we anticipate future 
operations allows us to resize our naval forces and to concentrate on those capabilities 
required in the complex operating environment of the littoral or coastlines of the earth.  
Naval Expeditionary Forces maneuver from the sea using their dominance of littoral 
areas to mass forces rapidly and generate high intensity, precise offensive firepower at 
the time and location of their choosing, under any weather conditions, day or night.  
Operating in the Littorals requires mobility, flexibility and technology to mass strength 
against weakness in a timely manner. 
(4) Our National Security Strategy Requires a Strong Forcible Entry 
Capability into the littoral areas and adjacent land.  As discussed in detail in the 
Department of the Navy’s Concept of “From the Sea”, America’s interests will continue 
to dictate the necessity to influence events on the other side of our protective oceans.  
While even the viability of political reinforcement, by uncontested1 forward-presence 
forces, requires a credible forcible entry capability, the requirement to respond against an 
invader or international outlaw requires the unquestionable ability to place power in the 
littorals and ashore.   In 2020 with few adjacent land bases in the world, the requisite 
sustainable, forcible entry capability can only come from the sea.  In this time frame, 
allied forces will be required to enter areas defended by integrated systems of modern 
space, air, sea, and ground weapons.  While some defenses will consist of relatively 
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immobile forces and fixed positions, others will include mobile, combined-arms units-
backed by space weapons, naval and air craft (manned and unmanned) and employing the 
newest unmanned vehicles, missiles and mines against our planes, ships, and landing 
forces. Design of operations and forces to defeat these opponents must accommodate our 
societal intolerance of attrition and demands for victory. 
(5) “Forward From the SEA”(FFFTS) is a concept for projecting naval 
power in the littorals and ashore in support of a strategic objective.  Essentially, FFTS is 
the application of maneuver warfare principles to the maritime portion of a theater 
campaign, capitalizing on the ever-expanding capabilities of modern naval airborne 
forces (manned and unmanned) to project power in an increasingly sophisticated and 
lethal environment. Operations are designed to break the cohesion and integration of 
enemy defenses while avoiding attrition oriented attacks.  Emphasis will be placed on 
speed, mobility, deception, surprise, and other measures of battlefield preparation that 
confuse or create uncertainty and delay in the enemy’s actions. Our ultimate desire is to 
destroy his will to fight or carry out actions contrary to the interests of the United States. 
(6) FFTS is a single, seamless operation extending from homeports to 
secure sea bases across the littoral to dominate a critical enemy center of gravity.  The 
FFTS concept requires a single force that can change its character with its environment 
but always operate with a single objective. FFTS brings all facets of sea power to bear; it 
replaces our recent history of separately controlled movement, supporting operations, 
landings, and maneuver ashore.  The next generation of technology provides our 
opportunity to close the batt1efield mobility gap between space assets, airborne 
operations, ship firepower and on shore forces, to link maneuver in ships, space assets, 
airborne operations with maneuver ashore. 
(7) Increased operational speed will be the sum of more rapid decisions of 
command, faster methods of control, quicker execution, higher speed of sea borne 
systems, and blurring distinction between maneuver at sea and maneuver in the littorals.  
Relative operational speed (the difference between our speed and that of the enemy) will 
increase as enemy operations are degraded by simultaneous surprise, deception, strikes, 
fires, and special / information operations.  The moment of achieving superior operational 
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tempo will be reached when the frequency of our operations do not allow our opponent to 
respond effectively or maintain cohesion of his forces. 
(8) While strike and special operations are complementary forms of sea 
power projection, new technologies, equipment, and tactics will be required to allow the 
navy after next to gain superiority in the littorals.  The conduct of a littoral operation 
encompasses almost all types of ships, aircraft, weapons, and landing forces of the U.S. 
Navy and Marine Corps in a collaborative military effort. The salient requirement of the 
littoral operation is the necessity of rapidly building up combat power from an initial 
level of zero to full coordinated striking power to gain success and maintain objectives. 
(9) Future naval forces will be structured and equipped to project combat 
power in the littorals to seize control of the crisis arena for follow-on joint operations. 
Power projection requires air, space and water mobility, speed, firepower, and a versatile 
mix of survivable vehicles that enable launch in nearly all weather from a sea base of 
versatile ships.  The force provides standoff (Battle space) for the Naval Task Force to 
enable the effective employment of active/passive defense systems against enemy air and 
surface-fired weapons, avoids the major sea mine threat and avoids attrition.  The Battle 
space will be very complex around the task force with large numbers of enemy and 
friendly manned and unmanned vehicles in the air. 
b. Type of System Proposed 
Title 10, U.S. Code, directs the Navy to develop equipment used for 
maritime operations.  This MNS addresses the operational capabilities and design 
considerations for Sea Archer, the centerpiece of the CROSSBOW Battle Group. 
c. Operational Concept 
(1) As part of the Navy after Next initiative, the Navy plans to introduce a 
new Battle Group concept called CROSSBOW (Figure 1), designed from the bottom up 
for littoral operation. This new force should operate primarily in the littoral environment 
as a complement to the CV Battle Group (CVBG) and yet be capable of operations 
independent of the CVBG during certain Military Operations Other Than War 
(MOOTW) and low intensity conflicts.  CROSSBOW should provide additional assets to 
assist in the penetration of the littorals to suppress/soften enemy Integrated Air Defenses 
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(IAD) and area denial capability to provided CVBG access.  When low intensity or 
MOOTW activities lead to escalation, CROSSBOW provides a credible force to harass 
and suppress enemy forces, while awaiting CVBG arrival.  CROSSBOW forces may 
consist of squadrons of Sea Archers, small expeditionary aircraft carriers (approximately 
6-8 –actual number yet to be determined through analysis) operating in concert with up to 
20 Sea Lance, which are small, low cost, high-speed combatants capable of deploying the 
Expeditionary Warfare Grid (EWG) and providing offensive and defensive missile fires.   
By using distributed sea based air assets, CROSSBOW should be capable of supporting 
continuous, rather than pulsed, air operations.  The Sea Archer air wing, CV air wing, Sea 
Lance, and other escorts operating in the area of action will provide force protection and 
offensive firepower. One or more Sea Quivers, which are high-speed support ships, 
should provide logistic and maintenance support for the CROSSBOW Battle Group.  The 
smallest CROSSBOW operational element is envisioned to consist of two Sea Archers 
and four Sea Lances capable of operating independently.  
(2) The Sea Archer air wing should consist manned and Unmanned Air 
Vehicles (UAVs).  For air vehicle quantities and other planning factors see Table 1.  
Flight deck design should focus on automation.  High-speed launch and recovery 
operations should take place from an unmanned flight deck. The Sea Archer air wing 
provides the eyes and ears of the CROSSBOW force.  Targeting and reconnaissance 
information should be provided via appropriate data links to Sea Lance and armed 
airborne units for a coordinated engagement.  A significant number of airborne missions 
must be launched from the Sea Archer to support a CROSSBOW Battle Group operating 
in the littoral environment.    No single airborne platform is expected to accomplish all of 
the required missions and all missions do not need to launch from a single Sea Archer.  It 
is recognized that some missions may require the simultaneous operation of more than 
one of any given airborne platform type.  Airborne capabilities are detailed in the 
CROSSBOW Airborne Systems MNS and highlighted in Figure 2.   
(3) Sea Archer may have the ability to act as a “Lillie pad” (recover, fuel, 
& launch) for AV-8s, VTOL JSFs, and helicopters under 30K lbs max gross weight.  Sea 
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* These are very preliminary – campaign analysis mini-studies & further research on platforms will help to 
refine the numbers. Additionally, launch intervals and turn-around times need to be specified. 
 
Table 1. Planning Factors. 
 
d. Support Concept 
(1) Historically, requirements definition for system logistics and 
maintenance support has been left until far too late in the acquisition cycle.  Early and 
rigorous logistics analysis is needed to prevent excessive Operations and Support (O&S) 
costs.  Weapon system capability rates have been in a steady decline due to reduced 
budgets, system operation beyond intended design life, inaccurate failure rate projections, 
and closed/proprietary architectures.  Sea Archer design must facilitate rapid and cost-
controlled incorporation of new technologies as they become available. 
(2) Supportability, maintainability, and reliability should be designed into 
Sea Archer.  The ship should have an embedded logistics/maintenance system to improve 
readiness throughout its lifecycle.  Significant O&S cost reductions may be realized 
through decreased repairs, spares, repair man-hours, and support infrastructure.  
Additionally, adequate bandwidth must be provided to support Network Centric 
Logistics. 
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(3) Recognizing that a Level Of Repair Analysis (LORA) has not been 
completed, the CROSSBOW concepts calls for Sea Archer to conduct only 
organizational level maintenance.  All higher levels of maintenance are anticipated to be 
the responsibility of the Sea Quiver support ship, which should act like a tender for major 
repairs.  Aircraft onboard Sea Archer may follow a similar plan and only conduct 
organizational level servicing, repair and troubleshooting.  Remove and replace activities 
should be the emphasis.  The Sea Quiver should be capable of recovering any Sea Archer 
aircraft on its flight deck. 
2. Projected Threat 
The threat to naval forces in 2020 will lie in the proliferation of high-tech/low-
cost weaponry and sensors. These systems will be designed to inflict maximum damage 
by simple saturation of own-ship sensors and defensive measures. 
a. Major Threat Areas 
(1) Space. Space may continue to represent the primary 
information conduit for U.S. forces - which includes, but is not limited to, Command and 
Control, targeting, and reconnaissance. New weapons should reach maturity whose 
purpose is to destroy these vulnerable assets - lasers and particle beams are examples, 
from the ground, the air, and space. 
(2) Air. UAVs may be the platform of choice for future 
combatants.  The absence of pilot constraints, namely G-forces, will allow designers to 
incorporate radical maneuvering capabilities.  UAVs are also generally less expensive 
than their manned counterpart. This may lead to attacks of large numbers of aircraft, most 
small, difficult to detect, and once detected difficult to counter due to it exceptional 
maneuverability. With advances in propulsion systems, new long range cruise missiles 
should have loiter and wait capabilities that far exceed those of today. And with the 
miniaturization of explosive ordnance, much smaller missiles are likely.  Payloads for 
tomorrow’s high-altitude aircraft may include precision guided munitions, lasers, particle 
beams, and EMP weapons. 
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(3) Surface. Large numbers of advanced, relatively inexpensive 
long range Anti-ship Missiles (ASMs) may be employed against our forces. Grand sea 
battles will be fought over the horizon (OTH), much akin to those of WWII carrier duels. 
But in this case, ASMs and UCAVs may replace manned fighters, bombers, and torpedo 
planes. Torpedo technology will enable extremely long-range torpedoes to be sent to 
loiter or wait in standby on the bottom. Extremely high-speed torpedoes may be capable 
of overtaking even the fastest of surface ships.   
(4) Undersea. Nations will employ generation after next 
submarine technology, including the capability to mask in the noise of the ocean, making 
them virtually undetectable. These submarines may be capable of deploying ultra-high 
explosive mines, extremely high-speed torpedoes, Special Forces, and missiles. 
(5) Info-sphere.  Information Warfare poses a threat to secured 
communications networks that can be attacked directly, and anonymously, by foreign 
powers or terrorist organizations. Traditional military weapons are ineffective against 
enemy information operations. Indeed, adversaries may use electronic espionage, 
sabotage, psychological warfare attacks, digital deception, and hacker attacks to 
neutralize our traditional forces. Command and Control nodes may be the targets of 
choice. 
b. Common Threads Amongst These Threats Include 
(1) Enhanced multi-source intelligence collection and Information 
Warfare Operations. 
(2) Enhanced tactical mobility systems that reduce reaction time, protect 
the littorals, and improve firepower and sea protection. 
(3) Higher-volume, longer-range targeting, command, control, and 
communications. 
(4) Enhanced counter-mobility capability by using land and shallow water 
mines. 
(5) Increased availability, numbers and accuracy of precision guided 
munitions. 
(6) Increased lethality and reliability of weapon systems [The possible use 
of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)]. 
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(7) Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities to monitor, direct find, jam and 
deceive in the Radio Frequency (RF) and electro-optical spectrums. 
(8) Early attack and disruption of supplies and logistics. 
(9) The ability to reach into the blue water ocean with submarines, smart 
mines and aircraft carriers. 
(10) Ability to take advantage of the sea and land terrain close to shores. 
(11) Own system saturation due to number of aircraft, missiles, and 
rockets in the air at the same time, dramatically increasing the probability of attrition. 
3. Shortcoming of Existing Systems 
There is no existing system with the capability the Sea Archer is being asked to 
provide.  The emergence of UAVs / UCAVs, the continued U.S. Navy focus on the 
littorals, the desire for force distribution, the need for operational cost reductions, and the 
advent of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) all combine to support a requirement to re-
think how future warfare will likely be waged in the littoral.  A ship has never before 
been designed, from the bottom up, to support the operation of a primarily UAV / UCAV 
air wing in a high-threat environment.  Sea Archer will be the first. The CVBG projects 
power and dominates the blue waters in which it sails.  The object of the CROSSBOW 
Battle Group is to augment CV capabilities in the contested littorals of the world. 
4. Operational Constraints 
a. Environmental 
Sea Archer should remain fully operational in all environments up to and 
including sea state 4 (threshold)/5 (objective), regardless of time of day, whether 
conducting independent or force operations, in heavy weather or in the presence of 
electromagnetic interference, or chemical, biological, or radioactive (CBR) 
contamination.   Internal operating spaces should have full CBR protection, and hanger 
decks at least conditional (personal protection required). Automated Damage Control 
(DC) should be provided. Sea Archer should be able to transit through sea state 6.  Sea 
Archer minimum operational water depth should be commensurate with the littorals of 
the world to within 20nm of the beach (threshold), 10nm (objective).   
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b. Maneuverability 
Sea Archer should be capable of sustained speeds of 40 knots (threshold), 
and 60 knots (objective).  Operational speeds of 60 knots for 20 minutes (threshold), 40 
minutes (objective) are necessary for optimal air operations under light wind conditions.  
For air operations, ship motion should not exceed 3 degrees pitch, 8 degrees roll, and 
vertical accelerations of 0.5g. 
c. Staying Power 
It is assumed that the Sea Quiver supply ship would have similar transit 
speeds and should accompany a squadron of Sea Archers on deployment.  Sea Archer 
should be capable of sustained combat operations of three days (threshold) / seven days 
(objective) without re-supply.  A CROSSBOW Battle Group should be capable of 90 
days of self-sustained peacetime operations 
d. Size/Cost 
Sea Archer should be able to use current USN port facilities.  Sea Archer 
must be small enough to ensure that force distribution (squadron of 6-8 ships) is 
affordable and yet large enough to launch and recover the CROSSBOW air wing. A 
squadron of Sea Archers and their air wing should be roughly equivalent, in cost, to a CV 
and its air wing.  It is desired that the Sea Archer be PANAMAX constrained; however, 
this should be considered trade space.  If radical new hull designs that force PANAMAX 
to be exceeded make significant contributions to performance, then the requirement will 
be reconsidered. 
5. Required Capabilities 
a. Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) 
(1) Network Centric Warfare (NCW).  NCW is an information 
superiority-enabled concept of operations that generates increased combat power by 
networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, 
increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased 
survivability, and a degree of self-synchronization. In essence, NCW translates 
information superiority into combat power by effectively linking knowledgeable entities 
in the battle space.  Incorporation of NCW concepts is necessary for CROSSBOW to be 
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an effective force.  The Distributed Sea-based Air concept demands a highly flexible 
Command and Control Architecture with system multiplicity, and redundancy built-in to 
ensure total system availability and enhanced survivability during combat and non-
combat operations.  Therefore, all Sea Archer ships should have the same command and 
control capability. Sea Archer C4ISR should share tactical and administrative 
information using advanced networks and technologies. These new resources will 
continue to automate manual processes, but should also improve decision support 
functions through advanced modeling and simulation. Sea Archer’s information 
architecture should be designed to optimize interoperability, data access, information 
sharing, managed security and reliability of service while reducing data redundancy and 
costs. 
(2) Interoperability. Sea Archer’s communications architecture 
must be fully interoperable with other naval, expeditionary, interagency, joint and allied 
information systems.  A coherent tactical picture is necessary to support Joint Force, 
Battle Force, Battle Group and Air Wing planning, coordinate actions with other forces, 
and communicate the force’s actions to appropriate commanders.  Sea Archer must have 
the necessary command and control architecture to communicate with a Joint Force 
Commander (JFC).  Additionally, it is necessary to leverage NCW to fully integrate 
sensor and shooter into an effective and potent fighting force. The Defense Information 
Infrastructure (DII) Common Operating Environment (COE) should be used. 
(3) Control of UAVs & UCAVs. The Sea Archer should have 
responsibility for control of unmanned air vehicles within its air wing.  Direct control 
may be transferred to other elements or other Sea Archers depending on the mission.  
(4) Commander of Task Force (CTF).  The size of any given 
operation will determine who the CTF is and where he/she and staff are located.  All Sea 
Archers should be equipped to handle command and control, but should not be designed 
to accommodate a CTF staff. 
(5) Information Warfare (IW).  IW is the ability to exploit, 
corrupt, deny, or destroy an adversary’s information base while leveraging friendly 
information and information systems to achieve Dominant Battle space Awareness. As 
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information technology continues to proliferate and as our susceptibility to Offensive IW 
increases, defensive IW enables full spectrum protection.  The Sea Archer must be 
capable of 1) protecting its own information systems and 2) leveraging U.S. and allied 
information to gain a decisive advantage.  
b. Humanitarian Operations 
Sea Archer should provide empty shelter space for accommodating 30-50 
non-combatants in an emergency. This space may be used for crew recreation or 
enhanced survivability; it must not interfere with the ability of the ship to conduct normal 
functions, even with the additional passenger load onboard.  At the Battle Group 
commander’s earliest convenience, these non-combatants should be ferried to a Sea 
Quiver, CV, or other large combatant for longer-term support and transport. 
c. Survivability/Vulnerability 
Sea Archer must be able to operate aircraft in hostile environments, 
protect itself from enemy attack, and if hit, degrade gracefully and remain afloat 
(threshold); / remain afloat and launch air wing for recovery on sister ships, Sea Quiver, 
or CV (objective).  The ship survivability performance must support damage control 
operations in a reduced manning environment. To reduce vulnerability in the littorals, the 
ship should be equipped with enhanced survivability features, such as in-stride mine 
avoidance capability and full-spectrum signature reduction (Radio Frequency/Infra-
Red/Electro-Optical/Communications Conformal Apertures, reduced clutter, geometric 
shaping). Attention should be given to acoustic quieting and magnetic signature reduction 
for both equipment and propulsion systems.  Inclusion of a damage-tolerant design, and 
an integrated magazine protection system should also be considered.  
d. Self-Protection 
The ability to assess terminal threat situations quickly and correctly will 
be an essential element of Sea Archer’s weapon systems.  Shipboard defense capabilities 
should provide a protective shield against cruise missiles, submarines, torpedoes, mines, 
aircraft and other future threats. The defensive weapon systems selected must have high 
precision/accuracy, high probability of kill and high repetitive fire rates.  The generation 
after next (2020) Close In Weapon System (CIWS) replacement and a shipboard version 
of something akin to the new Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System (RAMICS) could 
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be candidates for consideration.  Sea Archer should have integrated Electronic Warfare 
(EW) capability to support ship defense.   
e. Special Operations 
Sea Archer should have the capability to embark one SEAL platoon and 
their equipment.  SEAL platoons should be embarked as required by the operational 
scenario.  When SEALs are embarked, the multi-mission helicopters (e.g. H-60) needs to 
be a part of the air wing (rather than the attack helicopters) to provide an airborne 
insertion capability. 
f. Inport Force Protection, Mooring, and Ship Access 
Sea Archer should have the means to provide adequate Inport Force 
Protection and ship access control.  Sea Archer should be able to be made fast to the 
ground, buoy, or pier and safely remain made fast in up to 30 knots of wind.  These 
systems should be as automated as possible to minimize manning requirements. 
g. Logistics Summary 
• Prognostics / Diagnostics 
• Remote Sensing Virtual Presence 
• Ship & Airborne Assets 
• All linked 
• Minimize Special Tools 
• Access to Intermediate/Depot Level Repair Information 
• Damage Control / Battle damage scenarios 
• Wireless Links to Tech Libraries (Throughout Ship) 
• Remote Access to Requisitioning & Materials Support Info 
• Design 
• Modular 
• Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) where appropriate 
• Max use of Automation & Robotics 
• Yellow gear functions 
• Stock & Storage 
• Movement of provisions from/to flight deck 
• Fueling / Armament / Storage 
• Replenishment 
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• RAS / VERTREP / CONREP 
• High-speed UNREP with Sea Quiver 
• Helicopter & RAS staging areas port & starboard 
• Fuel / Liquid transfer stations port & starboard 
• Weapons Storage 
• Small arms – SEAL platoon & Ships Company 
• New small smart munitions – 250 lb 
• Other airborne weapons  
• Missiles Rockets pods/ Mini-gun rounds / RAMAIC rounds…. 
• Rounds for CIWS replacement 
• Food stores / dry provisions / chill-freezers 
• Located near food preparation facilities 
• Capacity – 150 people for 3 months 
• Safe / reliable dumbwaiters for food transfer… 
Habitability needs follow: 
• Personnel  
• Notional – 150 (Threshold) 
• 25 Officers / 25 Chiefs / 100 Enlisted 
• 100 (Objective)  
• Enlisted spaces – 4/Stateroom 
• Refuse devices to reduce trash maintained onboard 
• Biodegradable meal containers 
• Self-service crew services 
• Laundry 
• Ship’s store 
• E-mail center 
• A/V room… 
• Workload reductions 
• Wax-less floors 
• Endurance paints 
• Paint-less surfaces 
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APPENDIX B.  SEA ARROW MNS – VERSION 2 
SEA ARROW 
 










A. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY 
1. Mission Area 
(1) National Security Strategy has shifted from a focus on a global threat to a 
focus on regional challenges and interests in Littoral waters.  While the prospect of global 
war has receded, we are entering a period of enormous uncertainty in regions critical to 
our national interests.  Our forces can help to shape the future in ways favorable to our 
interests by underpinning our alliances, precluding threats, and helping to deserve the 
strategic position we won with the end of the Cold War.  Naval Forces will be full 
participants in the principal elements of this strategy--strategic deterrence and defense, 
forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution. The Naval White Letters Forward 
From the Sea (FFTS) and Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) provide 
direction to the U.S. Navy (USN) and the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) concerning the 
challenges of the post-Cold War world and shift the operational focus of naval forces 
from the open ocean to the world's littorals. The concept of Littoral Warfare emphasizes 
the capability of naval forces as a forward deployed crisis response force to deter conflict 
in the littorals, and to prevent escalation and restore stability where deterrence has failed. 
These Naval forces will meet far greater threats in numbers, quality and intelligence of 
weapons. As simultaneous coordinated attacks come with larger number of all types of 
weapons (from subsurface, surface, air and space), any Naval force will have far less time 
to plan and carry out defensive and offensive operations.  This view of a combat 
operation in the time frame of 2020 will require a mix of all types of Airborne missions 
both manned and unmanned.  For planning purposes, the Crossbow equipped task force 
will embark from San Diego for the South China Sea in September of 2021.  All new 
Missions, Technologies, Equipment, and Operations Strategies must be validated, 
certified and practiced by Fleet Battle Experiments in the Summer of 2021. 
(2) The state of the world in Asia in 2020 is defined by the final report of the 
SEI 1 class and the two books by Michael Pillsbury on China.  With a far greater 
emphasis on joint and combined operations, the Navy, Marine Corps, Army and Air 
Force will provide unique capabilities of indispensable value in meeting our future 
security challenges especially in the littorals.  Ready, relevant, and capable American 
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Naval Expeditionary Forces provide:  a powerful yet unobtrusive presence, strategic 
deterrence, control of the seas, extended and continuous on-scene crisis response, precise 
power projection from the sea, and sea lift if larger scale war-fighting scenarios emerge.  
These maritime capabilities are particularly well tailored for the forward presence and 
crisis response missions articulated in the emerging National Security Strategy.  The 
requirement for the capability to deploy, transport, and project landing forces in sufficient 
strength and capacity for the conduct of up through Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) 
level amphibious operations without nearby land bases for support has been identified in 
the Marine Corps Master Plan (MCMP) 1996-2006. 
(3) Our ability to command the seas in areas where we anticipate future 
operations allows us to resize our naval forces and to concentrate on those capabilities 
required in the complex operating environment of the “littoral” or coastlines of the earth.  
Naval Expeditionary Forces maneuver from the sea using their dominance of littoral 
areas to mass forces rapidly and generate high intensity, precise offensive firepower at 
the time and location of their choosing, under any weather conditions, day or night.  
Operating in the Littorals requires mobility, flexibility and technology to mass strength 
against weakness in a timely manor. 
(4) Our National Security Strategy Requires a Strong Forcible Entry 
Capability into the littoral areas and adjacent land.  As discussed in detail in the 
Department of the Navy’s Concept of “From the Sea”, America’s interests will continue 
to dictate the necessity to influence events on the other side of our protective oceans.  
While even the viability of political reinforcement, by uncontested forward-presence 
forces, requires a credible forcible entry capability, the requirement to respond against an 
invader or international outlaw requires the unquestionable ability to place power in the 
littorals and ashore.  Without an adjacent land base, the requisite sustainable, forcible 
entry capability can only come from the sea and new methods of supply and maintenance 
must be developed.  Our forces will be required to enter areas defended by integrated 
systems of modern space, air, sea, and ground weapons.  While some defenses will 
consist of relatively immobile forces and fixed positions, others will include mobile, 
combined-arms units-backed by space weapons, naval and air craft (manned and 
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unmanned) and employing the newest unmanned vehicles, missiles and mines against our 
planes, ships, and landing forces. Design of operations and forces to defeat these 
opponents must accommodate our structural intolerance of attrition and societal demands 
for inexpensive victory. 
2. Type of System Proposed 
Title 10, U.S. Code, directs the Navy to develop equipment used for maritime 
operations.  This document addresses the operational capabilities and design 
considerations for the Airborne Operational family (Sea Arrow) to be associated with the 
Crossbow. The family of vehicles will consist of Manned and Unmanned Aircraft (with 
emphasis on Unmanned) to perform Defensive, Offensive, Fleet Support, and Military 
Operations Other Than War.  A primary goal is to reduce casualties and win through 
deterrence.  Figure 1 shows the trend in airborne missions over time.  During the Second 
World War, every airborne vehicle carried munitions and was used for destruction of 
enemy forces.  In the Gulf war there were on the order of 5 support airborne vehicles for 
every one that carried ordinance.  It is expected that this trend will continue. 
 













Number of support aircraft 






3. Operational Concept 
(1) “From the SEA”(FTS) is a concept for projecting naval power in the 
littorals and ashore in support of a strategic objective.  Essentially, FTS is the application 
of maneuver warfare principles to the maritime portion of a theater campaign, 
capitalizing on the ever expanding capabilities of modern naval airborne forces (manned 
and unmanned) to project power in an increasingly Sophisticated and lethal environment. 
Operations are designed to break the cohesion and integration of enemy defenses while 
avoiding attrition oriented attacks.  Emphasis will be placed on speed, mobility, 
deception, surprise, and other measures of battlefield preparation that confuse or create 
uncertainty and delay in the enemy’s actions. Our ultimate desire is to destroy his will to 
fight or carry out actions contrary to the interests of the United States. 
(2) FTS is a single, seamless operation extending from homeports to secure 
sea bases across the littoral to dominate a critical enemy center of gravity.  The FTS 
concept requires a single force that can change its character with its environment but 
always operate with a single objective. FTS brings all facets of sea power to bear; it 
replaces our recent history of separately controlled movement, supporting operations, 
landings, and maneuver ashore with collaboration founded on Network Centric Warfare.  
The next generation of technology provides our opportunity to close the battlefield 
mobility gap between space assets, airborne operations, ship firepower and on shore 
forces, to link maneuver in ships, space assets, airborne operations with maneuver ashore. 
(3) Increased operational speed will be the sum of more rapid decisions of 
command, faster methods of control, quicker execution, higher speed  of airborne 
systems, and ever diminishing friction in the transition from maneuver at sea to maneuver 
in the littorals.  Relative operational (speed the difference between our speed and that of 
the enemy) will increase as enemy operations are degraded by simultaneous surprise, 
deception, strikes, fires, and special / information operations.  The moment of achieving 
superior operational tempo will be reached when the frequency of our operations do not 
allow our opponent to respond effectively or maintain cohesion of his forces. 
(4) While strike and special operations are complementary forms of sea power 
projection, new technologies, equipment, and tactics will be required to allow the 
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Crossbow force to gain superiority in the littorals.  The conduct of a littoral operation 
encompasses almost all types of ships, aircraft, weapons, and landing forces of the U.S. 
Navy and Marine Corps in a collaborative military effort. The salient requirement of the 
littoral operation is the necessity of rapidly building up combat power from an initial 
level of zero to full coordinated striking power to gain success and maintain objectives. 
(5) Naval Crossbow forces will be structured and equipped to project combat 
power in the littorals to seize control of the crisis arena for follow-on joint operations. 
Power projection requires air, space and water mobility, speed, firepower, and a versatile 
mix of survivable vehicles that enable launch in nearly all weather from a sea base of 
versatile ships.  Crossbow is not intended to act alone; but could act alone under special 
circumstances.  The force provides standoff (battle space) for the Naval Task Force to 
enable the effective employment of active / passive defense systems against enemy air 
and surface-fired weapons, avoids the major sea mine threat and avoids attrition.  The 
battle space will be very complex around the task force with large numbers of enemy and 


































(6) As part of the Navy after Next initiative the Navy plans to introduce squadrons 
of small expeditionary aircraft carriers (approximately 7 –actual number yet to be 
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determined) designed to operate in concert with up to 20 Sea Lance, small, low cost, 
high-speed combatants capable of deploying the Expeditionary Warfare Grid.  This new 
force shall operate primarily in the littoral environment and be capable of operations 
independent of or with support from a CVN battle group for short periods of time during 
Military Operations Other Than War and low intensity conflicts. 
(7) The unmanned vehicles shall be optimized for missions characterized by “The 
Dull, the Dirty, and the Dangerous”. 
4. Support Concept 
It is intended that the Crossbow Airborne Vehicles-Sea Arrows -  can be operated 
and maintained by sailors and marines with skill levels generally commensurate with 
those currently in the Navy.  Logistic support and maintenance for the airborne vehicles 
must be performed within the existing logistic support organizational structures as 
defined by “Network Centric Logistics”.  The Navy supply support system will provide 
timely acquisition, distribution, provisioning, and inventory replenishment of system 
components, spares, repair parts and consumable supplies necessary to maintain the 
airborne vehicles in a high state of readiness.  Supply planning will be closely 
coordinated with maintenance planning during all phases of the development to ensure 
timely availability of supplies to meet provisioning and replenishment requirements from 
Initial Operational Capability (IOC) through Full Operational Capability (FOC). 
5. Threat 
a. Time Frame 
The threat to naval forces in 2020 will encompass the entire operational 
spectrum of military capabilities ranging from dissident/guerrilla forces to sophisticated 
first line equipped, regular forces. These threats are detailed in the China Area Denial 
Study of 1998, the two books on China by Michael Pillsbury, and the final report of SEI 
1. Anticipated threat objectives will be the coordinated effort to use all target acquisition 
and force support agencies available for the purpose of denying the combat power of the 
littoral force during the initial stages of ship movement.  Central to the threat’s defensive 
plan is the early identification and rapid denial in the littorals. 
 
 93
b. Common Threads 
Common threads of future threat capabilities include: 
• Enhanced multi-source intelligence collection and Information Warfare 
Operations 
• Enhanced tactical mobility systems that reduce reaction time, protect the 
littorals, and improve firepower and sea protection 
• Higher-volume, longer-range precision targeting, command, control, and 
communications 
• Enhanced counter mobility capability by using land and shallow water 
mines 
• Increased availability, numbers and accuracy of precision guided 
munitions 
• Increased lethality and reliability of weapon systems [The possible use of 
weapons of Mass Destruction (NBC)] 
• Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities to monitor, direct find, jam and 
deceive in the Radio Frequency (RF) and electro-optical spectrums 
• Elimination of US Space assets 
• Early attack and disruption of supplies and logistics 
• The ability to reach into the blue water ocean with submarines, smart 
mines and aircraft carriers 
• Ability to take advantage of the sea and land terrain close to shores 
• Information Operations (IO) 
• With so many aircraft, missiles, & rockets in the air at the same time, the 
probability of attrition is very high 
6. Shortcoming of Existing Systems 
a. Background 
The current manned aircraft were put into service in the 1970’s and 
1980’s.  Major service life extension programs are underway and, coupled with depot 
level maintenance programs, extended service lifetimes are projected into the 21st 
century. Despite an extensive product improvement program, the current airborne 





The CVN battle group projects power and dominates the blue waters in 
which it sails.  The object of the CROSSBOW battle group is to augment CVN 
capabilities in the contested littorals of the world. 
The CVN’s advantage of concentrated power is so serious a liability in 
unsafe waters that no one would risk it in dangerous contested regions without an 
extended and arduous period of softening up. For this reason it will have a difficult time 
providing cover for the Sea Lance ships and Marines operating inside 100 nm of the 
beach. 
The future sea based distributed aviation concept goes beyond the 
distribution of the carrier platform.  Distributed, reliable and survivable airborne 
platforms will help to provide graceful degradation of capability during combat 
engagements. 
Existing naval airborne platforms were designed to operate from a CVN 
and in most cases are too large to operate from a 10-20 thousand ton ship.  Additionally, 
manned aircraft were put into service in the 1970’s and 1980’s are obsolete.  The only 
close in aircraft developments that can be considered for this future force are JSF, V-22, 
and the SH/CH-60.  If the VSTOL version of the JSF is considered as part of the 
Crossbow air wing of Sea Arrows, the ship may become unaffordable.  A full squadron 
of Crossbow ships (4 plus) including the air wing should be roughly equivalent, from a 
cost perspective, to a CVN with its air wing.  A variant of the H-60 should certainly be 
considered when exploring ways to meet the airborne requirements, but only a small 
number (2-3) is likely to be supportable from each ship.   
Historically, opportunities for revolutionary change in the military are 
rare.  Let us take full advantage of all unmanned vehicles! 
7. Specific Airborne Missions for CROSSBOW 
a. General 
A significant number of airborne missions must be launched from the 
expeditionary aircraft carriers to support a Crossbow Battle force operating in the littoral 
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environment.  It is anticipated that Crossbow will operate with a minimum of 4 
expeditionary aircraft carriers.  No single airborne platform, Sea Arrow - is expected to 
accomplish all of the required missions and all missions do not need to launch from a 
single expeditionary carrier.  It is recognized that some missions may require the 
simultaneous operation of more than one of any given airborne platform type.  However, 
the total airborne system shall maximize modularity, replace ability and commonality to 
minimize total operating / lifecycle costs.  All maintenance will be done by replacing 
modules. The mission MTBF shall be 100 times the defined total mission time (Fly to 
station + On station time + Fly back to the Crossbow).  A high priority is for all airborne 
platforms designed to meet this mission statement shall use the same fuel as the ship and 
be launch-able from either the Crossbow or a modified Sea Lance; but only need to be 
recoverable on the Crossbow. 
Firepower and other performance characteristics equivalent to CVN based 
aircraft are NOT required.  The airborne system for CROSSBOW shall be scaled for the 
littoral missions and provide complementary capabilities for operations conducted in 
concert with a CVN Battle Groups, see Figure 3. The shipboard pilot shall maintain 
safety of flight responsibilities during all hand-off activities. 
Even though this a Mission document, for initial trade-offs and design 
efforts the following can be assumed regarding the CROSSBOW ship – Sea Archer: 
• Wind over the deck of 20 knots will always be available 
• Wind over the deck of up to 70 knots can be expected 
• At least one electromagnetic catapult can be provided: 
• Length – (1/4 length of smallest ship) 
• Acceleration capability: adequate. 
• Launch & Recovery 
• Maximum Pitch – 3 degrees 
• Maximum Roll – 6 degrees 
• Vertical Acceleration - .5 
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Airborne Missions
Defensive Offensive Fleet Support MOOW





































The missions, technologies and program developments shall be in 
accordance with the “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap – 2000 to 2025” dated April 
2001 from the Office Of The Secretary of Defense.  The theme of the Crossbow MNS is 
the same as the theme of this roadmap  -- The unmanned vehicles shall be optimized 
for missions characterized by “The Dull, the Dirty, and the Dangerous”. 
B. MISSIONS BY FUNCTION 
1. Offensive Missions 
a. Combat Air Support (CAS) 
Provide spontaneous fires in support of ground forces operating in the 
littoral environment (shoreline to 100 nm inland). Forward Air Controllers (FACs) shall 
be provided the capability of local control.  
• Combat Radius – 200 nm 
• Loiter – 2 hours (threshold); 4 hours (objective) 
• Max Cruise Speed – 1 M (threshold); 2 M (objective) 
• Payload Capacity – 1,000 Lbs * 
b. Combat Air Patrol (CAP) 
Complement shipboard defensive systems, with Airborne Radar. 
• Combat Radius – 100 nm 
• Loiter – 4 hours (threshold); 8 hours (objective) 
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• Max Cruise Speed – 0.6 M (threshold); 0.8 M (objective) 
• Payload Capacity – 1,000 Lbs * 
c. Battlefield Interdiction (BI) 
Deliver smart munitions on high value targets in the littoral environment 
(shoreline to 100 nm inland).   
• Combat Radius – 200 nm 
• Loiter – 2 hours (threshold); 4 hours (objective) 
• Max Cruise Speed – 0.6 M (threshold); 0.8 M (objective) 
• Payload Capacity – 1,500 Lbs * 
d. Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) 
Inflict mission kill damage to enemy air defense radars (out for 12+ hours) 
with HARM like weapons scaled to the mission and 2020 technology: 
• Combat Radius – 200 nm 
• Loiter – 2 hours (threshold); 4 hours (objective) 
• Max Cruise Speed – 0.6 M (threshold); 0.8 M (objective) 
• Payload Capacity – 1,500 Lbs * 
e. Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) 
Airborne ASW shall operate in concert with surface units, CVN assets, 
and/or land-based ASW assets in the AOR to maintain contact with and targeting 
information on all enemy subs operating within the vicinity of the battle group. 
• Combat Radius - 100 nm; 
• Loiter  Short Range – 4 hours (threshold); 8 hours (objective) 
• Max Cruise Speed – 0.6 M (threshold); 0.8 M (objective). 
f. Precision Kill Targeting and Designation 
Pass precise targeting data for cruise missile terminal guidance 
• Combat Radius – 200 nm 
• Loiter – 2 hours (threshold); 4 hours (objective) 
• Max Cruise Speed – 0.6 M (threshold); 0.8 M (objective) 
• Payload Capacity – 1,000 Lbs* 
g. Signal Intelligence and Electronic Warfare 
Monitor enemy electronic emissions 
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• Combat Radius – 200 nm 
• Loiter – 4 hours (threshold); 6 hours (objective) 
• Max Cruise Speed – 0.6 M (threshold); 0.8 M (objective) 
• Payload Capacity – 1,000 Lbs * 
h. Mine Delivery 
Deliver micro / nano mines of all types within the AOR 
• Combat Radius – 200 nm 
• Loiter – 2 hours (threshold); 4 hours (objective) 
• Max Cruise Speed – 0.6 M (threshold); 0.8 M (objective) 
• Payload Capacity – 1,000 Lbs * 
i. ASW Weapons  
Deliver  torpedoes and Depth Charges to destroy submarines and mine 
fields. 
• Radius of action  – 100 nm 
• Loiter – 6 hours (threshold); 8 hour (objective) 
• Max Cruise Speed - .0.6 M (threshold); .0.8 M (objective) 
• Payload Capacity –1,000 Lbs * 
j. Anti – Satellite/Space Warfare 
Protect naval and littoral operations from interference from space 
surveillance, targeting and attack. 
• Combat Radius -- Out to 1000 nm arc length from the task force. 
• Altitude - Out to synchronous orbit. 
• Loiter – 4 hours (threshold), 6 hours (objective) 
• Max Cruise Speed - .0.6 M (threshold); .0.8 M (objective) 
• Payload Capacity – 1,500 Lbs * 
C. DEFENSIVE MISSIONS 
1. Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
The ISR suite shall provide expeditionary commanders operating in the littoral 
area with near-real time data required to support active and passive surveillance 
requirements independent of, or in concert with, CVN battle group assets, or reliance on 
limited Joint Theater or National Assets. 
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• Radius of action Short Range = 100 nm; Long Range = 200 nm 
• Loiter Short Range – 2 hours (threshold); 4 hours (objective) 
• Loiter Long Range – 4 hours (threshold); 6 hours (objective) 
• Max Cruise Speed - .0.6 M (threshold); .0.8 M (objective) 
• Payload Capacity Short Range – 500 Lbs * 
• Payload Capacity Long Range – 1,500 Lbs * 
2. Battle Damage Assessment 
Provide intelligence to the battle group regarding damage inflicted. 
• Radius of action – 200 nm 
• Loiter – 30 minutes (threshold); 1 hour (objective) 
• Max Cruise Speed - .1M (threshold);  .2M (objective) 
• Payload Capacity – 500 Lbs * 
3. Support of Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
PSIOP and covert sensor placement. Locate mines in the littoral (bottom & 
volume), and Mark mines for neutralized. Deploy decoys, deliver Information Warfare 
leaflets over enemy controlled territory and Transport/recover Navy Seal team behind 
enemy lines 
• Combat Radius – 300 nm 
• Loiter – 30 minutes (threshold); 1 hour (objective) 
• Max Cruise Speed - .0.6 M (threshold); . 0.8M (objective) 
• Payload Capacity – 500 Lbs * 
4. Theater Missile Defense 
Detect and provide targeting for Tactical Ballistic Missiles and launch sites 
precision strikes. 
• Radius of action– 100 nm at 80 K Feet 
• Loiter – 4 hours (threshold); 6 hours (objective) 
• Max Cruise Speed - .0.6 M (threshold); .0.8 M (objective) 
• Payload Capacity – 1,500 Lbs * 
5. Combat Search and Rescue 
Search for and locate downed aircrews (Over land & Over water), Recover 
downed aircrews under fire.  Direct fire when fired upon as required 
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• Combat Radius – 200 nm 
• Loiter – 4 hours (threshold); 6 hours (objective) 
• Max Cruise Speed – 0.6M (threshold); 0.8M (objective) 
• Payload Capacity – 500 Lbs* 
D. FLEET SUPPORT MISSIONS 
1. Local Navigation System (GPS Like) Pseudolite 
Provide local navigation to the same accuracies as GPS up to 1000 nm from the 
task force for those systems with modified GPS receivers. This signal will be broad band 
and anti-Jam 
• Radius of action– 100 nm at 80 K Feet 
• Loiter – 4 hours (threshold); 6 hours (objective) 
• Max Cruise Speed - .0.6 M (threshold); .0.8 M (objective) 
• Payload Capacity – 500 Lbs * 
2. Logistics / Team Re-Supply 
Perform the following: Personnel Transfer/Medivac, Mail pick up and delivery, 
Communications / Data Relay, and Network Centric Logistics. 
• Radius of action– 200 nm 
• Loiter – 30 minutes (threshold); 1 hour (objective) 
• Max Cruise Speed - .0.6 M (threshold); .0.8 M (objective) 
• Payload Capacity – 500 Lbs * 
3. Communications Relay 
Relay VHF/UHF transmissions within the theater of operations 
• Radius of action– 100 nm 
• Loiter – 4 hours (threshold); 6 hours (objective) 
• Max Cruise Speed - .0.6 M (threshold); .0.8 M (objective) 
• Payload Capacity – 500 Lbs * 
4. Detect WMD Effects 
Detect Nuclear, Biological, & Chemical materials in the atmosphere. 
• Radius of action– 200 nm 
• Loiter – 4 hours (threshold); 6 hours (objective) 
• Max Cruise Speed - .0.6 M (threshold); .0.8 M (objective) 
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• Payload Capacity – 500 Lbs * 
5. Meteorology & Oceanography Detection 
Provide Weather and Ocean conditions. 
• Radius of action– 200 nm 
• Loiter – 4 hours (threshold); 6 hours (objective) 
• Max Cruise Speed - .0.6 M (threshold); .0.8 M (objective) 
• Payload Capacity – 1,000 Lbs * 
6. Digital Mapping 
Develop and transmit Digital Maps of unknown terrain. 
• Radius of action– 200 nm 
• Loiter – 4 hours (threshold); 6 hours (objective) 
• Max Cruise Speed - .0.6 M (threshold); .0.8 M (objective) 
• Payload Capacity – 500 Lbs * 
E. MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR 
1. Embargo Enforcement 
Perform the following: Transport law enforcement detachment to target vessel, 
Conduct recon of vessel, & Deliver micro UAVs or nano sensor technology for detailed 
inspection or tracking 
• Radius of action (un-refueled) – 100 nm 
• Loiter –2 hours (threshold); 4 hours (objective) 
• Max Cruise Speed - .0.6 M (threshold); .0.8 M (objective) 
• Payload Capacity – 500 Lbs * 
2. CNN Direct 
Provide a direct CNN satellite feed from the area of conflict.  Used as a deterrent 
to show an enemy that continued hostilities is useless. 
• Radius of action (un-refueled) – 100 nm 
• Loiter –2 hours (threshold); 4 hours (objective) 
• Max Cruise Speed - .0.6 M (threshold); .0.8 M (objective) 




F. MISSIONS BY PAYLOAD WEIGHT* 
All of the mission Functions defined above are also categorized by Payload 
weight (the numbering system uses the same numbers as the Missions by Function).This 
should help in the development of Modular capabilities.  Each of the following is 
assumed to carry 250 Lbs of Avionics and Control Equipment. 
1. 500 Lb Maximum Payloads 
a. Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) 
• Towing Array of Hydrophones = 200 Lbs 
• UHF Transmitter = 50 Lbs 
OR 
• 2 Small Torpedoes = 100 Lbs/each 
• Launching Rack = 50 Lbs 
b. Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR): - Short 
Range 
• Search Radar = 150 Lbs 
• Visual Camera = 50 Lbs 
• UHF Transmitter = 50 Lbs 
c. Battle Damage Assessment 
• BDA Radar = 125 Lbs 
• Visual Camera = 50 Lbs 
• UHF Transmitter / Recorder = 75 Lbs 
d. Support of Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
• 10 Sonoboys = 20 Lbs / each 
OR 
• 10 Land Sensors = 20 Lbs / each 
OR 
• Pallet of Leaflets = 200 Lbs 
e. Combat Search and Rescue 
• (a) Search Radar = 150 Lbs 
• (b) Visual Camera = 50 Lbs 
• (c) UHF Transmitter = 50 Lbs 
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 f. Local Navigation System (GPS Like) Pseudolite 
• GPS Receiver = 50 Lbs 
• High Power GPS Transmitter = 200 Lbs 
g. Communications Relay 
• VHF / UHF Receiver = 50 Lbs 
• VHF / UHF Transmitter = 200 Lbs 
h. Detect WMD Effects 
• Nuclear Sensor = 25 Lbs 
• Biological Sensor = 75 Lbs 
• Chemical Sensor = 50 Lbs 
•  UHF Transmitter (medium power) = 100 Lbs 
i. Digital Mapping 
• TERCOM (MMW) = 200 Lbs 
• UHF Transmitter = 50 Lbs 
j. Embargo Enforcement 
• Search Radar = 150 Lbs 
• Visual Camera = 50 Lbs 
• UHF Transmitter = 50 Lbs 
k. CNN Direct 
• Video Camera = 50 Lbs 
• Satellite Link = 150 Lbs 
2. 1,000 Lb Maximum Payloads 
a. Combat Air Support (CAS) 
• 24 – MK 76 (Improved) = 30 Lbs / each 
b. Combat Air Patrol (CAP) 
• 2 – Sidewinder (Improved) = 125 Lbs / each 
• Airborne Track Radar = 500 Lbs 
OR 
• AMRAM (Improved) = 250 Lbs 
• Airborne Track Radar = 500 Lbs 
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 c. Precision Kill Targeting and Designation 
• Precision Track Radar = 300 Lbs 
• LADAR = 250 Lbs 
• LASER Designator = 150 Lbs 
• UHF Transmitter = 50 Lbs 
d. Signal Intelligence and Electronic Warfare 
• Receiver (Signal Intelligence) = 150 Lbs 
• VHF/UHF Transmitter (High Power) = 550 Lbs 
• UHF Transmitter = 50 Lbs 
e. Mine Delivery 
• 24 Mines(Improved) = 30 Lbs / each 
f. ASW Weapons 
• 12 MK 76 (Improved) = 30 Lbs / each 
• Track Radar = 200 Lbs 
• Visual/IR Tracker = 15 Lbs 
• UHF Transmitter = 50 Lbs 
OR 
• 12 Depth Charges = 30 Lbs / each 
• Track Radar = 200 Lbs 
• Visual/IR Tracker = 15 Lbs 
• UHF Transmitter = 50 Lbs 
g. Logistics/Team Re-Supply 
• Smart Pallet = 700 Lbs 
h. Meteorology & Oceanography Detection 
• LASER for Environmental Evaluation = 200 Lbs 
• Weather Radar = 200 Lbs 
• Atmospheric Sensors = 200 Lbs 




3. 1,500 Lb Maximum Payloads 
a. Battlefield Interdiction (BI) 
• 4 – Bombs = 250 Lbs / each 
• LASER = 200 Lbs 
b. Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) 
• 4 – HARMS = 300 Lbs / each 
c. Anti – Satellite / Space Warfare 
• ASAT = 1,000 Lbs 
• High Altitude Radar = 200 Lbs 
• UHF Transmitter = 50 Lbs 
OR 
• 3 – Surveillance Satellites = 400 Lbs/each 
OR 
• 3 – Communications Satellites = 400 Lbs / each 
d. Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) – Long 
Range 
• J STARS (Improved) = 1,200 Lbs 
• UHF Transmitter = 50 Lbs 
OR 
• Search Radar = 500 Lbs 
• LADAR = 250 Lbs 
• IR Imaging Sensor = 350 Lbs 
• UHF Transmitter (Medium Power) = 100 Lbs 
e. Theater Missile Defense 
• High Altitude / Long Range Search Radar = 600 Lbs 
• Multi- Spectral IR Sensor = 500 Lbs 
• UHF Transmitter (Medium Power) = 100 Lbs 
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APPENDIX C.  ROADMAP 
ROADMAP 
Technology-
Methodology ORGANIZATION POC PHONE E-MAIL 
     
Advanced Ship 
Concepts-Information 
Sys Integration DD-X PEO Dilisio, Mr. F. Scott  (202) 781-2569 DSN: 326 dilisiofs@navsea.navy.mil 
Aging Aircraft 
Aging Aircraft office, 




Eaton, RADM (ret) 
Don (831) 656-3616 deaton@nps.navy.mil 
Aging Aircraft 
Methods-Concepts 
NAVAIR 4.1 - Aging 
AC 
Ernst, Bob (Aero 




NAVSUP & DoD 
Logistics AIT Office  
Benjamin Morgan & 
Daniel Kimball (717) 605-6793 DSN: 430 benjamin_b_morgan@navsup.navy.mil 
Autonomic Logistics 
for JSF 
JSF Deputy PM 
Logistics Bodnar, Mr. Al  (703) 601-5622 bodnaraf@jast.navy.mil 
Autonomic Logistics 
for Marine Task 
Force HQ Marine Corps 
Wagner, Major Chris 
USMC   
Depot Level 
Production Methods 
NADEP North Is F/A-
18C PM 
Delaware, Mr. 
Shawn  (619) 545-3512 DSN: 735 DelawareLS@navair.navy.mil 
Executive Data 
System (CAFSIS)  
NAVAIR CF-18 
Program Office Senkel, Mr. Rich  (301) 757-7556 DSN: 757 senkelrm@navair.navy.mil 
     
Former Age 
Exploration Team 






GA Tech Logistics and 
Research Applied 





Integrated Data  
GA Tech Logistics and 
Research Applied 
Maintenance Center Wagner, Ron  (404) 894-3357 ron.wagner@gtri.gatech.edu 




Defense Enterprise Sol Calvo, Mr. Alberto (781) 205-7112 abcalvo@tasc.com 
NALDA 3M data 
Naval Aviation Logistics 
Data Analysis Yates, AZ1 James (301) 757-3103 DSN: 757 YatesJP@navair.navy.mil 
Naval Aviation 
Maintenance 
Initiatives to Support 
Focused Logistics in 
a Network-Centric 
Environment NAVAIR (AIR 3.6B) 
Mishler, Dr John W. 




Eaton, RADM (ret) 
Don (831) 656-3616 deaton@nps.navy.mil 
Network Centric 
Environment NAVAIR (AIR 3.6B) 
Mishler, Dr. John W., 
III (301) 757-8896 DSN: 757 MishlerJW@navair.navy.mil 
PHM Savings 
Northrop Grumman 
Supportability & Naval 
Integration Hodson, Mr. Bob  (310) 332-4586 HodsoRo@mail.northgrum.com 
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Reliability Centered 
Maintenance NAWC Lakehurst, NJ  Regan, Nancy A (617) 921-5408 ReganN@navair.navy.mil 
Robotic Technologies Inuktun Services Ltd.  (877) 468-5886 http://www.inuktun.com/custom.htm 
Rotorcraft Health and 





Hayes, LCDR (SC) 









Supportability  Hodson, Mr. Bob  (310) 332-4586 HodsoRo@mail.northgrum.com 




Maintenance NAWC Lakehurst, NJ Regan, Nancy (617) 921-5408 ReganN@navair.navy.mil 
Training Cost 
information and 
length of training by 
NEC 
Naval Education & 
Training Professional 
Devel. & Tech Ctr 
(NETPDTC), Pensacola, 
FL Smith, Mrs. Pat  
(850) 452-1001 x1511 
DSN: 922 Pat.smith@cnet.navy.mil 




Program Wiggfall, LtCol Vic  (301) 757-5818 DSN: 757 WigfallV@navair.navy.mil 
Data Management-
Canadian Air Force 
NAVAIR PMA265 CF-




APPENDIX D.  PARAMETRIC MODEL  
A. METHODOLOGY AND ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Baseline Model and Input Data 
The three worksheets in the NALDA baseline data [Naval Aviation Logistics 
Data Analysis, 2001] spreadsheet were labeled “Raw F/A-18 Data”, “F/A-18 Filtered 
data – formulas”, and “UCAV Comp”.  The “Raw F/A-18 Data” columns were totaled 
and summarized.  The “F/A-18 Filtered data –formulas” worksheet contained edited data 
from the “Raw F/A-18 Data” sheet that eliminated unidentified WUC’s.  An example of 
this worksheet is seen in the example below. 
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 NALDA Baseline Spreadsheet. 
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This reduced the number of line items to 2,700.  The data was then sub-divided 
into two-digit WUC system levels.  These subdivisions totaled 39 two-digit WUC 
categories.  The data in the MFHBF and FAILURES columns were then totaled for each 
two-digit WUC category.  This worksheet also contained formulas that calculated the 
two-digit MFHBF and overall MFHBF by dividing the total number of flight hours 
(524,060) by the number of failures for each two-digit WUC as well as the totals of the 
MFHBF and FAILURE columns.  The third worksheet “UCAV Comp” was developed to 
show the systems that would be eliminated in a UCAV.  The MFHBF and FAILURE 
columns were then recalculated for each two-digit WUC.  The total flight hours  
(524,060) was the divided by the resulting numbers in the two-digit WUC FAILURE 
column to calculate a UCAV MFHBF for each of the two-digit WUC systems and overall 
total MFHBF. 
Fiscal Year Aircraft Type/Model/Series Element Number Element Description Then Year Dollars ($K) FY 00 Dollars ($K)
1988F/A-18C 1.1.1Organizational Military Personnel Costs 21472 31938
1988F/A-18C 1.1.2Organizational Civilian Personnel Costs 0 0
1988F/A-18C 1.1.3Organizational Contractor Personnel Costs 0 0
1988F/A-18C 1.2.1Temporary Additional Duty Costs 132 170
1988F/A-18C 1.2.2Training Expendable Stores Costs 1830 2254
1988F/A-18C 1.2.3Support Supplies Costs 1112 1435
1988F/A-18C 1.2.4AVDLR Costs Total Regular 3174 4274
1988F/A-18C 1.2.4.1AVDLR Costs 3174 4274
1988F/A-18C 1.2.4.2Commercial RoR Costs 0 0
1988F/A-18C 1.2.5Fuel Costs 4870 9529 
Example of Partial Elements in the CAIG Cost Template. 
The VAMOSC CAIG template data was downloaded from the VAMOSC 
[VAMOSC-CAIG, 2000] website and transferred into an Excel spreadsheet for analysis.  
A partial example of the template format is seen in the example above.  
It was found that the CAIG templates varied in elemental format where some 
elements had been added and eliminated according to the FY that was being analyzed.  
The elements that were the same were grouped as such: FY1988-1991, FY1992-1993, 
FY1994-1997, FY1998-1999 and then FY2000.   
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After each FY element difference was separated, the element costs were then 
totaled by FY column in the Total row of the spreadsheet as seen in the example below, 
and then discounted using a 10 percent rate in the formula: 
Total FY $/(1+Discount rate%)Year number 
The Total row was then added to the Discounted cost row to derive the 
Cumulative discounted cost row.   
 
Year number 1 2 
Total ($) $46,563,000.00 $141,932,000.00
Discounted cost $42,330,000.00 $117,299,173.55
Cumulative discounted cost $88,893,000.00 $259,231,173.55
  
Example of the Element Total, Discounted and Cumulative Discounted Costs. 
The Cumulative discounted cost row for each FY column was then totaled to 
equal an overall FY1988-FY2000 total LCC that established the baseline for comparison 
against the parametric F/A-18C baseline spreadsheet and analogous comparison with the 
UCAV parametric analysis spreadsheets.   
2. Parametric Model 
Once the Baseline for validation of the F/A-18C parametric baseline spreadsheet 
was established, the information from the NALDA MFHBF was input into the parametric 
model.  An Aerospace Engineering student at the Naval Postgraduate School, for a 
Logistics Engineering course [Junge, 2000], developed the parametric model that was 
used in the analysis of LCC for the Sea Arrow UCAV component of the Crossbow force.  
This model had been originally used for the academic analysis of LCC for a Vertical 
takeoff and Landing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV).  This model was made up of 
six worksheets that were labeled User Inputs, Manning, Training, RDT&E, O&M, and 
Totals.  There are two additional worksheets that were in the model that were a summary 
graph and a Poisson table that is used in calculation of component sparing.   
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The User Inputs page was made up of the components:  General Inputs, Training 
Inputs, Operational Inputs, Manning Inputs, Maintenance/Equipment Inputs, RDT&E 
and Production Inputs, and Component Inputs.    
The General Inputs component contained the Discount Rate block that was used 
in the formulation of the present value (PV) calculations in Manning, Training, RDT&E, 
O&M, and Totals worksheets into the formula:  
Total $*(1+InflationRate) number of Years/ (1+(DiscRate+InflateRate)) number of Years 
The Inflation Rate was an input to Inflation Rate formula:  
Total $*(1+InflationRate) number of Years 
This formula was contained in the Manning, Training, RDT&E, O&M, and Totals 
worksheets.  The inflation rate was assumed to be two percent.  The Attrition Rate block 
was applied to the Training worksheet in the Excel formula:  
If the number of squadrons present year is less than the number of squadrons past 
year, or the BTWEUAV (Basic Training Weeks Enlisted UAV then the number will equal 
zero, If not, the systems per squadron*the number of enlisted in the detachment *number 
of squadrons standing up)+(Attrition Rate*systems per squadron * the number of 
enlisted in the detachment * number of squadrons present year (rounded up to the 
nearest whole number. 
This formula represented how the number of training program attritions for 
Officer, Chief Petty Officer (CPO) and Enlisted (E) pay grades One through Six were 
calculated.  This attrition rate is based on the assumption that not all of the students in the 
training pipeline will complete the curriculum for various reasons.  The attrition rate was 
assumed to be two percent.   
The Peacetime and Contingency Attrition Rates and Contingency Chance blocks 
were used in the calculations in the RDTE worksheet that accounted for the losses of 
aircraft given the chances of the occurrence of a contingency operation.  The Peacetime 
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and Contingency Rates were the attrition rates for the UCAV given a peacetime or 
Contingency scenario.  It is assumed peacetime and contingency attrition rates in a 
minimum/maximum/delta format to be a peacetime rate of one percent/three percent/two 
percent and Contingency attrition rate to be five percent/ten percent/five percent 
respectively.  The chance of the occurrence of a contingency was assumed to be 10 
percent.   
The number of squadrons provides data input to the number of I-Levels per 
squadron calculation in the User Inputs page, the transportation cost formula in the O&M 
worksheet, RDTE worksheet in the number of I-levels online row and the Totals 
worksheet into the total systems built calculation.  The number of squadrons was assumed 
to be 30 for the F/A-18C parametric model.  The number of systems per squadron was 
assumed to be “one” with 12 aircraft in a system.   
Officer, CPO and E1-E6 salaries were based on Military Cost handbook figures 
[Price, Waterhouse, Coopers, 2001].  The Officer salary figure was calculated as an 
average of the O-3, O-4 and O-5 pay grades.  The CPO salary was calculated as an 
average of E-7, E8 and E-9 and the Enlisted salary was calculated as an average of E1 – 
E6 pay grades.   
The life years of the program was assumed to be 20 years.  This was based on 
projected average life of an F/A-18C in the fleet.   
a. Training Costs 
Training costs were derived from data received from the Naval Education 
& Training Professional Development & Technology Center (NETPDTC) Pensacola, FL 
[Smith, 2001].  The subsequent average of Basic Training Costs and Advanced or “A-
School” training costs were used as inputs for Basic and Advanced Air Vehicle (AV), I-
Level Basic and Advanced and the Squadron Headquarters (HQ) Basic and Advanced 
Training blocks of the User Inputs worksheet.   
The length of time for training was given in number of weeks required.  
The Officer training length of time was assumed to be a 50-week length of time for entry-
level pilot training, and 50 weeks for advanced pilot training given an uninterrupted 
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pipeline.  I-level Officer Training was assumed to be 10 weeks, which is currently the 
length of time for Aviation Maintenance Duty Officer Training.  It was assumed that the 
Squadron HQ Officer required no training.  The CPO Basic AV training was assumed to 
be 1 week for CPO indoctrination and no follow on training for an advanced AV level of 
expertise.  I-level CPO and Squadron HQ CPO was assumed to be the same as Basic and 
Advanced AV CPO training lengths of time.  The E1-E6 Basic AV training was based on 
a 10-week basic training syllabus and the Advanced AV training was based on an average 
of 3 weeks for A-school training.  I-level Basic and Advanced and Squadron HQ Basic 
and Advanced were assumed to be the same lengths of time as the Basic and Advanced 
AV.   
b. Operational Inputs 
Operational Inputs included the Petroleum/Oil and Lubrication (POL) 
Costs per flight hour, Ground Equipment (UCAV only), AV flying hours per vehicle 
input on a per month basis and Auto Land and Launch per recovery hours (UCAV only).  
The Ground Control Equipment (GCE) Hours was assumed to be not applicable to the 
F/A-18C parametric model, however in the UCAV parametric model, these hours were 
assumed to be twice that of the air vehicle for the reason that training will be conducted 
on the GCE as well.  The POL Costs per flight hour were based on VAMOSC data where 
the annual cost of fuel for FY2000 was divided by the number of total F/A-18C flight 
hours for that year.  The Auto Land and Launch per recovery hours were assumed to be 
90 percent of the total flight hours with the remaining 10 percent being pilot guided 
hours.   
c. Manning Inputs 
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The manning numbers for the Detachment or Squadron F/A-18C baseline 
system was taken from current Navy squadron activity manning documents.  The 25 
Officers included 18 pilots and seven ground officers.  The CPO manning includes all 
CPOs necessary for work center manning as well as a day and night shift in maintenance 
control.  E1-E6 manning is based on all work centers in a standard F/A-18C squadron.  
The I-level manning was based on rough estimates of current Carrier Aircraft 
Intermediate Maintenance Department manning levels [Smith, 2001].  The Squadron HQ 
consists of a typical composition of an F/A-18C Strike Fighter Wing Staff.  The UCAV 
manning levels remained in the same three categories where the numbers of personnel 
assigned to the Detachment and Squadron HQ was based on figures from the Navy’s 
UCAV program office.   
d. Maintenance and Equipment Inputs 
This section of the model was dedicated to the number of Air Vehicles in 
the system where the number of system is assumed to be only one per squadron.  The Air 
Vehicle Unit Costs for the F/A-18C were based on figures presented in the Navy Fact 
File put out by Chief of Information (CHINFO) for the Navy [Chief of Naval 
Information, 2001]. The cost for the UCAV was based on data from a Naval Postgraduate 
School Aerospace Engineering Sea Arrow design team model.   
Ground Equipment cost was assumed to be similar to the cost of the 
automated test equipment cost of $2.4M in the UCAV model only.  The complete cost of 
test equipment at the I-level was unable to be determined from all of the data sources that 
were queried.  Only the cost of the Consolidated Automated Support System (CASS) 
electronic test set could be determined based on cost data from the Military Cost 
Handbook.  The remaining cost of I-level test equipment was assumed to be $7.6M for a 
total Test Equipment cost of $10M.   
The Critical and Non-critical protection levels translate to the percentage 
of sparing levels for critical and non-critical systems within the Air Vehicle. Turn-
Around-Times (TAT) for the I-level is based NALDA data from CY00-01.  The I-level 
TAT is the average of all CV AIMD's from July of 2000 to July of 2001 with a low of 8 
Days and a high 60 Days.  The Depot Level (D-level) TAT is based on practical 
experience for the average F/A-18C Air Vehicle to go through the Depot at Naval 
Aviation Depot North Island.  The number of I-levels is based on the assumption that 
there are 12 AIMD’s aboard 12 Aircraft Carriers and one F/A-18C I-level per coast for a 
total of 14.  The number of I-levels per squadron is simply based on a formula that 
divides the total number of I-levels by the number of squadrons.  
The ratio of failures that were repaired at the I-level and the number of 
failures that were repaired at the D-level was based on information found in Blanchard’s 
Logistics Engineering and Management [Blanchard, 1992].  The number of maintenance 
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actions split between the I-level and D-level to be 20 percent and 80 percent.  The spare 
level factor on a per day basis was calculated based on the TAT of the I-level multiplied 
by the percentage of repairs at the I-level plus the TAT at the D-level multiplied by the 
percentage of repairs at the D-level all divided by 30 days in a month.  The systems per I-
level were calculated by dividing the number of systems per squadron by the number of 
I-levels per squadron.   
There is assumed to be no I-level activation costs as the I-levels are 
already in operation at the time of Air Vehicle manufacture.  The I-level cost per year is 
based on VAMOSC an average from FY88-00 of F/A-18C template element 2.0.  
Transportation and shipment cost was assumed to be $30.00 per part or unit.     
e. RDTE and Production Inputs 
Production Line Open Costs were assumed to be $25M.  The RDTE over 
four years was based on facts from the Data Search Associates US Weapons Systems 
Costs 2000.  The production line was assumed to be open for 10 years which was the 
actual number for the F/A-18C Hornet from 1988-1998.  The first year of production was 
assumed to be in year four of the program with the first four years dedicated to RDTE.  
The system availability percentage was based on 2000 Commander Naval Forces Atlantic 
(COMNAVAIRLANT) readiness targets.   
f. Component Inputs 
The Component Inputs were comprised of the Reliability Factors and The 
Work Unit Codes (WUC) of the Aircraft Components.  The original NALDA 5 digit 
WUC’s were combined to a two-digit WUC system structure.  The Reliability Factors 
were percentage MTBF increases that were applied to the WUC MTBF rates across the 
entire spectrum of components or systems that exist in the model.  This feature enabled 
the user to perform broad sensitivity analyses of the LCC with the changes in the 
MTBF’s.  The table also computed the failure rate or λ of the component by using the 
equation:  
λ = 1/MTBF  
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The table listed and labeled components as “Critical” or “Non-critical” 
components and are assigned a percentage from the Maintenance Equipment Input 
section of the worksheet.  The last column on the Component Inputs was where the unit 
cost of the component was placed.  This cost was derived as either the actual unit cost of 
the two-digit WUC or an average of the two-digit WUC component Aviation Depot 
Level Repairable (AVDLR) cost.   
B. DATA 
In order to develop the parametric model for comparison of the Sea Arrow UCAV 
against the baseline F/A-18C system changes were made to the User Inputs worksheet.  
Parametric model descriptions and worksheet relationships were placed in appendices.    
In the General Inputs section the numbers of squadrons increased from 30 
squadrons to 60.  This was based on outfitting  (10 AC/Sqdn) on every Sea Archer 
(40x10ac/sqdn = 400AC); outfit East and West Cost FRS’ (20AC-10 ac per FRS).  
Salaries stayed the same throughout the cost comparison.  Additionally, each worksheet 
was changed in the Number of Squadrons standing up row to reflect 6 squadrons standing 
up each year from 2004 to 2013 for a total of 10 years.   
The Training Section of the User Inputs was changed as Basic UAV changed to a 
12-week training cycle (based on UCAV-N program data) from a 50-week cycle for 
Officers (pilot). CPO training changed from increased by weeks and Basic E1-6 training 
increased by two weeks.  I-level and Squadron HQ training stayed the same.   
Advanced Officer training stayed at 12 weeks for advanced pilot training and 
Crew Chief training CPO decreased to a 10 week training cycle in the advanced category.  
E1-6 training was increased by 7 weeks if they were scheduled to be a Crew Chief 
candidate.  I-level and Squadron HQ stayed the same for training.  
1. Operational Costs  
Fuel costs decreased from $723.30 to $136.95.  This number was derived from the 
total lifetime fuel cost per air vehicle divided by the total number of hours over the 
lifetime of an AV.  Ammunition costs were not considered as a portion of this parametric 
LCC evaluation.   
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Hours per month on the AV changed from 29.27 hours to 10 hours per month.  
Hours were reduced because more simulation time was assumed to take place during 
training when the squadron was in the Inter Deployment Training Cycle (IDTC).  This 
data was based on the assumptions of the Aerospace Engineering team from NPS.    
Ground Control Equipment (GCE) hours doubled that of the AV because it was 
assumed that GCE was used as a trainer as well for actual missions.   
It was assumed that the Auto Launch and Recovery System (ALRS) was used 100 
percent of the time afloat while that ALRS system will be used 80 percent ashore.   
2. Manning Inputs 
The number of Detachment officers decreased from 25 to 4, number of CPO’s 
decreased from 16 to 8 and the number of E1-6 decreased from 182 to 134.  These 
decreases were based on notional manning levels stated in UCAV-N data [Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency, 2001] with total detachment manning levels of 804 
divided by 6 squadrons.  The I-level remained static, however the squadron HQ 
decreased from 10 to 8 Officers, 20 down to 6 CPO’s and from 10 down to 4 E1-6.   
3. Maintenance and Equipment Inputs 
Twelve AV’s per squadron changed to 10 AV’s per squadron for the Sea Arrow 
UCAV.  The cost of the UCAV was based on Aerospace Engineering calculations that 
were made during the design of the Sea Arrow.  The cost decreased from $29M per AV 
down to $9M per AV.  Ground Equipment cost was added at a level of $2.4 M per GCE 
unit.  I-level test equipment costs remained the same as the number of I-levels remained 
static. 
Critical and Non-Critical protection levels remained the same.  Even with the 
introduction of autonomic logistics and streamlined data flow, the desired spare 
protection level remained unchanged.   The Turn Around Time (TAT) for the I-level 
decreased from 30 to 9 days; the Depot level TAT decreased from 120 to 90 days.  These 
TAT decreases were driven by the assumption that the autonomic system was able to 
fault isolate earlier in the troubleshooting and repair cycle.  This earlier isolation 
decreased the number of days spent trying to find the problem in a Weapons Replaceable 
Assembly (WRA) at the Intermediate Level.  The number of I-levels, the number of 
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failures repaired at I and D level percentages, the operating cost per year of the I-level 
and the transportation cost all remained static.    
4. RDT&E and Production Inputs 
The production line open costs decreased from $25M to $10M; the RDT&E costs 
increased over all four years by varied amounts due to the new technologies that are 
being researched and developed for Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV) and 
Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV’s).  It was assumed that the production line 
was open for 10 years and made production runs of 600 UCAV’s.  This data was taken 
from Aerospace Engineering analysis.  The UCAV system operational availability of 90 
percent was based on the numbers proposed by UCAV-N supportability estimations.   
5. Component Inputs 
All of the component groupings were taken from the baseline system of the F/A-
18C and improved by 20 percent.  The same components were then analyzed at a 50 
percent improvement.  For the third trial, only the two lowest MTBF categories of 
Airframe and Flight Control Systems and Radar-Navigation and Weapons systems were 
improved by 50 percent and then the results were calculated.   
C. ANALYSIS 
The User Input and changes to worksheet data that was altered in order to provide 
an analogy between the F/A-18C and the Sea Arrow reduced many cost areas of the 
parametric LCC model.  The analysis using the parametric model was conducted by 
inserting the UCAV data at the points discussed in the Data section into the established 
F/A-18C model.  In the parametric model for the F/A-18C, the first data inputs from the 
original program data sources resulted in an overall LCC of $20.7B.  Once the changes 
were made, the LCC of the Sea Arrow was found to be $13B, a decrease in the overall 
LCC of  $7.7B.  This analysis stepped through the changes made to the F/A-18C 
parametric model so that it accurately reflected the notional Sea Arrow UCAV.  After all 
the changes had been made in the parametric F/A-18C model to reflect UCAV data, the 
Totals worksheets for both models were analyzed to determine which overall NPV areas 
were decreased and which cost areas had increased and why.  It was found that changes 
in the overall LCC reflected the increase or decrease in the cost area (i.e.: manning, 
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training, etc).  The last section of the analysis for each worksheet displayed what the 
specific cost area differences were between the UCAV and the F/A-18C.  
Manpower reductions at the Organizational Level and Squadron HQ level resulted 
in an overall LCC increased despite the reduction in the number of squadron personnel 
required for the UCAV.  The cost increase was $315M over the entire LCC.  The 
reduction of 32 O-level (squadron personnel) and 22 Squadron HQ personnel in the 
UCAV model had a noteworthy impact as the cost per squadron was decreased with the 
changes in the number of weeks required for training.  The reduction in manpower is 
typically one of the largest cost savings initiatives in any program as it is one of the top 
cost drivers.  In the UCAV model, the costs in comparison to the F/A-18C decreased on a 
per squadron basis by 45 percent.  This decrease occurred despite the addition of 30 
UCAV squadrons.    
The number of weeks required for training was decreased and the net result was a 
LCC cost increase because of the additional squadrons.  The additions drove an $11M 
LCC category increase when transitioned from the F/A-18C to the UCAV model.  The 
minimal cost increase with the reduction in the number of training weeks required for an 
unmanned system despite the additional manning was noteworthy.  The reasons for these 
increases were simply due to the fact that the overall number of personnel had increased 
with the addition of 30 squadrons.  Manpower and the training required are “cost static” 
in nature, meaning the only way to reduce costs in these areas is to reduce the amount of 
manpower and thereby eliminate subsequent training requirements.   
The reduction in Production line open costs combined with the increase in RDTE 
costs over four years resulted in a net decrease of $4.58B despite the increase in the 
number of AV’s produced.  The resultant savings of $15M was due to reducing 
Production line open costs and the cost of the UCAV was $20M per unit less.  This 
savings came as a result of the Production line open costs having been reduced by $15M 
and the cost of the UCAV was $20M less per copy to produce.  The production line open 
costs were reduced due to the modular design improvements of the Sea Arrow UCAV as 
well as the reduction in production space requirements for an aircraft 1/3 the size of the 
F/A-18C Hornet.  RDTE costs over the four years, however, were increased for the 
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unmanned AV because of the technology requirements of the GCE, the unproven 
technologies of the unmanned realm of aircraft and the research necessary for their 
integration into carrier operations.   
In changing the number of squadrons in the General Inputs section, Number of 
AV’s per system and AV unit cost data from the Maintenance/Equipment input section of 
the model had to be changed simultaneously.  When these changes were made the LCC 
appeared to have increased.  The reason for this, despite the cost reduction of the AV to 
$9.4M apiece, was that the number of total aircraft produced and maintained jumped 
from 360 to 600.  POL or Fuel costs were then changed to reflect the cost per hour of the 
notional Sea Arrow.  This change reduced the overall LCC.  This cost reduction 
demonstrated the operational LCC savings of a smaller, more fuel-efficient AV.   
With the advent of the UCAV, however, the Ground Control Equipment (GCE) 
inputs were introduced into the analysis.  The hours per month usage on the GCE 
produced no change to the overall LCC, as the operating costs of the GCE are negligible.   
The Auto Launch and Recovery hours also increased due to the introduction of the 
unmanned aspect, but again this added nothing to the overall LCC increase.  On the other 
hand, the purchase cost of the GCE must be considered.  This purchase of GCE increased 
the LCC from $25.82B to $25.88B, an increase of  $66M.  This increase was inevitable 
due to the necessity of having some means to control the AV.  Although the overall costs 
increased, the actual cost of pilot training over the entire LCC remains exponentially 
higher than the cost of the unmanned pilot training and GCE required for an unmanned 
system.  
The Operating hours of the UCAV, when reduced to 10 hours per month from the 
29.97 hours per month of the F/A-18C, resulted in another significant cost savings.  This 
reduction in operating expense due to less flight hours drove the sparing level that was 
determined with the number of flight hours per month.  Flying the aircraft less for 
training and strictly for operational purposes produces LCC savings on several levels, 
most notably, in spare components and fuel costs.  However an unrealized benefit of 
reduced flight hours in this spreadsheet was the LCC savings as a result of the reduction 
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in wear and tear of frequent carrier based take-offs and landings.  Improvements in target 
system availability had no bearing on LCC even though the target increased from 75% to 
90% availability.   
The data for TAT with regards to the I and D levels was reduced in the Sea Arrow 
as previously explained with the assumption of Autonomic Logistics and Prognostic and 
Health monitoring systems.  This reduction in I-level TAT produced an overall reduction 
in LCC down to $13.86B a total of $2B.  The reduction was driven by the fact that with a 
decrease in TAT, a lesser number of spares were required for system support.  Also, a 
decrease in TAT requires less spares to support a system. When the D-level TAT was 
decreased from 120 to 90 days, the overall LCC was decreased again. The radical LCC 
cost reduction due to the TAT reductions by 70 percent at the I-level and 25 percent at 
the Depot level, highlighted the importance of the development of autonomic 
troubleshooting and aircraft health and monitoring technology, and the importance of 
looking for ways to reduce logistics delays. 
Through the development and implementation of these technologies, significant 
savings over the entire life cycle of a system could be realized.  Studies performed by 
Northrop Grumman for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program underscored the 
importance of Autonomic and Prognostic systems.  During their analysis of 
troubleshooting hours for Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RETOK) 
maintenance actions, it was found that there was a five fold improvement in heading off 
CND troubleshooting and the RETOK maintenance action was completely eliminated 
[Brown, 2001g].   
The final section that changed the analogy in the parametric analysis was the 
improvement in the MTBF.  The MTBF was assumed to have an improvement of 20 
percent due to reliability improvements as a result of technology advances.  The end 
result of this reliability improvement was a cost reduction of $13.02B.  Given a 50 
percent improvement across the entire component spectrum, the cost was reduced by 
$806M.  There are however significantly lower reliabilities that are noted in two 
component areas.  The areas of the WUC 1* series for Airframe and Flight Control 
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Systems and WUC 7* series for Radar-Radar Navigation, and Weapons Systems had 
MTBF factor of 6.69 hours and 6.09 respectively.  With the 20 and 50 percent 
improvement in these two component areas alone, a $673M LCC reduction was realized.  
This accentuates the importance of the pursuit of even seemingly minimal reliability 
improvements.   
Operations and Maintenance costs proved to be the largest decrease in LCC 
during the analysis.  The total category LCC savings of $5.5B was made possible by the 
reduction of fuel costs, flight hours per month coupled with across the board reliability 
improvements of the AV components.    
A leading aviation industry firm supportability and sustainment engineer stated 
that the target for a UCAV concept should be 20 to 30 percent of the O&M cost of a 
baseline, real-world combat aircraft system.  During normalization of the UCAV and 
F/A-18C parametric spreadsheets and subsequent sensitivity analysis, it was found that 
the actual per squadron O&M cost of the Sea Arrow was 27.5% of the per squadron 
O&M cost for the F/A-18C baseline.  This was found to be within the recommended 
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 UCAV Parametric Model User Inputs and MTBF Inputs Example. 
Req'd Manning Levels Squadron I-Level (1/sqdn)  HQ Salary/Individ Squadron Per I-Level Squadron HQ
Officer 25 20 10 Officer 103,000.00$         2,575,000$           2,060,000$           1,030,000$           
CPO 16 40 20 NCO 68,000.00$           1,088,000$           2,720,000$           1,360,000$           
Enlisted 182 500 10 Enlisted 34,000.00$          6,188,000$           17,000,000$         340,000$             
Total 9,851,000$           21,780,000$         2,730,000$           
FY Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Squadrons "Standing Up" 0 0 0 0 3 6 3 4 4
Squadrons "Decomming" 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Number of Squadrons 0 0 0 0 3 9 12 16 20
Number of I-Levels On Line 0 0 0 0 7 14 14 14 14
Number of New Systems 0 0 0 0 3 6 3 4 4
Total Number of Systems 0 0 0 0 3 9 12 16 20
Squadron -$                            -$                    -$                    -$                    29,553,000$   88,659,000$         118,212,000$       157,616,000$       197,020,000$       
I-Level -$                            -$                    -$                    -$                    152,460,000$ 304,920,000$       304,920,000$       304,920,000$       304,920,000$       
Squadron HQ -$                            -$                    -$                    -$                    2,730,000$     2,730,000$           2,730,000$           2,730,000$           2,730,000$           
Total (Current $) -$                            -$                    -$                    -$                    184,743,000$ 396,309,000$       425,862,000$       465,266,000$       504,670,000$       
Inflation (Then Year) -$                            -$                    -$                    -$                    203,971,200$ 446,308,302$       489,181,576$       545,133,274$       603,127,367$       
PV (FY2000) -$                            -$                    -$                    -$                    115,738,737$ 226,113,676$       221,280,902$       220,170,186$       217,493,775$       
NPV (FY2000) 2,951,580,814$      
FA-18C Life Cycle Cost (LCC) Analysis:      Manning
 
F/A-18C Parametric Model Manning Worksheet Example. 
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Req'd Manning Levels Squadron I-Level (1/sqdn)  HQ Salary/Individ Squadron Per I-Level Squadron HQ
Officer 4 20 8 Officer 103,000.00$       412,000$            2,060,000$         824,000$            
CPO 8 40 6 NCO 68,000.00$         544,000$            2,720,000$         408,000$            
Enlisted 178 500 4 Enlisted 34,000.00$        6,052,000$         17,000,000$       136,000$           
Total 7,008,000$         21,780,000$       1,368,000$         
FY Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Squadrons "Standing Up" 0 0 0 0 6 6 6 6 6
Squadrons "Decomming" 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Number of Squadrons 0 0 0 0 6 12 18 24 30
Number of I-Levels On Line 0 0 0 0 7 14 14 14 14
Number of New Systems 0 0 0 0 6 6 6 6 6
Total Number of Systems 0 0 0 0 6 12 18 24 30
Squadron -$                          -$                    -$                    -$                    42,048,000$   84,096,000$       126,144,000$     168,192,000$     210,240,000$     
I-Level -$                          -$                    -$                    -$                    152,460,000$ 304,920,000$     304,920,000$     304,920,000$     304,920,000$     
Squadron HQ -$                          -$                    -$                    -$                    1,368,000$     1,368,000$         1,368,000$         1,368,000$         1,368,000$         
Total (Current $) -$                          -$                    -$                    -$                    195,876,000$ 390,384,000$     432,432,000$     474,480,000$     516,528,000$     
Inflation (Then Year) -$                          -$                    -$                    -$                    216,262,931$ 439,635,790$     496,728,441$     555,928,943$     617,298,774$     
PV (FY2000) -$                          -$                    -$                    -$                    122,713,395$ 222,733,173$     224,694,720$     224,530,376$     222,604,126$     
NPV (FY2000) 3,266,024,878$    
Cost per Squadron $54,433,747.97
% of F/A-18C Cost 55.3%
UCAV Life Cycle Cost (LCC) Analysis:      Manning
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D. DESCRIPTION OF THE MANNING WORKSHEET 
This section of the parametric model focused on the total manpower costs for the 
Officer, CPO and Enlisted and the O, I and Squadron Headquarters levels.  This cost 
worksheet was divided into four sections, the Required Manning Levels, Individual 
Salary calculations, FY Inputs section that was formatted by FY number and by 
corresponding program year number, and Totals for Squadron, I-level and Squadron 
Headquarters.   
Required Manning Levels and inputs for the Salary per Individual section of the 
salary calculations were taken directly from the User Inputs Manning section and General 
Inputs Sections respectively.  The salaries were then multiplied by the number of 
personnel at each of the Squadron, I-level, and Squadron Headquarters to provide a total 
manning cost per activity.  This formula was as follows:  
 
Salary Total = Number of applicable personnel *Salary of Applicable category 
 
For example:  
 
Salary Total = 16 Detachment CPO’s * $68,000.00 
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The section FY Inputs Section allowed for the input of the number of squadrons 
standing up, the number of squadrons decommissioning, total number of squadrons, 
number of new systems, and total number of systems.  These FY inputs were then 
referenced in the Manning LCC calculations over 20 years, the totals of the Squadron, I-
level and Squadron HQ manning costs over 20 years.  For example for a Squadron total:  
 
Total Manning Cost = Total Squadron Salary * Number of Squadrons in that FY 
 
Totals.  The LCC calculations for each activity were then totaled in Current Year 
dollars, Then Year Inflation, and Present Value (PV).  From the PV row of the 
worksheet, a Net Present Value (NPV) was calculated for the Manning worksheet and the 
subsequent total was then transferred to the Totals worksheet.   
 
Training Cost (Individual) Basic UAV Adv  UAV I-Level Basic I-Level Adv SQ HQ Basic SQ HQ Adv
Officer 131,450.00$           57,800.00$       26,290.00$       -$                        -$                        -$                        
CPO 2,629.00$               -$                  2,629.00$         -$                        2,629.00$               -$                        
Enlisted 26,290.00$             3,468.00$         26,290.00$       3,468.00$               26,290.00$             3,468.00$               
FY Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Squadrons "Standing Up" 0 0 0 0 3 6 3 4
Squadrons "Decomming" 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Number of Squadrons 0 0 0 0 3 9 12 16
Number of I-Levels On Line 0 0 0 0 7 14 14 14
Number of New Systems 0 0 0 0 3 6 3 4
Total Number of Systems 0 0 0 0 3 9 12 16
Detachment Basic
Officer 0 0 0 75 152 80 106 108
Chief Petty Officers 0 0 0 48 97 51 68 70
Junior Enlisted 0 0 0 546 1103 579 772 787
Detachment Advanced
Officer 0 0 0 75 152 80 106 108
Chief Petty Officers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Junior Enlisted 0 0 0 546 1103 579 772 787
I-Level Basic
Officer 0 0 0 28 57 30 40 41
Chief Petty Officers 0 0 0 56 114 60 80 81
Junior Enlisted 0 0 0 700 1414 742 990 1008
I-Level Advanced
Officer 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chief Petty Officers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Junior Enlisted 0 0 0 700 1414 742 990 1008
Squadron HQ Basic
Officer 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chief Petty Officers 0 0 0 60 122 64 85 87
Junior Enlisted 0 0 0 30 61 32 43 44
Squadron HQ Adv
Officer 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chief Petty Officers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Junior Enlisted 0 0 0 30 61 32 43 44








FY Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Detachment Basic
Officer -$                        -$                  -$                  9,858,750.00$        19,980,400.00$      10,516,000.00$      13,933,700.00$      
Chief Petty Officers -$                        -$                  -$                  126,192.00$           255,013.00$           134,079.00$           178,772.00$           
Junior Enlisted -$                        -$                  -$                  14,354,340.00$      28,997,870.00$      15,221,910.00$      20,295,880.00$      
Detachment Advanced




Officer -$                        -$                  -$                  736,120.00$           1,498,530.00$        788,700.00$           1,051,600.00$        
Chief Petty Officers -$                        -$                  -$                  147,224.00$           299,706.00$           157,740.00$           210,320.00$           
Junior Enlisted -$                        -$                  -$                  18,403,000.00$      37,174,060.00$      19,507,180.00$      26,027,100.00$      
I-Level Advanced
Officer -$                        -$                  -$                  -$                        -$                        -$                        -$                        
Chief Petty Officers -$                        -$                  -$                  -$                        -$                        -$                        -$                        
Junior Enlisted
Squadron HQ Basic
Officer -$                        -$                  -$                  -$                        -$                        -$                        -$                        
Chief Petty Officers -$                        -$                  -$                  157,740.00$           320,738.00$           168,256.00$           223,465.00$           
Junior Enlisted -$                        -$                  -$                  788,700.00$           1,603,690.00$        841,280.00$           1,130,470.00$        
Squadron HQ Adv
Officer -$                        -$                  -$                  -$                        -$                        -$                        -$                        
Chief Petty Officers -$                        -$                  -$                  -$                        -$                        -$                        -$                        
Junior Enlisted -$                        -$                  -$                  104,040.00$           211,548.00$           110,976.00$           149,124.00$           
Total (Current $) -$                        -$                  -$                  48,907,066.00$      98,915,607.00$      51,959,145.00$      69,178,107.00$      
Inflation (Then Year) -$                        -$                  -$                  52,938,581.09$      109,210,822.83$    58,514,436.44$      79,463,900.03$      
PV (FY 2000) -$                        -$                  -$                  33,643,425.33$      61,969,153.81$      29,645,234.54$      35,945,432.82$      
NPV 289,922,564.20$    
Funds Required for Training
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Training Cost (Individual) Basic UAV Adv  UAV I-Level Basic I-Level Adv SQ HQ Basic SQ HQ Adv
Officer 31,548.00$              13,872.00$       26,290.00$       -$                        -$                        -$                        
CPO 31,548.00$              11,560.00$       2,629.00$         -$                        2,629.00$               -$                        
Enlisted 31,548.00$              11,560.00$       26,290.00$       9,248.00$               26,290.00$             9,248.00$               
FY Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Squadrons "Standing Up" 0 0 0 0 6 6 6 6
Squadrons "Decomming" 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Number of Squadrons 0 0 0 0 6 12 18 24
Number of I-Levels On Line 0 0 0 0 7 14 14 14
Number of New Systems 0 0 0 0 6 6 6 6
Total Number of Systems 0 0 0 0 6 12 18 24
Detachment Basic
Officer 0 0 0 24 25 25 26 26
Chief Petty Officers 0 0 0 48 49 50 51 52
Junior Enlisted 0 0 0 1068 1090 1111 1133 1154
Detachment Advanced
Officer 0 0 0 24 25 25 26 26
Chief Petty Officers 0 0 0 48 49 50 51 52
Junior Enlisted 0 0 0 1068 1090 1111 1133 1154
I-Level Basic
Officer 0 0 0 28 29 30 30 31
Chief Petty Officers 0 0 0 56 58 59 60 61
Junior Enlisted 0 0 0 700 714 728 742 756
I-Level Advanced
Officer 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chief Petty Officers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Junior Enlisted 0 0 0 700 714 728 742 756
Squadron HQ Basic
Officer 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chief Petty Officers 0 0 0 36 37 38 39 39
Junior Enlisted 0 0 0 24 25 25 26 26
Squadron HQ Adv
Officer 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chief Petty Officers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Junior Enlisted 0 0 0 24 25 25 26 26
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FY Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Detachment Basic
Officer -$                         -$                  -$                  757,152.00$           788,700.00$           788,700.00$           820,248.00$           820,248.00$           
Chief Petty Officers -$                         -$                  -$                  1,514,304.00$        1,545,852.00$        1,577,400.00$        1,608,948.00$        1,640,496.00$        
Junior Enlisted -$                         -$                  -$                  33,693,264.00$      34,387,320.00$      35,049,828.00$      35,743,884.00$      36,406,392.00$      
Detachment Advanced




Officer -$                         -$                  -$                  736,120.00$           762,410.00$           788,700.00$           788,700.00$           814,990.00$           
Chief Petty Officers -$                         -$                  -$                  147,224.00$           152,482.00$           155,111.00$           157,740.00$           160,369.00$           
Junior Enlisted -$                         -$                  -$                  18,403,000.00$      18,771,060.00$      19,139,120.00$      19,507,180.00$      19,875,240.00$      
I-Level Advanced
Officer -$                         -$                  -$                  -$                        -$                        -$                        -$                        -$                        
Chief Petty Officers -$                         -$                  -$                  -$                        -$                        -$                        -$                        -$                        
Junior Enlisted
Squadron HQ Basic
Officer -$                         -$                  -$                  -$                        -$                        -$                        -$                        -$                        
Chief Petty Officers -$                         -$                  -$                  94,644.00$             97,273.00$             99,902.00$             102,531.00$           102,531.00$           
Junior Enlisted -$                         -$                  -$                  630,960.00$           657,250.00$           657,250.00$           683,540.00$           683,540.00$           
Squadron HQ Adv
Officer -$                         -$                  -$                  -$                        -$                        -$                        -$                        -$                        
Chief Petty Officers -$                         -$                  -$                  -$                        -$                        -$                        -$                        -$                        
Junior Enlisted -$                         -$                  -$                  221,952.00$           231,200.00$           231,200.00$           240,448.00$           240,448.00$           
Total (Current $) -$                         -$                  -$                  56,309,596.00$      57,509,147.00$      58,602,811.00$      59,773,443.00$      60,864,478.00$      
Inflation (Then Year) -$                         -$                  -$                  60,951,317.63$      63,494,745.21$      65,996,283.41$      68,660,897.28$      71,312,436.62$      
PV (FY 2000) -$                         -$                  -$                  38,735,664.25$      36,028,623.63$      33,435,771.06$      31,058,703.01$      28,801,897.10$      
NPV 301,565,018.91$     
Cost Per Sqaudron 5,026,083.65$         
% of F/A-18C cost 52.0%
Funds Required for Training
 
UCAV Parametric Model Training Worksheet Example (Page 2). 
 
E. DESCRIPTION OF THE TRAINING WORKSHEET 
This section of the parametric model focused on the total training costs for the 
Officer, CPO and Enlisted and the O, I and Squadron Headquarters levels.  This cost 
worksheet was divided into three sections, the Training Cost of the individual, number of 
personnel that require training, and the funds required for training.   
The Training cost per individual was determined for all levels of maintenance at 
the Officer, CPO and E1-E6 by the equation:  
 
=Cost category of advanced or basic training*applicable number of weeks 
For example:  
 
Individual Cost = $2629.00 (cost of advanced training) * 50 weeks 
Each of the inputs for this equation came from the User Inputs worksheet in the 
Training Inputs section.   
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The number of personnel requiring training was calculated from inputs from the 
section of the worksheet that details FY Inputs section and is formatted by FY number 
and by corresponding program year number.  This section allows for the input of the 
number of squadrons standing up, the number of squadrons decommissioning, total 
number of squadrons, number of new systems, and total number of systems.  Each of 
these sections is input according to the FY and corresponding year in which the event 
took place.  After this information is placed into the worksheet, the Detachment, I-level 
and Squadron Headquarters costs for all categories of Officer, CPO and Enlisted are all 





In plain language:  
If the number of squadrons in the present year was less than the previous year or 
the Basic Training weeks equal zero, then the number of personnel requiring training was 
zero.  If not, then the systems per squadron was multiplied by the number of applicable 
personnel (O, CPO or E) and the number of squadrons standing up.  All this was added to 
the total of the attrition rate from the User Inputs page multiplied by the systems per 
squadron, the number of applicable personnel (O, CPO or E) and the number of 
squadrons for that year.   
The Funds Required for Training section of the Training worksheet was formatted 
the same as Figure (x) in this appendix.  Each of the cells for the categories were 
calculated by using the formula:  
 
Funds Required = Personnel requiring training * Cost of training for the category 
 
For Example:  
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Funds Required = 75 Officers * $131,450 (Basic Officer Training Cost) 
 
The Training costs were then totaled in the Totals section of the spreadsheet and 
then the Then Year Inflation, PV (FY2000), and a total NPV of the Training costs was 














UCAV Parametric Model RDT&E Worksheet Example. 
 
F. DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT TEST AND 
EVALUATION (RDTE) AND PRODUCTION WORKSHEET 
The RDTE and Production worksheet is divided into five sections labeled: FY 
Inputs, UAV Attrition Information, Production Line Open Costs, Ground Equipment 
Information, Development Costs, Production Costs, Total Development and Production 
Costs.    
The FY Inputs section is formatted by FY number and by corresponding program 
year number.  This section allows for the input of the number of squadrons standing up, 
the number of squadrons decommissioning, total number of squadrons, number of 
systems produced, number of new systems, total number of new systems, total number of 
Air Vehicles fielded.  Each of these sections is input according to the FY and 
corresponding year in which the event took place.   
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The purpose of the UAV/Attrition Information section is to show how many 
additional UAV’s need to be produced in the case of a contingency.  This section deals 
with the Pacific and Mediterranean theatres and the UAV attrition rate, the number of 
UAV’s operating in the theatre and the total number of attrition Air Vehicles.  This 
portion of the model was not used for the purposes of this study but can be used with a 
Crystal Ball analysis if needed.  Therefore the number of attrition Air Vehicles and total 
number of attrition AV’s produced was zeroed out.  
Production line open costs were assumed to be $25M over 10 years for the F/A-
18C model and the $10M over 10 years for the UCAV model.  The Ground Equipment 
information was not applicable to the F/A-18C model, but was in the UCAV model.  In 
the UCAV model the number of Ground Equipment produced was determined by an 
Excel “IF-THEN” equation that stated:  If the number of squadrons equals one, then the 
number of Ground Equipment produced was equal to zero.  If not, the number of 
squadrons standing up for that year was multiplied by the total number of systems per 
squadron as input in the User Inputs worksheet. 
Development Costs were imported directly from the User Inputs worksheet.  
Production Costs included the cost of the total number of AV’s produced, total cost of the 
Ground Control Equipment (UCAV model only) and the cost of test equipment 
installation.  For the purposes of this analysis it was assumed that the test equipment was 
already in place and did not have to be developed.   
The RDTE and Production costs were then totaled in the next section of the model 
and then their inflation, PV, Cumulative present day value with and without inflation, and 
Cumulative PV in FY2000 dollars were calculated over the entire 20 year life cycle of the 
program.  A copy of this section was made underneath and from that a total NPV of the 
RDTE and Production costs was completed and sent as an input to the Totals worksheet.     
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 F/A-18C Parametric Model O&M Worksheet Example. 
 
 
UCAV Parametric Model O&M Worksheet Example. 
 
G. DESCRIPTION OF MAINTENANCE WORKSHEET  
This worksheet was divided into two sections, the Per I-Level and the FY 
Summary blocks.  In column B of the I-level section the Work Unit Code Descriptions 
were given for all of the two-digit work unit codes of the Air Vehicle.  Column C took 
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the MTBF inputs from the User Inputs Component Inputs Section and applied them to 
this section.   
Column D was the failures per system, which was calculated by taking the AV 
Flight hours per year divided by the MTBF of the particular component (rounded to the 
nearest whole number).  Column E is λ which was calculated by using the data in 
Column C into the formula:  
λ = 1/MTBF 
 
The protection level in column F was from the User Inputs Page where the 
Protection level of each component is stated and relates to either a Critical or Non-
Critical Component.  Column G calculated the number of spares based on the formula:  
 
Total Spares = AV Hours*Spare Level Factor 
 
Where the AV Hours and the Spare Level Factor data came from the User Inputs 
section. 
The average number of failures in column H was calculated by taking the number 
of Systems per I-level, the failure rate, or λ and the total operating time and placing them 
into the formula:  
 
Spares Required:  µ = kλt  
 
where µ = average number of failures, k = number of systems, λ = 1/mean time between 
failure (MTBF) and t = total operating time.  The equation was solved for µ and then 
went to the Poisson table and solve for the number of spares by looking up the desired 
protection level under the column that contains the column with the µ value.   
The required spares were calculated in two methods, the first used a Normal 
distribution and the second used a Poisson distribution.  The Normal distribution used a 
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NORMINV Excel function, which takes the probability, which was the Critical or Non-
Critical percentage, multiplied by the mean or failures per hour and the standard 
deviation or square root of the failures per hour.  For example: 
  
Normal Distribution of Spares = NORMINV(.75 * 16.0 * √16.0) 
 
This equation then gave the number of required spares for the individual WUC.   
The Poisson distribution calculation of spares took the Critical or Non-Critical 
Protection level percentage and went to the Poisson Table Worksheet and looked 
vertically until it found the protection level percentage and the corresponding spare based 
on the percentage stated in the table.   
The Unit Cost was taken from the User Inputs page.  The Annual Maintenance 
Costs were calculated by taking the Failures per hour * the cost of each unit * percentage 
assumed that maintenance costs are of total unit cost.  For example:  
 
Annual Maintenance Costs = 16.00 * $8400 * 60% 
 
The 60 percent factor is taken from Blanchard’s book in chapter 2 where he 
describes the maintenance costs as being 60 percent of the unit cost.  Initial Purchase cost 
of the components was derived by the calculation:  
 
Initial Spares Purchase Cost = Poisson distribution of Spares * Unit Cost 
 
The second section of this worksheet was the Summary Blocks.  These blocks 
were labeled as seen in column B.  The first section of blocks from rows 31-38 described 
the year of the program, inputs for the number of squadrons standing up, 
decommissioning, and total number of squadrons as well as the new I-levels and total 
number of I-levels on-line.   Additionally, the number of new systems and total number 
of systems was calculated from the input information.   
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I-level Activation Cost was not applicable as the 14 I-levels already existed.  
Annual I-Level Operating Cost was calculated over the Life Cycle of the program (20 
years in the formula:  
 
Total Operating Cost = Annual I-Level Operating Cost * Number of I-levels online 
 
The Transportation Cost was calculated using an Excel “IF” statement that stated:  
 
If the number of I-levels < number of squadrons, then:  the number of 
shipments * total number of systems * transportation cost per shipment, if not then 
the number is equal to Zero 
 
Petroleum, Oil and Lubricant (POL) costs were calculated using the formula in 
the worksheet:  
 
=UAV’s per System*Total number of systems*POL Cost*AV Flight Hours/year 
 
The Initial Spare purchase total row was calculated by taking the number of new 
I-levels on line and multiplying that number by the Cost of spares per I-level.  If there 
were no new I-levels, then no initial purchase spares were needed.   
Maintenance Costs were totaled by taking the total number of I-levels online and 
multiplying it by the cost of maintenance per squadron total.   
The next rows of Total, Inflation, Present Value (PV) and Net Present Value 
(NPV) were calculated from the previously described rows to provide a NPV as seen in 
the example below for the Operations and Maintenance Worksheet that was transferred to 
the Total worksheet.   
 
Total (FY2000) -$                           -$                          -$                      -$                      1,005,164,481$    
Inflation (Then Year) -$                           -$                          -$                      -$                      1,109,782,807$    
PV (FY2000) -$                           -$                          -$                      -$                      629,720,569$       
NPV 6,471,646,106$       
Example of the Total, Inflation, PV and NPV Spreadsheet Rows. 
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Total FY00 FY01 FY02
Year  1 2 3
Manning 10,807,828,000$                                                  -$                                    -$                                   -$                                    
Training 623,812,189$                                                       -$                                    -$                                   -$                                    
RDTE & Producton 10,775,200,000$                                                  30,000,000$                    11,800,000$                  10,100,000$                    
Operations & Maintenance 39,034,412,090$                                                  -$                                    -$                                   -$                                    
Total (Then Year) 61,241,252,279$                                                  30,000,000$                    11,800,000$                  10,100,000$                    
Inflation adjusted (Then Year) 79,972,216,591$                                                  30,600,000$                    12,276,720$                  10,718,201$                    
PV (FY 2000) 20,778,717,833$                                                  27,321,429$                    9,786,926$                    7,629,004$                      
Cumulative PV (FY2000)  27,321,429$                    37,108,355$                  44,737,358$                    
Total Inflated 79,972,216,591$                                                  
Total PV 20,778,717,833$                                                  
Design to Unit Cost 15,460,745$                    
Systems Built 30
Production Cost 5,565,868,311.86$                                               
LCC to O&M Cost (LCC cost/squadron and u 692,623,928$                                                       57,718,661$                    
Systems Built 30
Total LCC $20,778,717,833
O&M Cost to Sqaudron (O&M cost/squadron $1,301,147,069.65
Systems Built 30
FA-18C Life Cycle Cost (LCC) Analysis:    Overall
Cj values
 
F/A-18C Parametric Model Total Worksheet Example. 
 
Total FY00 FY01 FY02
Year  1 2 3
Manning 12,406,644,000$                        -$                                   -$                                -$                                   
Training 704,906,782$                             -$                                   -$                                -$                                   
RDTE & Producton 6,097,574,000$                          53,871,000$                  50,189,000$               43,087,000$                  
Operations & Maintenance 21,431,082,597$                        -$                                   -$                                -$                                   
Total (Then Year) 40,640,207,379$                        53,871,000$                  50,189,000$               43,087,000$                  
Inflation adjusted (Then Year) 40,640,207,379$                        53,871,000$                  50,189,000$               43,087,000$                  
PV (FY 2000) 12,733,649,312$                        48,973,636$                  41,478,512$               32,371,901$                  
Cumulative PV (FY2000)  48,973,636$                  90,452,149$               122,824,050$                
Total Inflated 40,640,207,379$                        
Total PV 12,733,649,312$                        
Design to Unit Cost
Systems Built 60
Production Cost
Design to O&M Cost
Systems Built 60
Total LCC $12,733,649,312
UCAV Life Cycle Cost (LCC) Analysis:    Overall
 
48,383,327$                  
2,902,999,605.78$                     
212,227,489$                
 
UCAV Parametric Model Total Worksheet Example. 
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H. LIFE CYCLE COST OVERALL WORKSHEET DESCRIPTION 
The Overall worksheet is a summary of the Manning, Training, RDTE/Production 
and O&M worksheets in the parametric model.  This worksheet provides an executive 
snapshot of each worksheet category’s total LCC.   
The format of the worksheet the same format as the individual cost category 
worksheets.  The columns were labeled as Total, then by FY, and then by the Program 




Manning 12,406,644,000$                        -$                                   
Training 704,906,782$                             -$                                    
Example of Overall Column Layout. 
 
Each worksheet category row input was taken directly from the labeled worksheet 
as seen the example:  
 
Manning 12,406,644,000$                        -$                                   -$                                
Training 704,906,782$                             -$                                   -$                                
RDTE & Producton 6,097,574,000$                          53,871,000$                  50,189,000$               
Operations & Maintenance 21,431,082,597$                        -$                                   -$                                 
Example of Worksheet Category Rows. 
Once the information was compiled from the separate worksheets, the Then Year 
total for all the FY columns was derived.  The Inflation Rate was calculated for each 
column with the Excel formula:  
 
=Then Year Column Total*(1+InflateRate from User Inputs worksheet) Program Year 
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Once the inflation adjustment columns were calculated the Present Value (PV) for 
each FY column was calculated with the Excel formula:  
 
=Inflation Adjusted total/(1+Discount Rate + Inflation Rate) Program Year 
 
Once the PV columns were calculated, the Inflation Adjusted Row was added to 
the PV row and from that the Cumulative PV for FY2000 was determined.    
The Total Inflated Costs and the Total PV costs were calculated by totaling the 
Inflation Adjusted row and the PV (FY2000) row respectively.   
The final section of the Overall costs page is the comparison of the Design to Unit 
Cost and the Design to O&M cost.   These costs were calculated to demonstrate the NPV 
of the cost of RDTE and Production per Air Vehicle and the cost of Operations and 
Maintenance per Air Vehicle over the entire 20-year life cycle.  An example of the 
worksheet blocks is shown in the example below.   
 
Design to Unit Cost
Systems Built 30
Production Cost
Design to O&M Cost
Systems Built 30  
15,135,701$                 
5,448,852,473.31$         
57,393,617$                 
Example of the Design to Unit and Design to O&M cost blocks. 
 
The equations used to calculate these costs were simply:  
 




(LCC ÷ Systems Built) ÷ # of Aircraft per squadron 
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The final block of the Overall worksheet calculated the Total Life Cycle Cost of 
the Air Vehicle from the data that was sent from the individual cost area worksheets.  
This block was then transferred back to the User Inputs worksheet so that the user was 
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APPENDIX E.  SHIP COST MODEL 
A. INTRODUCTION  
This aspect of the analysis establishes the acquisition cost and 20-year life cycle 
cost for the SEA QUIVER logistics support ship.   
B. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
A pre-formulated spreadsheet model was used to determine the LCC of a SEA 
QUIVER performing peacetime operations.  The outputs from the model were intended 
for high-level cost estimation, and not to derive precise identification of system costs.  
These formulations are not intended for specific program cost justification, but to provide 
a rough order of magnitude during the concept development of a weapons system.   
The life cycle model does not account for costs associated with production runs 
throughout the existence of the program.  Additionally, RDT&E costs are included in the 
yearly operations costs rather than the acquisition cost.   
C. METHODOLOGY AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Baselines cost figures, of an AOE Supply class ship, were acquired from 
VAMOSC [VAMOSC, 2001] to use in the formulation of acquisition and total LCC for 
one SEA QUIVER.  The cost figures for the SEA QUIVER were also scaled to 50 
percent of the AOE class ship to reflect the smaller size of the conceptual logistic ship. 
Analogy estimation was employed to generate the SEA QUIVER cost data, taking 
the AOE system data and adjusting it to assimilate the intended parameters of the SEA 
QUIVER system.  
The computed net present value was multiplied by 10, the number of projected 
SEA QUIVERS in the fleet, to derive a total cost to support the aggregate CROSSBOW 
squadrons.    
Two theses were used in the formulation of the acquisition and annual O&M cost 
estimations.  The first thesis written by Kirk J. Loftus [Loftus, 2000] dealt with the 
estimation of the acquisition costs for conventional surface ships.  James M. Brandt 
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[Brandt, 2000] wrote the second thesis that was used in the formulation of annual O&M 
costs, for U.S. Navy (Non-Nuclear) ships. 
The Loftus thesis, dealing with estimation of acquisition costs, formulas were 
derived that calculated ship cost with respect to the variables of Ship Length (feet), 
Displacement (Light Tons or LT), Shaft Horsepower (SHP), and the number of engines.  
The thesis by James M. Brandt dealt with the estimation of O&M costs for a ship based 
on three inputs for analysis.  The O&M costs were estimated by using the Displacement 
(LT), manning or length of the ship (feet).  The AOE data was input into these two 
different models for acquisition and O&M costs in order to establish the baseline for 
comparison.   
Once established, the AOE baseline data was then scaled to reflect the notional 
characteristics of the SEA QUIVER.  To imitate similar characteristics of a SEA 
ARCHER, the length and SHP scaling was based on the notional SEA ARCHER 
configuration.  However, due fuel and stores requirements and maintenance space 
requirements, the volume of the SEA QUIVER had to be scaled larger than that of the 
SEA ARCHER.  Therefore, the resultant displacement was scaled to be 50 percent of an 
AOE-1 class ship and became 24,400 LT.  The scaled data for the SEA QUIVER was 
input into the costing equations to produce a resultant cost derivation.  Figure 1 
demonstrates the specific set up for the acquisition spreadsheet and figures 2 and 3 
represent the O&M formulations and the subsequent LCC calculations.   
O&M ship costs, generated from the spreadsheet, were compared to actual 
VAMOSC CAIG data for O&M costs of the AOE Supply class [VAMOSC, 2000].  The 
SEA QUIVER and the AOE were then compared in the three different categories, 
demonstrated in Figures 2 and 3, of displacement, manning and length O&M cost.   
Total LCC was obtained by the combination of the calculated O&M costs, 
Military Cost Handbook RDT&E data and VAMOSC training and manning cost 
information.  O&M costs were calculated from the average of the O&M cost estimations 
provide from the categories of Displacement, Manning and Ship length.  This average 
cost input became the input factor for the 20 year LCC estimation.   
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RDT&E costs were derived from cost data listed in the Military Cost Handbook, 
which was used as input into the spreadsheet model for overall LCC calculation.  
Because the SEA ARCHER and SEA QUIVER share similar technologies, SEA 
QUIVER RDT&E was set at 25 percent of the  SEA ARCHER RDT&E costs to account 
for shared technology development, economies of scale, and elimination of continuous 
launch and recovery operations.    
Training and Manning costs were estimated by using VAMOSC data to produce 
an average of VAMOSC FY 98-00 AOE-1 class manning and training costs.  These costs 
were calculated in then year dollars and inflated to then year costs at an inflation rate of 2 
percent.  The present value (PV) was calculated by using the formula:  
 
Total FY $/(1+(Inflation Rate% +Discount rate%)) Year number  
   
Following the PV calculation, the data was totaled to show the Net Present Value 
(NPV) LCC for one ship.  Cost areas are demonstrated at the end of this appendix.    
The average of this data was found to be $177K for training and $19M for 
manning.  Each was assumed to be static over the 20 years of the program.  The new ship 
force would be reduced from 667 personnel (AOE  manning) to 110 personnel on the 
SEA QUIVER.  Therefore, the manning and training percentages for the SEA QUIVER 
were then assumed to be 19 percent (110/667) of the AOE.  Although the manpower 
numbers did not change from the notional SEA ARCHER manning, the type rating areas 
for personnel was assumed to have changed in order to reflect a repair/replenishment 
mission vice a power projection platform.    
D. ANALYSIS  
It was determined that the SEA QUIVER had a LCC of 11 percent more than that 
of the AOE-1.  This overall increase was due to the 98 percent increase in RDT&E costs 
as a result of the implementation of new technologies in the ship design and systems.  
The cost can also be attributed to the increased repair capability of the SEA QUIVER 
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(IMA) with the commensurate repair equipment cost. There was, however an 86 percent 
reduction in manpower costs and a 46 percent reduction in O&M costs.   
Despite the reduction in manning requirements, training costs were found to 
remain at the same level of costs. This cost was reflective of the increased training in 
advanced maintenance and replenishment systems.   
Once the baseline cost scenario was established, the manpower data was modified 
to reflect a change in the maintenance concept for component repair on board SEA 
QUIVER.  It was assumed that DLRs would be routed from the Organizational  (e.g. 
squadron) level to Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) instead of being repaired at 
an I-level, on board SEA QUIVER.  Manpower was assumed to remain static at 110 
people for the SEA QUIVER.  However, the ratings of the personnel intended for the I-
level component would be changed to reflect personnel ratings for other support 
functions such as fuel/stores and medical assistance.    
E. CONCLUSIONS 
Life Cycle Costs of the SEA QUIVER totaled $839M for one ship and $8.4B for 
10 ships (two SEA QUIVER per CROSSBOW squadron). Compared to the AOE-1 class, 
LCC increased by $160M because of the 98 percent increase in RDT&E costs over the 
life cycle.  This increase was due to the advanced technological concepts introduced into 
the SEA QUIVER.  Despite the increase in LCC, SEA QUIVER reduced logistics delay 
time and refueling time with increased repair capability and pump speed capability 
resulting from the additional RDT&E outlays  
The reduction in O&M costs was significant with the reduction in ship 
displacement when compared to the AOE-1 class.  The size difference of the SEA 
QUIVER drove a decrease in the O&M costs.  This savings in the O&M cost category 
shifted to the RDT&E category in order to fund the technological advances.  
With the elimination of the I-level, manpower resources could be maintained, or 
reduced, to reflect the purely support provisioning and replenishment functions.   
The argument could be made that if the cost of the S EA QUIVER is 11 percent 
more than the cost of the AOE Supply class, then why not keep producing what we have?  
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The SEA QUIVER would provide stealth of the smaller ships profile, enhanced repair 
capability of the IMA,  increased refueling pump speed, reduced manning requirements, 
and ultimately, a vessel sustainable beyond normal ship life spans with PHM and CBM 
enabling a longer effective life span.       
 
 Acquisition Cost Model 
Ship Type Length Disp SHP(khp) Number Eng MV2 RSE Beam # Ships Cost Basis Total Cost ($)
Sea Quiver 513 10000 82 8 100 2
Formula($M) $505.14 $508.93 $886.34 $693.04 $751.43
($) $505,140,200.00 $508,930,000.00 $886,344,600.00 $693,040,000.00 $751,429,660.00 MV2 $1,502,859,320.00
Average $648,363,700.00
DDG-51 509 8300 100 4 59 49
Formula($M) $500.32 $448.92 $1,058.16 $346.52 $741.32
($) $500,318,600.00 $448,920,000.00 $1,058,160,000.00 $346,520,000.00 $741,317,681.36 MV2 $36,324,566,386.44
Average $588,479,650.00
CG 567 9600 80 4 55 27
Formula($M) $570.23 $494.81 $867.25 $346.52 $946.96
($) $570,231,800.00 $494,810,000.00 $867,254,000.00 $346,520,000.00 $946,957,418.18 MV2 $25,567,850,290.91
Average $569,703,950.00
CV 1062.5 80800 280 8 130 2
Formula($M) $1,167.51 $3,008.17 $2,776.31 $693.04 $2,540.35
($) $1,167,507,500.00 $3,008,170,000.00 $2,776,314,000.00 $693,040,000.00 $2,540,353,100.00 MV2 $5,080,706,200.00
Average $1,911,257,875.00
AOE 754 48800 100 4 107 4
Formula($M) $795.64 $1,878.57 $1,058.16 $346.52 $1,411.73
($) $795,641,600.00 $1,878,570,000.00 $1,058,160,000.00 $346,520,000.00 $1,411,732,314.02 No Eng $1,386,080,000.00
38495.28689
Average $1,019,722,900.00  
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 Annual LCC Model for AOE-1 c
Year
Ship Type Disp (LT) Manning LOA (ft) 1 2
AOE 48800 667 754
Annual O&S Cost (FY$98) $87,891,407.29 $37,434,043.23 $49,115,730.81
Standard Error E (L) $60,047,409.46 $28,318,853.71 $35,594,170.12
Standard Error (U) $115,735,405.11 $49,480,318.35 $67,774,796.94
1.0 Direct Unit Cost $54,853,027.29 $23,362,586.38 $30,653,127.60
+ or - $13,921,698.33 $5,929,424.42 $7,779,763.78
2.0 Direct Intermediate Maintenance Cost $887,703.21 $378,083.84 $496,068.88
+ or - $9,587.19 $4,083.31 $5,357.54
3.0 Direct Depot Maint Cost $29,461,199.72 $12,547,891.29 $16,463,592.97
+ or - $318,180.96 $135,517.23 $177,806.80
4.0 Indirect O&S Cost $2,680,687.92 $1,141,738.32 $1,498,029.79
+ or - $28,951.43 $12,330.77 $16,178.72
TOTAL $87,882,618.15 $37,430,299.83 $49,110,819.23
Average $58,141,245.74
Compared to VAMOSC 1996 average of: $20,000,000.00
Inflation Rate 0.02
Years of pgm 20
Discounted cost $59,142,482.69 $25,189,518.77 $33,050,173.49






Total Then Year $77,404,482.40 $77,404,482.40








 Annual LCC Model for Sea Qui
Year
Ship Type Disp (LT) Manning LOA (ft) 1 2
Sea Quiver 10000 110 513
Annual O&S Cost (FY$98) $32,999,166.33 $9,687,615.11 $26,522,486.76
Standard Error E (L) $22,545,030.44 $7,328,680.83 $19,220,846.15
Standard Error (U) $43,453,302.23 $12,805,089.66 $36,598,379.47
1.0 Direct Unit Cost $20,594,779.71 $6,046,040.59 $16,552,683.98
+ or - $5,226,955.09 $1,534,485.10 $4,201,071.20
2.0 Direct Intermediate Maintenance Cost $333,291.58 $97,844.91 $267,877.12
+ or - $3,599.55 $1,056.73 $2,893.07
3.0 Direct Depot Maint Cost $11,061,320.55 $3,247,288.59 $8,890,337.56
+ or - $119,462.26 $35,070.72 $96,015.65
4.0 Indirect O&S Cost $1,006,474.57 $295,472.26 $808,935.85
+ or - $10,869.93 $3,191.10 $8,736.51
TOTAL $32,995,866.42 $9,686,646.35 $26,519,834.51
Average $23,067,449.09
Compared to VAMOSC 1996 average of: $20,000,000.00
Inflation Rate 0.02
Years of pgm 20
Discounted cost $22,205,272.21 $6,518,835.31 $17,847,088.38






Total Then Year $94,773,922.60 $105,273,922.60




Reduc in O&S 60.3%
Increase in RDTE 98.4%
Increase in LCC 11.8%
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APPENDIX F.  MODULE PROCESS TIMES AND 
DISTRIBUTIONS 
Function/Sub-Function      Module  Process Time  Delay/Route Time 
 
a. Initialize Squadron   
  
 (Flight) Station 
  Chance .653, .347 
  Delay        23 
  Route         0 
b. Assign type failure   
  Chance .38, .34, .115, .06, .05, 
    .04, .01 
    else 
    .005 
   
c. O-Level Repair   
 
i.  Store aircraft until matching part is ready 
Route  Process_Delay_Time 
+(Supply_time_scaler* 
   Process_Delay_Time) 
 
ii.  Replace Part at Squadron 
(Squadron)  Adv Server   Process_time +   Process_Delay_Time 
(Maint_time_scaler      +(Supply_time_scaler* 
*Process_time)  Process_Delay_Time)  
 
iii.  Return aircraft to service after 23hr delay 
   Route      23  
 
d.  Route items for repair  
   Chance .5, .475, .025   
 
i.  Route to Squadron Shop 
   Route     Process_Delay_Time 
                 +(Supply_time_scaler* 
                   Process_Delay_Time) 
  
ii.  Route to IMA by part type   





Function/Sub-Function      Module  Process Time  Delay/Route Time 
 
iii.  Route offship for major repair 




e.  IMA Repair    
 
(IMA_Airframes)   Adv Server  AIMD_Process_time+  Process_Delay_Time 
(AIMD_Process_time*         +(Supply_time_scaler* 
Maint_time_scaler)  Process_Delay_Time) 
 
(IMA_CommNavIFF) Adv Server  same as above   same as above 
(IMA_RNAVWCS)    Adv Server same as above   same as above 
(IMA_Ordnance)        Adv Server same as above   same as above 
(IMA_Utility Sys)      Adv Server same as above   same as above 
(IMA_Power Plants)  Adv Server same as above   same as above 
(IMA_Instruments)    Adv Server same as above   same as above 
(IMA_GroundEqpt)   Adv Server same as above   same as above 
       
f.  Ship DLR     
 











Total Flight Hours CNAV_Spares GCE_GTE_Spares 
FMC_AC  Engine_Spares TOTAL_AC 
 INSTR_Spares CAD_Spares   Supply_time_scaler 
AF_Spares  UTIL_Spares  Maint_time_scaler 






APPENDIX G.  SIMULATION RUNS 
 
System Reliability Adjustment Data 























































































































































































   


























































































































































Total Flight Hours 



























































































































































































































































































































































































MAINTENANCE TIME ADJUSTMENT DATA 
 
 
.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50
Down Time 
9.09 9.61 8.06 4.71 4.73 3.70 0.49 4.40 .62 .77 .21
 
0.19 9.73 7.92 6.20 5.28 4.57 4.41 1.86 .29 .02 .73
 
6.44 2.90 4.44 0.00 7.20 7.45 0.77 .46 1.37 .62 .72
 
0.87 3.01 5.26 4.49 3.37 0.31 0.71 3.18 .95 .78 .01
 
4.68 2.17 3.07 9.22 3.62 7.28 .48 2.52 .73 .05 .58
 
8.97 3.90 2.82 0.20 0.45 .43 .04 .55 .09 .92 .47
 
4.45 8.49 3.11 4.06 9.78 6.76 9.45 6.69 4.36 .96 .01
 
9.03 9.68 2.43 9.03 3.56 3.77 2.07 .34 .86 .56 .20
 
2.81 5.46 8.03 2.73 7.08 0.74 .41 .28 .10 .40 .65
 
4.15 3.92 8.68 1.34 8.37 1.74 .81 .58 .71 .69 .55
Down Time 
(Sum) 30.68 18.86 93.82 71.99 63.44 35.74 10.63 01.87 0.08 1.79 5.13
Down Time 
(Avg) 3.07 1.89 9.38 7.20 6.34 3.57 1.06 0.19 .01 .18 .51
 
Total Flight 
Hours 67.39 96.54 024.30 059.10 061.10 084.10 108.00 063.20 159.40 165.00 157.80
 
82.78 99.10 019.60 011.10 054.10 046.00 059.30 089.70 129.70 139.60 140.60
 
17.16 010.00 60.05 031.40 039.10 040.40 115.60 143.90 105.60 143.20 174.10
 
83.42 90.36 047.70 076.20 073.30 090.60 082.50 083.60 143.00 161.80 153.00
 
036.60 028.40 020.90 031.40 076.90 076.90 136.80 129.40 101.20 174.70 175.60
 
56.93 093.00 108.90 134.70 144.00 150.50 157.40 178.10 216.90 213.60 219.20
 
015.10 24.58 66.13 59.38 23.18 57.33 03.07 53.92 89.00 070.40 108.80
 
064.10 89.76 71.81 002.00 068.40 075.40 102.80 169.90 145.80 156.20 178.20
 
012.70 72.67 033.70 095.90 042.30 120.50 118.00 170.50 128.20 182.40 208.60
 
012.90 58.31 000.90 67.42 001.50 074.50 118.60 136.30 119.60 144.30 121.30
Total Flight Hours 
(Sum) 749.08 862.72 0053.99 0268.60 0383.88 0716.23 0902.07 1118.52 1238.40 1551.20 1637.20
Total Flight Hours 
(Avg/100) .75 .86 0.05 0.27 0.38 0.72 0.90 1.12 1.24 1.55 1.64
 
Total Failures 
35.26 24.62 33.76 53.02 42.89 65.58 64.84 53.95 85.95 89.30 79.38
 
56.68 48.47 40.96 40.54 64.27 54.93 55.31 64.30 89.54 86.54 85.83
 
80.60 61.07 35.83 67.70 64.27 62.07 00.76 10.00 84.91 09.30 20.07
 
43.89 40.65 59.97 64.91 69.88 64.37 69.06 61.35 86.03 97.24 01.55
 
11.34 35.24 35.18 40.38 58.08 56.56 80.04 77.92 68.38 97.06 93.87
 
41.68 63.53 84.53 75.52 80.59 95.09 85.15 97.91 01.13 04.10 11.63
 
88.58 02.53 21.48 10.04 06.04 54.44 24.30 44.39 60.54 87.10 00.39
 
40.07 58.39 56.34 62.58 88.86 79.45 91.98 25.41 10.16 20.30 25.86
 
29.70 23.01 45.25 68.74 33.58 77.50 81.30 99.42 89.69 99.26 09.98
 
46.18 53.48 58.83 55.03 63.86 79.72 12.41 16.94 08.81 14.01 06.46
Total Failures 
(Sum) 273.98 410.99 472.13 538.46 572.32 689.71 765.15 851.59 885.14 004.21 035.02
Total Failures 
 155
(Avg/100) .27 .41 .47 .54 .57 .69 .77 .85 .89 .00 .04
 
Op Avail 
3.44 8.47 9.53 1.96 2.24 3.36 7.59 3.08 1.86 3.58 3.34
 
5.86 7.21 8.86 0.95 1.73 2.47 3.20 5.89 0.40 1.48 0.97
 
8.74 4.03 3.69 6.61 9.78 9.55 5.40 7.42 5.86 9.50 2.03
 
6.01 4.83 1.49 2.60 2.77 7.31 6.32 3.07 1.16 9.89 0.55
 
8.83 3.79 4.93 8.41 3.41 0.30 8.17 5.12 8.87 3.09 2.08
 
3.28 3.29 3.40 7.49 7.19 8.35 3.51 4.02 7.10 6.52 8.00
 
6.88 0.12 4.27 4.09 9.30 9.65 7.88 0.00 2.53 7.14 8.80
 
8.19 6.38 2.80 7.37 2.58 2.78 4.51 1.09 0.47 0.79 4.04
 
5.70 2.91 9.85 4.36 1.12 6.52 8.89 1.59 8.11 2.95 5.00
 
8.82 2.54 7.84 5.31 8.23 5.30 6.90 9.63 9.48 2.10 1.07
Op Avail (Sum) 
45.75 53.56 76.65 99.14 08.35 35.59 62.37 70.90 95.83 17.03 25.88
Op Avail 




































.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50
Down Time 
9.09 0.63 8.19 1.20 4.95 2.19 .40 .42 .42 .47 .89
 
0.19 4.74 8.92 0.18 5.31 2.89 .47 .38 .68 .30 .05
 
6.44 8.93 8.60 3.53 2.18 4.57 .32 1.46 .24 .62 .35
 
0.87 0.80 1.49 6.64 3.22 0.61 0.75 .77 .76 .41 .29
 
4.68 9.55 1.07 9.57 4.68 1.40 .57 .96 .16 .69 .92
 
8.97 3.03 4.41 8.84 .31 0.28 .07 .84 .54 .04 .07
 
4.45 7.98 7.08 1.40 2.51 3.54 5.47 .71 .34 .89 .24
 
9.03 1.53 8.43 6.56 3.11 4.11 .07 .22 .84 .50 .37
 
2.81 3.89 9.04 0.40 0.27 .86 .54 .62 .68 .94 .40
 
4.15 2.50 9.21 8.23 5.57 5.52 .12 .56 .64 .25 .66
Down Time 
(Sum) 30.68 13.58 96.44 86.54 39.10 22.98 0.78 6.92 3.30 4.10 3.25
Down Time 
(Avg) 3.07 1.36 9.64 8.65 3.91 2.30 .08 .69 .33 .41 .32
 
Total Flight 
Hours 67.39 88.52 013.20 103.90 065.40 082.90 108.70 148.30 146.80 164.50 175.80
 
82.78 49.39 004.80 72.44 042.20 068.80 088.80 120.70 155.80 155.70 182.40
 
17.16 036.60 016.50 029.00 101.80 081.30 137.20 088.50 157.10 166.20 198.80
 
83.42 90.15 94.92 054.50 081.30 098.10 102.20 145.40 163.90 182.20 191.10
 
036.60 027.90 88.14 053.10 044.10 095.90 173.10 133.80 174.40 185.70 209.40
 
56.93 090.60 075.80 158.00 172.20 130.80 202.10 182.30 224.00 218.40 223.40
 
015.10 44.50 61.81 12.47 93.10 011.50 72.44 092.90 095.60 179.50 204.90
 
064.10 001.70 022.90 048.20 081.50 050.90 127.10 170.80 144.40 192.90 194.50
 
012.70 79.48 006.60 109.50 100.70 130.30 109.20 133.60 151.30 183.30 217.80
 








.75 .88 .99 0.54 0.60 0.78 1.14 1.35 1.55 1.79 1.98
 
Total 
Failures 35.26 21.61 34.38 70.75 50.56 60.69 69.90 75.98 70.00 81.07 94.97
 
56.68 29.91 38.59 28.83 50.44 61.61 71.91 83.69 96.64 95.71 03.80
 
80.60 70.07 51.28 58.39 87.45 83.15 01.16 81.42 08.91 10.87 29.87
 
43.89 41.40 39.28 55.30 73.51 78.82 79.78 87.90 00.00 18.10 18.81
 
11.34 39.98 22.16 47.42 37.94 59.72 92.66 77.25 83.34 01.37 18.03
 
41.68 54.93 47.86 80.72 85.06 80.11 07.48 00.04 07.06 09.55 09.09
 
88.58 21.95 16.76 34.40 26.59 58.60 49.35 92.53 88.85 28.91 49.17
 
40.07 54.71 61.04 74.22 95.44 82.40 06.69 15.30 14.64 32.58 24.96
 
29.70 22.84 37.69 78.16 63.53 81.90 75.55 88.62 89.91 03.38 08.48
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3.10 3.65 3.65 4.35 4.56 4.87 5.44 5.70 5.90 6.41 6.74
 
Op Avail 
3.44 6.74 9.45 5.18 2.78 5.43 8.49 0.61 1.08 3.07 4.44
 
5.86 3.39 8.65 7.55 1.91 4.66 8.09 0.30 2.52 2.52 4.57
 
8.74 6.99 8.53 7.64 4.94 1.85 7.88 5.64 1.53 3.70 6.63
 
6.01 7.00 5.97 9.88 3.67 6.66 6.41 9.72 1.24 5.10 4.03
 
8.83 7.73 5.84 8.06 2.98 6.00 0.23 8.64 0.82 3.56 4.59
 
3.28 3.90 2.41 0.30 1.03 7.26 5.89 4.90 7.87 7.26 7.23
 
6.88 0.06 0.79 5.19 4.93 3.64 1.57 8.53 9.17 3.23 6.61
 
8.19 5.27 8.09 0.18 3.08 2.55 7.88 1.50 0.53 4.97 5.22
 
5.70 5.44 8.59 6.67 6.69 8.54 7.73 8.53 0.26 3.35 5.48
 
8.82 4.14 7.41 8.16 1.01 0.57 0.25 0.85 1.89 2.65 4.84
Op Avail 
(Sum) 45.75 60.64 75.74 08.81 33.01 47.16 84.42 99.21 16.91 39.41 53.64
Op Avail 





























PROCESS DELAY ADJUSTMENT DATA 
 
 
.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50
Down Time 
9.09 2.04 7.72 0.21 9.94 1.30 7.46 8.84 1.83 2.75 6.98
 
0.19 8.23 1.83 8.47 6.72 0.67 1.92 5.10 2.55 2.83 9.13
 
6.44 0.06 2.06 6.14 7.98 7.50 4.56 0.08 2.63 9.99 0.48
 
0.87 2.02 7.50 1.28 9.89 9.36 9.10 5.89 5.48 4.66 3.71
 
4.68 5.49 4.84 8.12 9.79 1.02 1.78 3.35 2.75 2.39 4.14
 
8.97 5.73 4.86 7.58 4.10 5.19 5.35 6.38 6.41 5.77 2.10
 
4.45 0.74 6.12 1.92 9.18 6.97 7.69 8.71 0.93 6.49
 
9.03 3.34 6.69 6.03 1.89 8.75 3.51 3.93 3.25 3.46 3.71
 
2.81 2.34 8.27 2.65 1.04 6.89 2.91 6.47 8.22 5.33 3.63
 
4.15 5.92 8.53 9.68 0.70 0.42 2.23 9.05 4.68 7.35 1.04
Down Time 
(Sum) 30.68 35.91 37.94 36.27 23.97 10.26 25.79 16.78 16.49 35.46 31.41
Down Time 
(Avg/10) .31 .36 .38 .36 .24 .10 .26 .17 .16 .35 .31
 
Total Flight 
Hours 67.39 97.48 49.37 044.70 007.50 59.13 56.56 019.70 78.92 74.44 29.79
 
82.78 29.85 74.46 98.61 49.64 13.74 89.59 67.20 65.79 50.93 003.90
 
17.16 033.20 011.10 49.80 034.20 048.20 61.81 039.50 85.74 007.90 90.13
 
83.42 95.40 029.00 96.66 007.50 019.40 019.50 87.55 043.70 85.49 86.44
 
036.60 86.02 84.28 46.29 005.50 011.90 003.70 77.08 013.50 84.92 86.66
 
56.93 034.90 068.10 043.50 075.10 065.90 040.50 048.60 041.40 068.70 122.90
 
015.10 10.40 84.80 81.76 96.30 25.55 35.13 54.84 38.50 32.20 33.80
 
064.10 83.89 42.71 32.54 86.98 004.80 92.82 50.32 66.03 58.16 70.19
 
012.70 84.91 023.90 72.78 37.31 014.70 70.04 020.60 020.90 50.46 81.70
 
012.90 43.56 52.57 94.59 86.02 005.00 87.64 001.60 37.74 12.20 00.99
Total Flight 
Hours (Sum) 749.08 699.61 720.29 661.23 786.05 868.32 757.29 866.99 792.22 625.40 706.50
Total Flight 
Hours (Avg/100) .75 .70 .72 .66 .79 .87 .76 .87 .79 .63 .71
 
Total Failures 
35.26 32.72 10.97 34.09 36.07 10.08 05.28 33.17 20.90 15.40 99.83
 
56.68 12.01 34.94 40.57 25.12 14.13 35.39 33.76 27.86 29.04 48.38
 
80.60 63.60 55.40 47.77 70.93 62.15 42.97 69.00 47.48 58.23 51.46
 
43.89 37.83 51.83 44.19 43.39 47.13 46.04 37.16 55.75 36.80 37.61
 
11.34 21.07 19.75 12.38 35.06 36.35 30.97 20.40 32.17 22.80 26.19
 
41.68 40.34 55.38 46.17 59.69 55.76 35.99 46.83 34.44 52.20 81.58
 
88.58 98.96 89.53 85.77 90.84 98.65 01.24 06.65 02.87 01.55 06.48
 
40.07 53.94 42.58 35.62 56.98 55.04 53.30 37.64 50.49 42.82 48.37
 
29.70 27.93 50.57 28.81 14.36 42.12 30.57 47.52 50.54 27.13 27.70
 
46.18 36.31 46.30 64.56 63.14 65.12 57.11 62.68 47.93 37.86 26.40
Total Failures 




(Avg/100)  .27 .32 .36 .34 .40 .39 .34 .39 .37 .32 .35
 
Op Avail 
3.44 5.77 1.71 7.38 7.84 7.06 2.96 9.01 6.29 6.08 2.72
 
5.86 1.34 5.99 9.12 1.35 9.30 5.98 2.55 5.12 5.27 8.04
 
8.74 6.55 5.09 1.33 7.95 8.74 2.59 5.72 4.58 6.33 6.52
 
6.01 6.11 9.74 5.04 7.76 8.40 8.02 2.84 9.23 4.01 4.30
 
8.83 3.28 3.03 1.18 5.67 6.09 6.19 3.82 4.88 4.15 4.47
 
3.28 2.12 2.59 0.27 2.80 2.50 2.61 1.16 1.58 1.89 4.17
 
6.88 8.29 5.33 5.13 7.57 9.63 1.74 1.28 9.89 8.37 1.80
 
8.19 3.85 0.11 0.83 4.86 8.07 4.01 2.22 3.31 3.01 2.97
 
5.70 6.32 9.01 6.10 9.63 0.75 5.33 1.13 9.06 3.12 5.58
 
8.82 1.98 9.74 6.79 5.31 5.92 4.42 6.94 2.24 0.21 7.64
Op Avail (Sum) 
45.75 45.59 42.35 43.15 50.72 66.46 53.85 56.64 56.17 42.42 48.20
Op Avail 
(Avg/10) .46 .46 .42 .43 .51 .66 .54 .57 .56 .42 .48
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APPENDIX H.  RELIABILITY CALCULATIONS 




INCREASE IN RELIABILITY OF ALL SYSTEM COMPONENTS 
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